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Abstract 
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by 
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This thesis focuses on scientists and technologies brought together around the desire to 
improve fallible human memory.  Based on extended ethnographic fieldwork, it considers 
interdisciplinary collaborations among experts who design recording and archiving 
technologies that seek to maintain, extend, and commemorate life.  How are everyday 
experiences translated as information, and for what purpose?  How are our habits of 
drinking tea, talking on the phone, driving to work, and reminiscing with old photographs, 
turned into something that can be stored, analyzed and acted upon?  How might 
information be used in real time to supplement the living in a recursive feedback loop?  
By addressing these questions, I reveal how these memory banks are inherently tied to 
logics of capital, of stock and storage, and to logics of the technological where, when it 
comes to memory, more is more.   
 The first sections that make up this dissertation shift in scale from the micro to the 
macro: from historical national endeavors that turned ordinary citizens into a sensors and 
collectors of the mundane, to contemporary computational projects designed to store, 
organize and retrieve vast amounts of information. The second half of this dissertation 
focuses on two extreme cases of lifelogging that make use of prototypical recording 
technologies: Gordon Bell, who is on a quest to record his life for the sake of increased 
 objectivity, productivity, and digital posterity, and Mrs. B, a woman who suffers from 
amnesia and records her life in the hopes of leading a normal life in which she can share 
the past with loved ones. Through these case studies, I show how new recording 
technologies are both a symptom of, and a cure for, anxieties about time.   
 By focusing on the design of new objects and by addressing contemporary 
debates on the intentions that govern the making of recording machines, I examine how 
technologies take shape, and how they inform understandings of memory and the self as 
well as notions of human disability and enhancement.  In short, I show that the past, as 
well as the present and the future, are always discursively, practically, and 
technologically informed.   
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Remembering or forgetting is doing gardener's work, selecting, pruning.  Memories are 
like plants: there are those that need to be quickly eliminated in order to help the others 
burgeon, transform, flower. - Marc Augé 
  
1 
1 
Introduction: Cosmopolitical Networks 
 
This introductory and methodological chapter presents the topics at hand, and the 
technologies and scientists who are brought together around the notion of memory. It 
considers the nature of interdisciplinary collaboration between experts brought together 
around common problems and "boundary objects," and points to the different ways 
interests converge and diverge in the elaboration of new forms of knowledge and in the 
creation of new technological objects. 
 
Memory Machines: 
 
Today we gained an hour.  We must have paid for it with the daylight we diligently saved 
last summer.  It seems appropriate that we would "spring forward" in spring, not merely 
because of the redundant words but also because of the prelude that spring implies.  After 
all, why not impatiently jump toward all that is already coming?  Conversely, "falling 
back" into a pile of dead leaves and resting under a blanket of cool night that comes over 
us an hour earlier also feels right.1  What if we were to indulge in two hours instead of 
one?  What if we decided to keep spending rather than annually saving and buying the 
same amount of time?  Could we get a credit on time?  What would be time's return on 
investment?  Should we have a savings plan for when old age forces us to retire from 
time? 
 
                                                
1 Suggested at the end of the eighteenth century and formally adopted during World War I in Europe and 
the United States, the practice of shifting clocks an hour forward in the summer is meant to increase the 
number of waking and working hours spent in daylight rather than sleeping the day away (Prerau 2005). 
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 Microsoft, the public multinational computing corporation, is developing 
technologies to help us do just that: save time, manage time, and share time, where time 
takes the shape of digital memories.  By accumulating innumerable data about how we 
spend our time, Microsoft researchers hope to assist us in spending it more wisely in the 
future.  In short, their prototypes specialize in stockpiling information about our past for 
future use.  At Microsoft Research in California, a database system called MyLifeBits is 
currently being designed to house and manage all the material that can be digitized over 
one's lifetime, such as texts, photos, sounds, webpages, notes, pulse rates, temperature, 
and GPS (Global Positioning System) readings (Bell and Gemmell 2009; Gemmell et al. 
2006).  Microsoft claims that with this technology "users will eventually be able to keep 
every document they read, every picture they view, all the audio they hear, and a good 
portion of what they see," allowing fragments of memory to be retraced and indexed in a 
personalized presentation.2  In Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell's book-length manifesto 
titled Total Recall, Bell, senior researcher at Microsoft laments and predicts:  
each day that passes I forget more and remember less. [...] Yes, each day 
I'm losing a little bit more of my mind. [...] What if you could overcome 
this fate? [...] Soon, you will be able to. You will have the capacity for 
Total Recall. You will be able to summon up everything you have ever 
seen, heard, or done. And you will be in total control (Bell and Gemmell 
2009: 3). 
 
To capture what the user sees, as well as environmental cues, Microsoft Research in 
Cambridge, United Kingdom, has designed the SenseCam: a wearable camera (typically 
worn around the neck) equipped with infra-red light, temperature, and accelerometer 
sensors, about the size of a pack of cigarettes.  Preprogrammed, and relying on the 
sensors, the wearable device determines when to take a picture and record information 
                                                
2 April 10, 2005, http://research.microsoft.com/barc/mediapresence/MyLifeBits.aspx. 
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(Hodges et al. 2006).  This new technology promises not only to extend human memories 
– here seen as images – but also to enhance them by recording bodily and environmental 
cues and activities not even perceived by humans, such as one's pulse, eating habits, and 
GPS coordinates. 
 
 Critical of the ambition to indiscriminately record too much information, other 
scientists who are part of a project called Memoir at the University of Sheffield design 
tools to help reduce the complexity of recorded information.  They have been steadily 
developing the ChittyChatty, a prototypical "prosthetic memory" device that allows for 
the annotation of recorded speech with written notes.  Their work looks at how the device 
operates in conjunction with test users' "organic memory" (Kalnikaite and Whittaker 
2007). 
 
 Microsoft's research with the SenseCam as well as the University of Sheffield's 
Memoir project take place in the larger context of a United Kingdom national initiative 
where various disciplines are brought together to collaborate on a "grand challenge" 
referred to as "Memories for Life." 3  Commissioned by the United Kingdom Computing 
Research Committee (UKCRC), this challenge brings together different scientists to 
address the problem of storing information about the past.  Memories for Life defines 
itself as "a cluster of research projects" focused on the need to understand human 
memory and to "augment it with technological support" in a seamless interaction between 
humans and machines (O’Hara, et al. 2006: 361).  The network is an assemblage of 
psychologists, neuroscientists, mathematicians, engineers, and computer scientists from 
                                                
3 November 10, 2006, http://www.memoriesforlife.org 
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institutions such as the Oxford Internet Institute, the British Library, Microsoft Research 
in Cambridge, Dublin City University, and the University of Sheffield.4  The opening 
page on the Memories for Life website asserts that "[w]e are our memories. Our 
memories underpin every thought we have, every fact we learn and every skill we 
acquire."  Starting with the assumption that memory and temporality are the fabric from 
which both individuals and societies are cut, researchers seek to redress the fallible nature 
of human memory.  Whether through the use of wearable cameras and sensors or the 
creation of timelines and lifelines, Memories for Life scientists seek to create more robust 
pneumatic textures that will serve as the custodians of our life's memories.   
 
 To the question that is undoubtedly raised sooner or later: Why the UK?  I can 
only reply that I happened to come across this group of researchers when I began 
wondering about the archive fever I felt around me in Canada, and in the US.  I am not a 
specialist in UK history or culture, nor is the UK, per se, the topic of this dissertation, but 
I can venture to say that although all societies, in some form or another, pay attention to 
and shape their relation to their past, the UK, and especially Britain, continues to stand 
out.  From the safeguard of its national museums and libraries, to extensive collected oral 
histories of its ordinary citizens, to the development of DNA banks, to the ways in which 
it literally watches over its population, Britain has persistently worked to preserve its 
past; not just its glorious past as a powerful player on the international and colonial stage, 
but also the heterogeneous pasts of its workers, and of those elsewhere whom they saw 
                                                
4 These institutions and companies are just a few of the many invested in preserving the past. In the fall 
2012, Facebook added a new feature to its site called Timeline that lets users select key posts, photos, and 
comments to bring to the fore in a personalized presentation, "collect[ing] all your best moments in a single 
place" (Lessin 2011). 
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disappearing as a result of their quest to civilize.  Many of the scientists involved in the 
UK nationally funded Memories for Life initiative also work with interlocutors in the US, 
at Microsoft in the Bay Area and at MIT for example.  While this UK initiative serves as 
the basis for this investigation, it is rooted in worldwide technological advances, many of 
which are the results of collaborations between American and British researchers in the 
fields of mathematics and computing during World War II.  Over 18 months of 
ethnographic fieldwork, the various projects within the Memories for Life initiative have 
provided arenas through which memory could be examined both as a negotiated concept 
and as a working design.  Throughout this dissertation I elaborate on some distinctly 
British historical documentary endeavors, as well as on different contemporary projects 
(some of which involve American researchers) that form the Memories for Life initiative, 
which I have only gestured at here.  It is possible, even likely, that the researchers 
involved in the projects addressed herein have experienced what anthropologist George 
Marcus refers to as "the documentary impulse," which he pairs with a general atmosphere 
of "hyperawareness of great changes at work in the world" (1993: 2).  In Public Culture: 
Globalization, Andreas Huyssen portrays memory as a primary concern in the western 
world (2001: 57).  He associates modernity with the notion of "'self-musealization' by 
video recorder [...] confessional literature; [and] the rise of autobiography [...] with its 
uneasy negotiation between fact and fiction."  Accordingly, he wonders whether we are 
witnessing "an archivist’s fantasy gone mad" (2001: 61).  Has the West become culturally 
obsessed with notions of the eternal, of memory and of forgetting?  
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 With devices such as Microsoft's MyLifeBits and SenseCam, individuals are 
thought to achieve comprehensive memories that lead to greater self-understanding and, 
ultimately, to greater self-management, that imperative of neoliberal times (Rose 2007).  
Recording technologies are ubiquitous and a growing number of individuals express 
anxiety when separated from their cameras, blogs, Facebook profiles and voice recorders, 
devices that grant them the capacity to capture, to document, and to publish online.  
Hewlett Packard advertisements entice us to create and to share our memories.  As their 
slogan says: "document your life… now!  Anything is possible!"  Flickr hosts a group 
called "a day in the life of …" where users post and share pictures that document their life 
on a specific day.  Since 2004, scientists have gathered at a yearly event cleverly entitled 
CARPE, a symposium centered on the "Capture, Archival and Retrieval of Personal 
Experiences," where they discuss digital computer systems and wearable sensors that are 
currently being developed with the hope that they will expand and supplement the limits 
of biological human memory.5  In today's context of ever expanding digital space, 
deleting becomes an almost obsolete act and archival technologies are created in order to 
manage the saturation of recorded information.  
 
 Collectively, the objective is to make an encyclopedia of the everyday, a catalog 
of the mundane, perfunctory, even banal moments, which seen in a different light, or a 
different moment, may yield the fruits of well-being and progress.  Yet this utopian 
enterprise is based on two assumptions: that memories are something to be captured, 
                                                
5 The last couple of years have seen a plethora of recording technologies made public and marketed as 
memory tools. An example is the new Memoto camera: "A tiny, automatic camera and app that gives you a 
searchable and shareable photographic memory."  Jan. 10. 2013, http://memoto.com 
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stored, and shared; and that one can build useful tools based on specific conceptions of 
memories and selves.  As Memories for Life scientists state in their "Road Map," "lives 
are defined by time" (2008: 3).  These scientists perceive memories to be the fount of 
social and cultural identities, but this fount or wellspring can go dry or, worse, get 
contaminated with fictions.  In a review of their initiative, Memories for Life scientists 
claim that digital memories can help create the basis for social and political identity 
formation.  They point to the "ability of individuals to construct narratives of their past 
out of diverse materials" while drawing on technology's power "to avoid mythmaking" 
(O’Hara et al. 2006: 357).  The goal is, then, to create reservoirs, standing reserves of 
memories that can mitigate their unreliable tendencies.  Along the way, experiences are 
made to matter, they are made material, and in storing them, they are made valuable. 
 
 In a response to emergent technologies for remembering, Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger, researcher of public policy at the National University of Singapore and at 
Harvard, published a book called Delete, in which he outlines what he calls "the virtue of 
forgetting in the digital age" (2009: 130).  He warns that digital technologies such as 
those designed by Memories for Life scientists may create a world that doesn't allow us 
to forget.  This entrapment in our past and distrust in our own memories, he claims, might 
create "a future that is forever unforgiving because it is unforgetting" (5).  He points out 
that Google, with its stored thirty billion search queries a month, which can be traced 
back to specific IP (Internet Protocol) addresses, "knows more about us than we can 
remember ourselves" (7).  And that "as more and more information is added to digital 
memory, digital remembering confuses human decision-making by overloading us with 
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information we are better off to have forgotten" (164).  To counter the problem of too 
much information, he proposes means to increase technological forgetting, such as 
expiration dates on digital documents.  
 
 Mayer-Schönberger raises important questions as to whether the plethora of 
information created by such technologies actually helps improve our human condition.  
But in doing so, he reifies the binaries of remembering and forgetting while neglecting 
the ways in which these concepts are drawn upon in the first place.  Although I am 
tempted - like Mayer-Schonberger - to dwell on whether these new technologies actually 
help improve our human condition, and I long to bring up Plato's Pheadrus and his 
warning against the conflation of writing and memory, or Borges' Funes the Memorious 
who, because of his infallible memory is plagued with the impossibility of generalizing 
and therefore acting in the world, I first wish to complicate this very notion of memory 
that fuels the kind of technological work I've examined. 6 I wish to navigate between 
extreme imaginaries of utopianist futures where a perfect memory allows for greater 
sociality, better health, safer living, and of a paranoid panopticon where our most private 
thoughts are constantly monitored, regulated and never forgotten. 
 
 Indeed, remembering and forgetting are the constitutive limits of one another.  
Forgetting defines remembering by its very negation (Augé 2004).  However, 
philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers, in dialogue with sociologist of science Bruno 
Latour, proposes ways of examining scientific practices by calling into question dualistic 
concepts such as the ones these memory practices depend on (Latour 2005; Stengers 
                                                
6 I will indulge in some of these critiques, or odes to forgetting, in the following chapters. 
  
9 
9 
2005b).  In her "Cosmopolitical Proposal," she calls for the co-existence of converging 
and opposing discourses rather than the settlement of either/or dichotomies. Stengers 
argues that in order to address the contemporary world, one must not look to sort things 
based on existing concepts and theories (such as memory and forgetting), but rather to let 
things provoke thoughts and contingent formulations of them.7  For instance, how might 
we think beyond the given human need and interest in perfect memory that often acts as 
the starting point for the invention of these devices?  How might these emergent memory 
machines be turned into a cause for considering the practices around which they are 
built?  How, then, might the production of memory tools operate "in a mode that gives 
the issue around which they are gathered the power to activate thinking, a thinking that 
belongs to no one, in which no one is right" (Stengers 2005b: 1001)?  Following 
Stengers' 'cosmopolitical proposal,' I wonder if it is possible to frame my study in a way 
that might not imply the either/or dichotomies of remembering and forgetting, or of 
remembering accurately, versus in that fuzzy, faulty, dreamlike way we remember before 
being faced with the task of recording every moment of our waking lives.  How do these 
prototypical recording machines bring with them the obligation to rethink the divide that 
their makers draw between the fantasy of total recall and the fear of complete amnesia?  
In other words, as sites of contention and convergence, how might the design of new 
recording technologies offer possibilities for recoding experiences of remembering that 
are not "besieged by dramatic either/or alternatives that slice up our imaginations" 
                                                
7 Stengers refers to "cosmopolitics" as that which is concerned with the particularities of an event or 
situation such that the problems at hand are what oblige researchers to think and theorize.  Moreover, 
cosmopolitics implies that researchers are "required to construct and present what they know in a mode that 
makes them 'politically active,' engaged in the experimentation of the difference that what they know can 
make in the formulation of the issue and its envisaged solutions" (2005b: 998).  In her constructivist 
approach to studying science, Stengers seeks not to address science’s claims per se but rather to examine 
how truth is made through practice. She focuses on how claims are produced and processed and on how 
objects are made to have lives, actions, and consequences of their own. 
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(1002)?  Were we to think with Stengers and follow a cosmopolitical approach, rather 
than characterizing wearable cameras and archival software with well-established 
neurological or mechanical conceptions of memory and forgetting, the stage would be set 
for a productive amnesia or suspension of memory as we know it.  In other words, in 
their encounter with the world, these unfinished technological objects might raise new 
polyphonic formulations of the very concept of memory, allowing it to burst beyond the 
private and corporeal bounds we usually attribute to it. 
 
 Generally, my use of the term memory refers to an intersubjective, materially and 
spatially informed awareness of language, events, or anything else identifiable from the 
past.  Although a survey of the many divergent and convergent theoretical ways memory 
has been defined is beyond the scope of this dissertation, I would like to outline, however 
briefly, how a few thinkers have engaged with the vast, even immeasurable, topic of 
memory.  Memory is a concept that has long been addressed in the social sciences and 
humanities (Boyarin 1994; Boym 2001; Carruthers 1997; Connerton 1989; Derrida 1996; 
Halbwachs 1992), and many new media theorists speculate on the implications of bytes 
being stored in ever increasing amounts within ever decreasing spaces (Mayer-
Schonberger 2009; Van Djick 2007).  Autobiographical memories have been referred to, 
literally and metaphorically, across disciplines as reservoirs and scaffolds for a sense of 
identity and continuity.  As we will discuss further in chapter 3, Michel Foucault 
attributes the emergence of the Western concept of self to the adoption of a kind of 
mnemonic technology.  He examines the widespread use in antiquity of hypomnemata, or 
notebooks, in which an individual would collect written notes of personal thoughts and 
  
11 
11 
activities, as well as things seen and heard.  After a process of selecting and editing, the 
individual’s notes would be used as raw material for correspondence.  Through 
correspondence and the documentation of autobiographical memory, Foucault outlines 
the emergence of an ethical Western subject.8  
 
 Media theorist José Van Dijck maintains that mediated memories, whether 
through photographs, home movies, or shared narratives, allow for the construction of a 
sense of self by helping individuals give meaning to their past and envision their future.  
Reflecting on the relationship between media and temporality, historian Andreas Huyssen 
contends that although memories will no doubt continue to be shaped by new 
technologies, they are in no way reducible to them.  He argues that the separation 
between the "virtual" and the "real" is quixotic in that "anything remembered - whether 
by lived or imagined memory - is itself virtual.  Memory is always transitory, notoriously 
unreliable, and haunted by forgetting - in short, human and social" (2001: 76).  Science 
studies scholar Geoffrey Bowker circumscribes the problematic most succinctly when he 
asks: "What is memory, that a person may practice one" (2005: 8)?  Remembering is 
more than the occurrence of bringing knowledge to mind.  It is a set of practices through 
which we frame identities and temporalities, "practices that permit both the creation of a 
continuous, useful past and the transmission sub rosa of information, stories, and 
practices from our wild, discontinuous, ever-changing past" (Bowker 2005: 9).  Foucault, 
                                                
8 In chapters three and four, I treat more thoroughly the emergence of intermingled concepts of 
memory and identity.  Using Foucault's genealogy of the Western subject and his understandings 
of an ethics of self-making that begins in antiquity, I explore personal archival practices and show 
how technology designs are shaped by - and help shape - conceptions of identity that have long 
been tied to ideas of authenticity and memory (Foucault 1986). 
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Van Dijck, Huyssen, and Bowker all highlight, in various ways and across various 
disciplines, the relationships between matter, memory, and identity.  But more 
importantly, these thinkers remind us that memory isn’t simply an amorphous entity that 
resides in our heads, but rather an intimate and social phenomenon that occurs through 
objects, technologies, people and places. As such, I consider memory as both natural and 
cultural objects, experiences and practices. 
 
 Although the topic of this dissertation may appear timely, even futuristic, what the 
authors mentioned above show is that questions concerning memory and temporality 
raised by new and emerging tools are in fact longstanding.  Various actors and actants 
with differing ends and shifting sociocultural and historical conditions shape the concepts 
of remembering and forgetting.9  They underwrite, and are constantly being redefined in, 
contexts of technological innovation - from notebooks to robotic companions that prompt 
reminiscence, to new imaging devices that bring researchers to "see" memory at work.  It 
is worth noting however, that none of these authors (apart from Foucault) attempt to 
articulate their inquiries within the realm of technology production.  Most social studies 
of technology are centered on the history and on the effects of tools once they have 
already become integral parts of how we interact with the world (Benjamin 1978, Kittler 
1999, Sontag 1978).  In contrast, this dissertation examines the different actors and 
actants involved in the creation of what Latour calls "black boxes" (1987), that is to say 
                                                
9 Bruno Latour’s notion of actants (1987) and Michel Callon’s actor network theory (1986) extend the 
usual notion of a human actor to that of an actant, human or nonhuman, in a network.  Within networks, 
humans come to speak for nonhuman actants, enrolling them in their fluid processes of translation and 
mobilization of interests.  In this case, recording technologies as actants are called upon to add to the 
polyphonic conceptions of memory. 
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closed objects that receive "inputs" and emit "outputs," the mechanisms and 
consequences of which remain hidden and often unquestioned.  
 
 Recording practices made easier with the SenseCam and other new digital 
memory tools raise numerous pressing ethical questions concerning notions of selfhood, 
agency and privacy to name but a few.  For instance, as commodities, whom do the so-
called captured memories belong to?  Once "freed" from the body, can they be considered 
social memories, part of public history 2.0?"  In what a researcher from Memories for 
Life calls "an era of pervasive electronic recording of all human activity [… will] the 
collective have the right to subpoena individuals' memories?" (O'Hara, et al. 2006: 360).  
We need to examine the social and ethical consequences of producing, reproducing and 
owning memories in the forms of images, documents, sounds and video.  Shifting notions 
of property, memory and agency need to be addressed while new mobile recording 
technologies are being developed.  This said, as a researcher, I am invested in the 
formation of good questions rather than their clear often temporary and half-hearted 
resolutions.  I do not care to say the world is this way or that, but rather to question its 
contingent becomings.  Technology moves quickly; social commentary lags.  As a 
response to this lag in social theory this research project thinks through emergent objects 
and distances itself from many classics in Media and Science and Technology Studies 
that seek to study the belated 'impact' of technology on society (Kittler 1999, McLuhan 
1964).  Paradoxically, the slow moving discipline of anthropology is well placed to 
respond to such a lag.  With its signature practice of long term fieldwork, it can create 
what b calls a "space of hesitation," where one experiences a slowing down of science in 
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favor of thinking about its effects as well as its very own modes of knowledge 
production.  Such a practice can "slow down the construction of this common world, to 
create a space for hesitation regarding what it means to say [that something is] 'good'" 
(Stengers 2005b: 994).  The slowing down occurs for the anthropologist as well as her 
informants as they make sense of their own practices.  The result is a science that is 
inseparable from ethics, a place where epistemology and ontology intra-act (Stengers 
2005b; Barad 2003).  Another way of putting it might be to say that anthropology is good 
at being in the midst, in the middle of, where it seeks to be attuned to the effects and 
affects that surround its object and to which it is connected.  From the field, scientific 
practices and the objects they generate may be viewed "as a scene of immanent force, 
rather than [...] dead effects imposed on an innocent world" (Stewart 2007: 1).  It is the 
very practice of being in the midst that makes the task of writing ethnography, of 
museifying what is always already changing, so difficult. 
 
 Memories for Life is the only challenge of its kind, and presents unparalleled 
opportunities to slow down and to watch technological designs unfold.  Drawing on my 
experiences with the various scientists involved, I look at how the production of personal 
and wearable recording machines redefines what counts as remembering.  Here science is 
a social endeavor.  It seeks to understand, and even improve, memory and our 
relationship to the past through a certain technologization of everyday life, itself the 
result of particular scientific trajectories.  As such, historical inquiries help form this 
project in which we examine the dialectic between the epistemic and the technical.10  By 
                                                
10 The epistemic and the technical can be considered distinct realms with objects that may also be distinct in 
character.  Moreover, it may be that science drives technology, and that technology in turn drives science.  
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focusing on the design of new objects and by addressing contemporary debates on the 
intentions that govern the making of recording machines, I examine how technologies 
take shape, and how they inform understandings of memory and the self as well as 
notions of human disability and enhancement.  Above I have offered brief delimitations 
of what the term memory might imply; however, one of the goals of this dissertation is to 
show how memory and its related notions of self and temporality are far from being 
transparent referents.  With this in mind, I examine how Memories for Life scientists 
deploy the concept of memory as dependent upon specific notions of individuality, of 
interiority and exteriority, and of temporality and matter.  I look at how these categories 
are being constructed and how they are also constructing technologies as objects and 
subjects.  
 
The Field: 
If you want to understand what a science is you should look in the first instance not at its 
theories or it findings, and certainly not what its apologists say about it; you should look 
at what the practitioners of it do.  - Clifford Geertz 
 
This dissertation is based on ongoing ethnographic research that started in 2006, eighteen 
months of which took place in the United Kingdom with various labs that are part of the 
Memories for Life network.  As an intern, interviewer, workshop and conference 
participant, and test user of various prototypes, I immersed myself in what Stengers calls 
                                                                                                                                            
Or, that technological advances do not allow for radical epistemic shifts that define the advancement of 
science and should thus be approached as radically different realms.  Without disregarding the important 
questions raised by these various approaches to what is often now called technoscience, for the purpose of 
this project however, science and technology are at times conflated by the practitioners of these memory 
projects as well as in the discussions that follow below. 
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"ecologies of practices."11  I examined how interdisciplinary understandings of memory 
were brought together to create tools with the purpose of extending our fragile human 
memories.  In what follows, I hope not merely to show how the projects that make up 
Memories for Life rely on a separation of matter and memory, and of objectivity and 
subjectivity (in rendering the past "as it was" in contrast to how we remember it), but also 
to ask how these machines might be turned into a cause for considering the discourses 
and practices around which they operate.  How might we understand the presumed 
human need and interest in perfect memory that often acts as the starting point for the 
invention of these devices?  What kind of "ecology" creates the ripe environment for 
memory to become what Stengers and Latour call a "matter of concern"?   Fieldwork 
across various Memories for Life sites has led me to examine the scientific practices that 
occur alongside the narratives and objects they generate.  I have had the privilege of 
considering the social behind the technical.  Or better yet, as Bruno Latour advocates 
(1987), I have had the opportunity to see myriad ways that sociality and technicality do 
not and cannot exist separately from one another.  Nor does one preconceive the other.  
Throughout this project, I have sought to avoid a kind of technical determinism in order 
to propose a more circular view of the relationship between what we deem as social and 
technical. 
 
                                                
11 Stenger's "ecologies of practices" are worlds in which different understandings and different disciplines 
coexist without necessary consensus.  "One aspect of the cosmopolitical proposal is thus to accentuate our 
own rather frightening particularity among the people of the world with whom we have to compromise" 
(2005b: 999).  Refusing a transcendental birds-eye view or the adoption of concepts that rely on simplistic 
binary oppositions, her ecological approach takes the form of an immanent critique while looking at what a 
particular practice "demands" from its practitioners and from others within and across disciplines (2010: 
56). 
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 In order to study the ecology of the production of recording technologies, three 
simultaneous modes of social investigation have provided rich forms of insight: 
participant observation, interviews and textual research.  Firstly, I have gained valuable 
forms of tacit knowledge by attending Memories for Life and related seminars, 
conferences and workshops; participating in test uses of Microsoft's SenseCam, and other 
devices such as Sheffield University's ChittyChatty; and through my internship as an 
ethnographer with the University of Sheffield's Memoir team.  Taking part in conceptual 
group discussions in the lab, and in user studies outside of the lab has allowed me to 
experience the production, the testing and the consumption of technologies first hand.12  
                                                
12 There are many ways anthropologists have described our famed mode of operation we call participant 
observation. Harvey Russell Bernard draws on sociologist Herbert Gans to elaborate on our technique: 
"Once the field worker has gained entry, people tend to forget he is there, and let down their guard, but he 
does not; however much he seems to participate, he is really there to observe and even to watch what 
happens when people let down their guard" (Gans, 1968:314, emphasis mine, quoted in Bernard 1994: 
136).  But this quote makes us sound more like deceptive spies than researchers, let alone collaborators.  It 
certainly highlights the importance of the observation that occurs in participant observation.  However, in 
today's complex terrains for fieldwork, and as was the case during my research, many anthropologists 
actively participate in and even work for, the groups and institutions they study.  Moreover, the rise of 
'anthropology at home' has changed our relationship with the very acts of observation and brought us closer 
towards what we could call full-fledged participation.  As Bernard also notes, participant observation 
"involves establishing a rapport in a new community; learning to act so that people go about their business 
as usual when you show up; and removing yourself every day from cultural immersion so you can 
intellectualize what you've learned, put it in perspective, and write about it convincingly" (Bernard 1994: 
137).  So the process is one of moving in and out of a community so as to become part of it and then step 
back from it, review your notes, and reflect at the end of the day or later on in a moment of escape (from 
the community or institution you work in).  Bernard gives interesting examples to outline the difference 
between what he considers fieldwork (which doesn’t always include participant observation.  For ex: door 
to door, or short interviews), participant observation (which is always considered fieldwork), or just plain 
observation (which doesn't include the process of really getting in there that makes it participant, it’s more 
like the fly-on-the-wall technique).  In general participant observation means sharing the lifestyle (pace, 
food, climate, schedule, etc.) as the community you are studying.  Shadowing an informant is a way to 
make sure you share many parts of the day with them.  Participant observation doesn’t necessarily mean 
that we need to become pharmacists, journalists, computer scientists, or use medications.  Rather, it is an 
attempt to share the same space and to be present, while the activities you wish to observe occur around 
you.  Bernard emphasizes something important: to be ethical in your participant observation (to not be the 
deceptive spy Gans' earlier quote alludes to) it is important to tell the people who share your field that you 
are an anthropologist (some anthropologist have varying opinions about this necessary disclosure).  
Participant observation can be done through short or rapid fieldwork sessions, but more often involves 
several months of getting into the field, learning the language (or technical lingo) and hanging out.  It 
involves engaging in discussions, asking questions, getting guided tours by your informants, listening to 
their stories, letting them teach you things, etc. The advantages of participant observation are that by being 
there, you can witness events and reactions first hand, and get familiar with the people you will interview, 
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Secondly, structured, semi-structured and open-ended interviews with over 20 
researchers and lab directors have revealed issues encountered in the convergence of 
languages about memory.  Extensive oral histories of projects related to Memories for 
Life have been sought in order to elucidate the different facets of this complex 
multidisciplinary enterprise.  Thirdly, textual research has included articles written by the 
scientists about the tools being built and about their previous projects, as well as 
publications resulting from our collaborations.  I have followed correspondence between 
researchers across and within institutional boundaries and kept daily logs and fieldnotes 
on my observations, conversations, interactions and readings.  In addition, I have been 
given access to Sheffield researchers' video documentation of their workshops and test-
user interactions.13  These complementary modes of ethnographic investigation form the 
basis of this project and have allowed me to follow the concept of memory as it drives the 
design of new subjects and objects.  
 
 From this research I have come to know first hand what it means to attempt to 
collect the past by observing and recording, and to drown as a result of one's own archive 
fever.  As I write this, I suffer from information overload (surely there must soon be a 
disorder in the DSM, something akin to hoarding, ADHD (Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder), or the catatonia suffered by Borges' Funes the Memorious to 
whom we will return later).  In order to communicate, to give meaning, we must 
                                                                                                                                            
allowing them to be more open. Importantly, participant observation is a great opportunity to rethink and 
reformulate your research questions.  It helps you to give meaning to your data. Much has been written on 
the topic of ethnographic fieldwork in anthropology over the last several decades. See, Faubion and Marcus 
2009, Marcus 1998, Sanjek 1990, and Stocking 1983. 
13 Most scientists I interviewed and/or worked with chose not to remain anonymous for the purpose of this 
research.  Many have spent decades in the field, publishing their work and presenting at public venues.  I 
have changes the names and scrambled identifying information for those who preferred to remain 
anonymous either for the entire course of the study or during a specific encounter or conversation. 
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generalize and sometimes omit, delete, forget.  But faced with a deluge of audio video 
files, printed and digital articles, saved websites, typed notes, scribbled notebooks, 
sketchbooks, napkins and sticky notes (so many sticky notes), it is easy to stumble 
endlessly on the particular.  To do anthropology, one must group things, concepts and 
people, and follow traces between them.  The task then is to take the reader for a ride 
through these logics of association between ways (bundles) of being.  This task is at the 
heart of what Marcus terms "multi-sited" research: 
Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, 
conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer 
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, 
posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines 
the argument of ethnography (Marcus 1998: 90). 
 
This multi-sited ethnography is of diasporic tendency. It is an act of tying threads through 
things and offers the contextualization of objects in motion. 
 
 Before I continue, I would like to offer a few preliminary notes concerning the 
objects, settings and people I encountered during this period of fieldwork.  The objects 
imagined and designed by Memories for Life scientists live in the complex overarching 
fields of research and development and have only recently begun to reach the mass 
market.  This is to say that these object are prototypes that are sometimes clunky and 
fragile at best.  For instance, when I tested the SenseCam, besides noting my roommates' 
initial protests, legitimate claims to privacy invasion, and both our eventual and 
somewhat disturbing habituation to the device, I noticed how fragile the object really 
was.  It broke on the last day of my two-week trial.  When I first went in to labs such as 
Microsoft Research, I expected to find engineers tinkering on computers, robots, and 
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various other tabletop and touch screen interfaces.  While I did find these things, what 
struck me was that their work environment looked more like the university settings I was 
used to: Small offices lined with books, populated by researchers writing papers for their 
next conference.  The worlds of research and market development were much more 
distinct than I had anticipated.  Moreover, most of the researchers' claims about how 
these tools helped improve memory were based on user studies using very minimal 
technological innovation - the SenseCam itself is made of a few simple sensors that 
trigger a very low quality camera - much like the one we have in our cell phones.  The 
point to their work, I was told, was to produce papers and claims about what objects 
might do, rather than actually programming the devices to a marketable standard.  
Spending time tweaking devices so that they might be robust and reliable was an entirely 
different story, one I was told, that belongs to developers, not PhD granted researchers.  
Domains of practice differ.  Incompleteness is a norm for the researchers I was working 
with.  The polished object is not the end goal but rather the production of knowledge.  
Prototypes are thus tools to think with.  And as we will see in more detail in the 
concluding chapter of this dissertation, prototypes exist in in-between states as particular 
and telling objects.  They represent at once the idealization of what is to be built as well 
as the rudimentary, necessarily incomplete experimental processes in which such 
building occurs.  It is through user experiments that scientists make their claims, and as 
we will see, it is through trials, tests and errors that they also rethink some of their initial 
concepts.  In short, through use - even test uses - devices get hacked and sometimes used 
for other purposes that those intended.  Testing fragile prototypes and participating in 
research with my informants helped me grasp various forms of tacit knowledge that 
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would have eluded me had I simply referred to these scientists' many publications and/or 
conferences.  I returned to Rice shouting the merits of fieldwork, of being there, of taking 
time, of being with and nearby. 
 
 The networks I engaged in over the course of my fieldwork can be said to exist 
within various realms of expertise (engineering, social, computational, neurological), 
where an expert is, as anthropologist Dominic Boyer puts it: "an actor who has developed 
skills in, semiotic-epistemic competence for, and attentional concern with, some sphere 
of practical activity" (2008: 39).  But Boyer's definition, because of its very openness, 
allows for the question to remain as to what counts as an expert, seeing as almost anyone 
can be an expert in something (from juggling to law).  In his article, "Thinking Through 
the anthropology of Experts," Boyer outlines a brief history of anthropological research 
on the figure of 'the expert'.  In the 50s and 60s, anthropologists called on this nearly 
unquestioned character to designate a kind of source for religious or ritual knowledge 
(Boyer 2008).  The expert as a socio-historically configured role, drawing theoretical 
anthropological interest on the basis of his very expertise, has only gained prominence 
over the last decade, not least with the boom in science and technology studies (Born 
1995, Fischer 2003, Fortun 2001, Helmreich 2000, Kelty 2008, Latour 1987, Rabinow 
1996).  This said, and as Boyer's work shows, who or what counts as 'expert' remains 
elusive.  His definition highlights the existing tensions between regimes of expertise, 
whether performative or institutional, between "skilled doing" and "skilled knowing."  He 
refers to an expert who exercises the latter as an intellectual, a professional "knowledge 
specialist," and designates most anthropological work on experts as taking place in this 
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domain.  Indeed, then, it is surprising that more work hasn't addressed not only how 
we've come to define expertise, but how, as anthropologist experts in social theory and 
representation, we haven't questioned how we might "meaningfully engage the social 
experience of another culture of expertise without calling into question, at some level, 
precisely that expertise that is the ostensible locus of their social practice and 'culture'" 
(2008: 40)?  How then might different kinds of expertise interact, coexist and call each 
other into question?   
 
 Boyer draws on Holmes and Marcus' notion of para-ethnography (2005), where 
different kinds of experts (anthropologists included) are brought together around matters 
of common concern.  "These are realms in which the traditional informants of 
ethnography must be rethought as counterparts rather than 'others' - as both subjects and 
intellectual partners in inquiry" (Holmes and Marcus 2005: 236 cited in Boyer 2008). 
While studying the networks of experts enrolled in the endeavor to better remember, I 
was invited to collaborate with them on the design of staged encounters between users 
and technologies (voice recorders, gps devices, maps and photo browsers).  I was asked 
to think not only 'about,' but also 'with' these experts, and to produce a kind of 
ethnographic knowledge that might prove pertinent in the design of future tools.  In fact, 
it was my interlocutors' familiarity with, and enthusiasm for, ethnographic methods that 
facilitated my entry into the worlds of information science and technology design: "The 
anthropologist becomes one kind of cultural producer among others, some of whom at 
least were traditionally identified as merely subjects or 'informants'" (Marcus1998: 17).    
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 Since the 1980s, the field now known as Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has 
maintained that understanding, and designing for, peoples' relationship to technology is 
primordial.  As Thierry Bardini states in the preface to his book Bootstrapping, on the 
origins of personal computing, "if the computing technology is new [...] the interest for 
its human users is even newer" (2000: xii).  Initially based on the intersections of 
psychology and computer science, HCI studies now generally include a social research 
component.  Moreover, a related domain, Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW), is dedicated to the social interactions between humans with and around 
technology.  Researchers in these fields are geared towards accounting for users' social 
and cultural contexts while outlining what they call "implications for design," the title of 
nearly all the concluding remarks of papers published in these fields.  In their desire to 
incorporate the needs and particularities of those using the designs, researchers in HCI 
turn to anthropology.  Generally speaking, this has translated into the implementation of 
ethnographic studies of the often mundane and everyday ways people engage technology, 
leading to suggestions of what is needed to make technology more efficient and more 
meaningful for users, hence the "implications for design" (Dourish 2006).  Computer 
scientists Paul Dourish and ethnomethodologist Graham Button go so far as to argue for 
the use of the term "technomethodology" to designate the collaboration between 
computer science and ethnomethodology in which no particular discipline grafts on to the 
other, but rather both come together to produce new forms of knowledge (1998).  
 
 In the UK, upon meeting the researchers who would become my informants and 
collaborators, I was quickly invited to join the workshops and ongoing design discussions 
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centered on the problem of memory.  My training in anthropology was seen as a 
necessary asset among networks that consisted mostly of engineers, computer scientists, 
psychologists and neuroscientists.  When I explained that my interests lay more in the 
makings of technology, in understanding how such memory tools were imagined and then 
built, I was playfully urged to come ‘study them’ by working with them and by 
participating in different research projects (they often joked, calling themselves my 
"natives").  I was granted permission to examine "the interactions between scientists in 
the pursuit of their goals" (Latour and Woolgar 1986: 11), and moreover, to join in that 
pursuit.  In a recent article, Marcus describes this colliding of subject and researcher, and 
even the interchanging roles these actors play:   
The very parties who are the primary audiences of such research are also 
its subjects. Thus ethnography in its most classic inclination to make 
‘subjects’ of all of its interlocutors must develop the methodological 
practice today of making colleagues, fellow experts, frames of analytic 
discourse ethnographic subjects themselves in designing the multi-sited 
terrains of its research projects. Much ethnography shifts today from the 
study of culture or cultures to the study of knowledge-making processes, 
broadly conceived and diversely located, and in which its own expertise 
participates  (Marcus 2010).  
 
This is not to say that my relationship with my informants wasn't fraught with questions 
of interdisciplinarity, expertise, and to put it simply, different ways of imagining what it 
means to do ethnography and to produce design suggestions based on user studies.  
Dourish and Button's "technomethodology" and Marcus' migrations of expertise aren't as 
seamless as they might at first appear. 
 
 Despite the enthusiasm with which my informants greeted me based on my 
disciplinary expertise, my relationships with them brought into question what it means to 
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do ethnography and/or to design digital tools.  The modes of work in design (here I mean 
to include HCI, CSCW, and a number of projects coming out of Information Studies and 
Computer science) and in anthropology are fundamentally different.14  My migration 
across this disciplinary divide meant that I needed to reorient my approach.  Coming 
from a highly theoretical and philosophical background, I had to learn to speak and write 
in more quantitative ways that the other researchers could understand as directly leading 
to design suggestions.  My newfound interlocutors preferred a style of writing that was 
stripped from the veneer of poetics and self-reflection that my particular training in 
anthropology at Rice had cultivated.  They tended to take the social as a given upon 
which to build science and design.  Anthropology would be its path to what it considered 
the nature of the social.  As it became clear throughout my collaborations with various 
designers of digital memory tools, whether they came from HCI, computer science, or 
information science, was that they had not been stirred by a critical reflexive turn the way 
anthropology had (and continues to be) especially at Rice since the 1980s.  The 
researchers I worked with embraced an anthropology that makes use of what James 
Faubion calls "purely referential conceptual apparatuses" - ones that "are marked by and 
intimately compatible with statistical methods of representation and statistical inference.  
They give pride of place to the epistemic virtue of reliability - of empirical determinacy 
and empirically confirmable replicability" (Faubion 2011: 272).  For the researchers I 
worked with, anthropology was considered a sound scientific method of producing results 
in the shapes of tables, numbers and suggested design implications, a far cry from my 
                                                
14 The former might be considered traditionally more speculative, the latter more analytical, although these 
approaches are shifting in contemporary fieldwork design, subject matter and types of collaboration where 
the task is sometimes to invent concepts in order to make visible what is emerging (Faubion 2011, Faubion 
and Marcus 2009, Fortun 2001, Marcus 1998, Rabinow 2003). 
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more ambiguous and exploratory style of ethnographic writing and media making I have 
nurtured over the years.  By becoming an anthropologist among designers, "I learned of 
anthropology anew: of the "classic model" and all it was expected to produce, and of 
'how the authority of the discipline as craft comes to live on' [...] almost in spite of the 
discipline itself" (Reddy 2009: 90).  Moreover, anthropology, deeply engaged in post-
colonial critiques since the 70s and 80s, has tended to tread critically and cautiously when 
considering modes of intervention in the world, both during and after fieldwork.15  On the 
other hand, design seeks to intervene, to change our relationship with our environment, 
with each other and with things.   As Boyer puts it: "one often finds the anthropology of 
expertise both fascinated and repulsed by the expertise of its subjects, not least because of 
our inability to feel entirely 'at home' in another epistemic jurisdiction," even if that 
jurisdiction is ethnographic fieldwork itself (2008: 42).  Temporalities between design 
and anthropology's modes of thinking and doing are also different (Hunt 2007).  While 
ethnography is firmly grounded in the present (and often the past), design speculates on 
possible futures.  Both, however, rest on the possibility of being so attuned to one's 
surroundings that one might find the ordinary unfamiliar.16  I am pleased to say that my 
fieldwork experience has polluted the ways I imagine ethnography, leaving more room 
for the future (even while speaking about memory), and more room for conjectural "what 
ifs."  
 
                                                
15 One need only to pay attention to the various schools of thought and debates within anthropology 
between more theoretically and conceptually grounded approaches and more positivistic and moralistically 
applied ones. See Faubion 2011 for an articulate overview of the distinctive modes of theory making in 
anthropology. 
16 We will elaborate on these modes of making the familiar strange and the strange familiar when we 
discuss relationships between surrealism and anthropology in the 1930s in the following chapter. 
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 In the vignette that follows, I expand on how intersections between different 
modes of expertise, and methodological debates within disciplines prove to be productive 
sights for unearthing the ways we imagine and construct the notion of memory.  I turn to 
an example of an "ecology of practices," to include objects, organic, and mechanical, as 
well as desires and obligations belonging to various scientific discourses that have been 
brought together in the design of recording devices.  It describes a setting, an "ecology" 
within and across disciplines, that helps create the ripe environment for memory to 
become a "matter of concern." 
 
 In December 2006, I attended workshops and conferences held in London as part 
of the Memories for Life initiative.17  Judging by the extensive media attention, these 
scientists were addressing what seemed to be a hot topic: the future of our past.  With 
approximately fifty participants coming from different backgrounds, one might wonder 
how big concepts such as memory and forgetting were rendered commensurable.  How 
did neuropsychologists, for example, discuss the making of recording technologies with 
computer scientists?  For starters, they each have different disciplinary attitudes towards 
the phenomenon of forgetting.  Socially and biologically, forgetting is seen as a necessity 
for keeping order in an otherwise messy accumulation of information.  But in computing, 
forgetting is seen as a failure of hardware or software.  In an attempt to bridge 
disciplinary gaps, some of the questions addressed by the Memories for Life initiative 
were described as centered on the idea of biologically inspired computing (O'Hara et al. 
2006: 354).  By attending to the problem of biological memory in the brain, these 
                                                
17 Four previous workshops were held since 2004 as part of this network initiative to identify and to map 
out potential research areas. 
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researchers sought to improve the development of tools used in the storing of information 
outside of the body. 
 
 Participating in this ecology were the different demands and obligations brought 
on by biology, neuropsychology, and computer science.  But the objects and concepts 
these scientists produced were fluid and flexible, and leaked in and out of the porous 
walls of their disciplines.  Neuroscience examined the way memory works in terms of 
frames per second, and the web was compared to networks of neurons.  The importance 
of FMRI and finding the place of memory in the brain, the development of schemas that 
point to the compartmentalization of memory - one for places, one for faces - found 
analogues in the design of GPS devices, wearable cameras and external hard drives.  Yet 
it isn't that these different fields had similar methodological definitions of their object.  
And as Stengers points out, what differs communicates.  So each field created modes in 
which a relationship with another field, whether explicit or implicit, was seen as 
promising. 
 
 At one workshop, a Mathematician from Lancaster announced that "if Moore's 
Law continues to hold [… in 70 years] it would be possible to store a continuous record 
of life on a grain of sand" (Dix 2002; O’Hara et al. 2006: 352).18  During his talk, this 
same mathematician referred to Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida and emphasized the 
importance of affect in remembering.  In his famous text, Barthes describes his unique 
relationship to an old picture of his deceased mother.  For him, the medium-specificity of 
                                                
18 Moore's law in industry refers to an increase in memory and processing power while circuit, chip and 
transistor sizes decrease, thus allowing for faster, smaller computers. Performance is famously said to 
double every two years. 
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the photograph, its imposition of the undeniable fact that "the thing has been there" 
confuses the concepts of real and alive, and thus creates a particular élan of emotion in 
the viewer (1981: 58).  The subject photographed, according to Barthes, "has been" and 
continues "to be" through its unique luminous rays captured on the chemical emulsion 
that is the photograph.  But what does it mean to capture and to preserve light long after 
the object or subject has gone?  In Barthes' words, a "sort of umbilical cord links the body 
of the photographed thing to [the viewer's] gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a 
carnal medium" (1981: 60).  As though speaking about cell lines, where "the substance of 
the human body is now routinely maintained alive outside the body," information 
scientists described memories as entities to be captured, cloned and shared (Landecker 
2007: 3).  No longer bound to the organism or moment itself, memories and identities are 
to be sustained in artificial environments to be later used to extend the finite life of the 
person from which they came. 
 
 Most researchers affiliated to the Memories for Life initiative shared an interest, 
and justification, in the domains of health and in the therapeutic uses of memory tools. 
Yorick Wilks, computer scientists and a specialist in Artificial Intelligence and language 
from the University of Sheffield presented projects aimed at improving health and 
longevity through the development of mobile, electronic "life companions."  Also 
referred to as "personal agents," these scientists are designing robots as furry and cuddly 
friends, not as the metallic and rigid R2D2 companion we’ve all grown up to imagine.19 
Referring to the fact that "people with pets live longer than people without pets," the 
builders of these companions consider their research a significant contribution toward 
                                                
19 March 29, 2007, http://nlp.shef.ac.uk. 
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happier, healthier and longer lives for humans, (although one might wonder what a life of 
old age accompanied by furry robots might actually entail).  As a senior companion, the 
furry robot could remind one to take his medications and more importantly, stimulate a 
conversation, thus combating loneliness.  According to these scientists, these pet robots 
might allow anyone to become a kind of autobiographer.  They could be spurred to ask 
the user questions about his or her life and in turn record and document the responses and 
narratives.  Wilks gave the example of a lonely and forgetful elderly woman who could 
reminisce and view old photographs with her companion.  Based on previous 
conversations, the robot would have learnt about this woman and thus be in the position 
to help her tell stories about the photographs being viewed.  Should the woman become 
confused about who is in the photograph, the companion could correct her and steer her 
towards more accurate recollections of her past, producing a kind of hyper-reality for the 
forgetful subject.  In this case, recorded memories appear as positive historical facts.  In 
what Jean Baudrillard would call "the restitution of an absolute simulacrum," the 
memories of the forgetful subject are said to conform to the data.  Reminiscence is 
characterized by a "performative and demonstrative logic [...an] obsession with historical 
fidelity [or...] a perfect rendering" (1994: 47).  The woman's actual memories come 
second, cued and enhanced by the captured images prompted by her electronic pet.  Is 
this the other side of Stengers' and Latour's 'humans representing things' where robots 
come to speak for humans? 
 
 Discussions about how to best design recording devices were colored by the 
different ways memory was imagined in the first place.  Not all researchers present were 
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comfortable with equating captured 1s and 0s with the experience of memory - and this 
distinction was for them primordial in what they considered good design.  To quote 
Stengers: "Approaching a practice [...] means approaching it as it diverges, that is feeling 
its borders, experimenting the questions which practitioners may accept as relevant, even 
if they are not their own questions [...]" (Stengers 2005b: 2).  Outlining the theoretical 
and practical tensions involved in the design of memory tools, Abigail Sellen and Emma 
Berry, A Human Computer Interaction psychologist and a neuropsychologist from 
another Microsoft Research campus, presented studies using the SenseCam as a support 
for memory for a patient who suffers from amnesia (Hodges, et al. 2006).  Their results 
appeared hopeful; after reviewing the images captured by the SenseCam, the patient 
seemed to show a better recollection of past events.  However, these researchers raised 
questions as to what exactly was being captured and stored.  They argued against the 
general discourse held by Wilks, researcher behind the companions project, and other 
Microsoft researchers such as Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell working on MyLifeBits 
software and additional SenseCam research (to which we will return in the following 
chapters).  Rejecting the bifurcation of nature implied in Wilks, Bell and Gemmell’s 
distinction between a seamless "objective" digital memory, and a fallible "subjective" 
organic one, Sellen and Berry argued that these new recording devices were capturing 
series of memory "cues."  One could not talk of capturing "memory" or "experience," let 
alone a "person."  Doing so would be simply misleading and unproductive.  Rather, they 
suggested researchers concern themselves with figuring out what these devices are 
actually good for and in which context.  This might help further understandings of what 
specific kind of memory aid these machines actually provide.  
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 What these debates highlight is that even when it comes to human memory "a 
problem is always a practical problem, never an universal problem mattering for 
everybody" (Stengers 2005b: 7). The ecological perspective that Stengers challenges us 
to adopt remains precisely grounded around specific issues at hand, while including 
humans, machines, and furry robot companions.  In other words, the memory devices 
built by these scientists are what Science Studies scholars Susan Leigh Star and James R. 
Griesemer term "boundary objects" (1999). Boundary objects are scientific objects 
common to several interacting worlds.  They are 
both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the several 
parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity 
across sites. They are weakly structured in common use, and become 
strongly structured in individual-site use. [...] Such objects have different 
meanings in different social worlds but their structure is common enough 
to more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of translation. 
The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in 
developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting communities 
(Bowker and Star 1999, 297). 
 
As such, various entanglements, converging and diverging discourses around the design 
of memory tools, affect the practices of building recording devices, of testing their uses, 
and of conceiving how and where they might be inserted as part of the social, and as part 
of the body as prosthesis.  This dissertation considers the nature of interdisciplinary 
collaboration between experts brought together around common problems and "boundary 
objects," and points to the different ways interests converge and diverge in the 
elaboration of new forms of knowledge and in the creation of new technological objects. 
 
Memory Cues: 
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The chapters that follow provide different cues as to how we might examine the concept 
of memory at work in the making of prototypical recording devices.  In doing so, this 
dissertation tracks how information scientists create new physical objects, as well as new 
cultural conceptions and experiences of what we call memory.  In other words, the 
research networks addressed in this dissertation are sites in which the objects of recording 
devices - memories - are conceptualized, materialized and reconfigured in various, and at 
times contentious, ways.  As we have seen in the previous vignette, at issue are 
technologies, but also narratives - scientific and personal - about what it means to 
remember.  
 
 The first two chapters reflect on our relationship with information through the use 
of recording and archiving technologies that seek to maintain, extend, and commemorate 
life.  While the projects examined in the first chapter might be considered more 
ethnographic-artistic, and the ones in the second more techno-scientific, they all attempt 
in some way to answer the following questions: How are everyday experiences translated 
as information, and for what purpose?  How are our habits of drinking tea, talking on the 
phone, driving to work, and reminiscing with old photographs, turned into something that 
can be stored, analyzed and acted upon?  How might information be used in real time to 
supplement the living in a recursive feedback loop?   
 
 The first chapter, "Sensors and Satellites," tracks the concept of memory back to a 
time before ubiquitous digital recording devices.  It examines the significance of the 
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archive as it grapples with the notion of what it means to know our selves through 
practices of observation and recording.  First, we will see how Britain's Mass-
Observation Project, a nation-wide documentary endeavor that took place between 1937-
1950, was defined by practices of omnivorous collecting.  We will examine how, in the 
hopes of creating an archive of daily musings of ordinary citizens, this project brought to 
light a number of problems associated with capturing the infinitely particular.  Held in 
constant tension between its identity as a work of art and a work of science, between its 
surrealist roots and statistical demise, the Mass-Observation Project sat at the intersection 
of poetry and pattern.  The sections that make up this chapter shift in scale from the micro 
to the macro: from the citizen sensor and collector of the mundane, to the satellite view of 
the social offered by the sheer mass of information gathered and made available over the 
course of this documentary endeavor.  We then review various critiques of this ambitious 
project and consider surrealistic, ethnographic and cybernetic processes of observation as 
ways to navigate this immense archive (Harrison et al. 1937; Highmore 2002; Hubble 
2006; Luhmann 1998; MacClancy 1995; Malinowski 1922, Marcus 2001).20  The aim of 
this chapter is to offer an important historical interdisciplinary case study to think with 
that address the desire to know ourselves through practices of systematic observation, 
recording and archiving (Adorno 1980; Benjamin 1999: Luhmann 1998, Stocking 1983).   
 
 The second chapter, "Systems Emerge from Noise," is also in part historical.  The 
practices addressed herein examine how architectures of memory and technological 
conditions of knowledge about ourselves are imagined and created.  While not embarking 
                                                
20This section is based on archival research conducted at the Mass Observation Archive housed at the 
University of Sussex, UK in 2007.  
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on a linear history of recording devices, this first half of this chapter examines the history 
of cybernetics and computing.  It considers the formalization of matter and meaning into 
pure information, and charts how, over the course of particular historical moments, the 
past has been turned into digital 0s and 1s.  The second half of this chapter presents 
certain projects and practices of interdisciplinary scientists who are part Memories for 
Life.  These scientists develop information-mining technologies in order to improve 
human memory and knowledge about our selves.  The juxtaposition of these two sections 
- of the history of cybernetics and computing, and various Memories for Life projects - 
might enable a kind of montage thinking, a formal response to the practices examined, an 
enactment of the problems of gathering the particular and of collecting things in bits and 
pieces while gesturing to something larger at stake: the ways we attempt to look at our 
selves. 
 
 The third and fourth chapters focus on two extreme cases of lifelogging that make 
use of prototypical recording technologies designed by Memories for Life scientists: 
Gordon Bell, a senior researcher at Microsoft, who is on a quest to record his life for the 
sake of increased objectivity, productivity, and digital posterity (chapter three); and Mrs. 
B, a woman who suffers from amnesia and wears the SenseCam in the hope of leading a 
normal life in which she can share the past with loved ones (chapter four).21  Through 
                                                
21 Although much of the work I address in this article comes out of Microsoft, a multimillion dollar and 
multinational corporation, my goal here is not to embark on a corporate and institutional ethnography but 
rather to look at the MyLifeBits and SenseCam projects as exemplary of the many endeavors that are part 
of the larger UK Memories for Life project. 
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these case studies, I show how new recording technologies are both a symptom of, and a 
cure for, anxieties about time.   
 
 More specifically, in chapter three, "Against Oblivion," I reveal how these 
memory banks are inherently tied to logics of capital, of stock and storage, and to logics 
of the technological where, when it comes to memory, more is more.  Both remembering 
and forgetting operate in the economic, possessive discourse of time: losing time/finding 
time, wasting time/saving time.  While not abandoning these terms, I show through the 
case study of Gordon Bell, that the past, as well as the present and the future, are always 
discursively, practically, and technologically informed.  The fear of oblivion that drives 
Bell's "archive fever" (Derrida 1996; Nora 1995) relies on the assumption that one is able 
to record the past and one's self as they were and subsequently leaves one at risk of 
drowning in a sea of information (Plato 1973; Borges 1962).  I end this chapter by 
reflecting on Foucault's genealogy of the western subject and by posing the question of 
how to tolerate so much information (Foucault 1986; Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983). 
  
 In chapter four, " Prosthesis and Anamnesis," instead of asking whether or not 
these technologies mirror reality or the past, through the case study of Mrs. B, I prefer to 
ask how they act, what they do, and whom they speak for.  Throughout, this chapter 
proposes a shift from a representationalist argument about the bifurcation of nature (in 
this case, the objective reality of the ticking past and our subjective recollection of it) to a 
consideration of the ecologies of memories that we build and how they perform specific 
cuts through time (Barad 2003; Stengers 2010).   For the amnesiac Mrs. B the problem of 
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too much information is experienced quite differently than for Bell.  The noisiness 
created by the plethora of recorded memories is what allows her to un-forget, to 
experience a kind of anamnesis.  She exists in time through her experience of what Proust 
has called involuntary memory.  While Bell's desire to remember suggests that the past is 
out there, as a given, ready to be recorded, sorted, and subsequently tapped into whenever 
the need arises, Mrs. B's experience of involuntary memory suggests that the past is 
always only within the present.  By focusing on a posthumanist cyborg subject who longs 
to share the past with loved ones, I show how these new digital tools do not merely 
belong to the world of objects and representations (Faubion 2011; Haraway 2000; Hayles 
1999; Wolfe 2010).  They participate in a care of the self (a kind of poetic self-making) 
that occurs though one's relationship with one's self and with machines, but also with 
one's past, and as Faubion emphasizes, "with others, who themselves demand care, 
consideration, acknowledgment [...]" (2011: 75).  As such, these technologies are open to, 
and participate in, redefining concepts, subjectivities and temporalities.  I end by calling 
for an agential-realist account of intra-active memory, where intra-action, as defined by 
philosopher of science Karen Barad, presupposes no preexisting entities (or even 
temporalities) prior to relationships (2003).22  In the case of memory, intra-action means 
emphasizing not only the fluid relationships between individuals and machines, actors 
and actants, but also between the past, present, and future. 
 
                                                
22 Like Stengers' cosmopolitical approach, Barad's agential realist account "acknowledge[s] nature, the 
body, and materiality in the fullness of their becoming without resorting to the optics of transparency or 
opacity, [or] the geometries of absolute exteriority or interiority" (2003: 812). 
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 In guise of a conclusion, the last chapter draws on the tropes of the prototype and 
the parasite in order to think with Memories for Life's emergent recording technologies. 
Parasites, as philosopher Michel Serres reminds us, disturb systems (Serres 2007; Wolfe 
2007).  They create noise.  As parasites, prototypical recording technologies disturb our 
concepts of memory and forgetting.  Rather than merely representing the past, these 
technologies also help shape our present and future.  As such, they are performative 
rather than just representational or constative.  They help create subjects along with new 
concepts and temporalities.  Beyond their purely useful, or instrumental qualities, 
prototypical and parasitical technologies become tools to think with.  They help create 
what Marcus has termed para-sites: spaces "where anthropologists and their interlocutors 
come together to discuss matters of common concern"  (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010).  
They are spaces in which to perform horizontal collaborations in a transforming world 
(Marcus 2000).  In a sense, parasites (disturbers of systems) help produce para-sites 
(places in which to reflect on the possible disturbances that occur within these systems).  
Seen in this light, this dissertation in its attempt to evoke, depict and reconfigure old 
concepts might be considered a kind of parasitical prototype, a working tool to think 
with, to test ideas, and to generate new para-sites.  
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1- Sensors and Satellites: 
 
This chapter tracks the concept of memory back to a time before ubiquitous digital 
recording devices.  It examines the significance of the archive as it grapples with the 
notion of what it means to know our selves through practices of observation and 
recording.  First, we will see how Britain’s Mass-Observation Project, a nation-wide 
documentary endeavor that took place between 1937-1950, was defined by practices of 
omnivorous collecting.  We will examine how, in the hopes of creating an archive of 
daily musings of ordinary citizens, this project brought to light a number of problems 
associated with capturing the infinitely particular.  Held in constant tension between its 
identity as a work of art and a work of science, between its surrealist roots and statistical 
demise, the Mass-Observation Project sat at the intersection of poetry and pattern.  The 
sections that make up this chapter shift in scale from the micro to the macro: from the 
citizen sensor and collector of the mundane, to the satellite view of the social offered by 
the sheer mass of information gathered and made available over the course of this 
documentary endeavor.  We then review various critiques of this ambitious project and 
consider surrealistic, ethnographic and cybernetic processes of observation as ways to 
navigate this immense archive (Harrison et al. 1937; Highmore 2002; Hubble 2006; 
Luhmann 1998; MacClancy 1995; Malinowski 1922, 1954; Marcus 2001).23  The aim of 
this chapter is to offer an important historical interdisciplinary case study to think with 
that address the desire to know ourselves through practices of systematic observation, 
recording and archiving (Adorno 1980; Benjamin 1999; Luhmann 1998; Stocking 1983).   
                                                
23This section is based on archival research conducted at the Mass Observation Archive housed at the 
University of Sussex, UK in 2007.  
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Mass-Observation and the Collection of Everyday Life 
 
On the night of November 30th, 1936, the Crystal Palace in London, home of the 1851 
Great Exhibition and a symbol of Victorian capitalism, burnt down.  The smoke rising 
from that iron and glass building could be seen for miles.  Charles Madge (1912-96), a 
poet and journalist who had befriended England’s Surrealists, sought meaning in this 
incident, and wondered whether such events might help reveal some of society’s 
underlying myths and fantasies.  This burning of the Crystal Palace – as well as the 
abdication crisis over King Edward VIII’s love for an American divorcée – propelled 
Madge and a group of friends, including Humphrey Jennings (1907-50), a Surrealist 
painter, set designer and documentary filmmaker, to discuss the possibility of an 
"anthropology of our own people" (Madge 1937: 12). 
 
 On January 2nd, 1937, Madge wrote a letter to the New Statesman and Nation on 
behalf of this group, calling for a social investigation into the "Crystal Palace-Abdication 
symbolic situation."  Madge envisioned an exploration of public consciousness – 
examined through its coincidences and its idiosyncrasies. This vision was to be achieved 
through the enrolment of "real observers" who were "the millions of people […] 
irretrievably involved in the public events" (Madge 1937: 12).  He outlined and area of 
fieldwork focused on Britain's social imagination, and summarized his vision by stating 
that: "only mass observations can create mass science" (Madge 1937: 12). 
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 Tom Harrisson (1911-76), a renegade ornithologist turned anthropologist, 
described as "being more at home with cannibals than with academics," was living in 
Bolton and experimenting with some local fieldwork of his own through odd jobs as a 
truck driver or ice-cream man (Crain 2006: 1).  His poem about his latest exploration in 
the New Hebrides, "Coconut Moon," was published on the same page as Madge's letter in 
the New Statesman and Nation and, intrigued by this call for an anthropology of Britain, 
he went to London to meet Madge and his friends.  
 
 On January 30th, 1937, Harrisson, Madge and Jennings announced, in a new letter 
to the New Statesman and Nation entitled "Anthropology at Home," the launch of a 
project with the goal to document everyday life in Britain.  Seeking to go beyond the 
classic study of "primitives and abnormals" by a lone and foreign anthropologist away in 
the field, the project sought "to work with a mass of observers" who would "provide the 
points from which can be plotted weather-maps of public feeling" (Harrisson et al. 1937: 
155).  More of a campaign for a social movement than the description of an independent 
intellectual project, the letter called for the study of contemporary life through the 
observations of "behavior of people at war memorials, shouts and gestures of motorists 
[...] beards, armpits, eyebrows, anti-semitism [...] funerals and undertakers [... and] the 
private lives of midwives," among many other things (Harrisson et al. 1937: 155).  These 
observations were to be rigorously noted and exposed "in simple terms to all observers, 
so that their environment may be understood and thus constantly transformed" (Harrisson 
et al. 1937: 155).  This letter was the first of many publications by the group that came to 
be known as Mass-Observation; and London and Bolton soon became hubs for the study 
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of everyday life.  From the very beginning the founding trio's collaboration was a 
difficult one, "never even agreeing whether their group’s name meant observation of the 
masses or by them" (Crain 2006: 1).  They nonetheless managed to enlist thousands of 
volunteer observers and received countless reports of their daily lives.  
 
Surrealist Tactics and Juxtapositions 
 
Not much has been written about Mass-Observation in Anthropology, aside from a 
footnote in James Clifford's text "On Ethnographic Surrealism" (1988: 143).  If it weren't 
for a few books and articles by a few British cultural theorists (Highmore 2002; Hubble 
2006; MacClancy 1995; Marcus 2001), one can say that the movement itself has been 
largely neglected within the social sciences and the humanities.  In fact, even in George 
Stocking's Observers Observed, in which he looks at the history of British Anthropology 
and proposes to examine "the systematic study of human unity-in-diversity, against the 
background of historical experience and cultural assumption that has provoked and 
constrained it," there is no mention of the project (Stocking 1983: 6).  This is perhaps due 
to Mass-Observation's position at the borders of both academia and the arts.  Never quite 
fitting with any larger group or discipline, the project played with the very dichotomies 
that can be used to reflect on it today: familiar and strange, art and science, or observer 
and observed. 
 
 While Clifford's text focuses on French anthropology's influence on Surrealism 
between the two wars, it offers valuable insight into a time when ethnography was still 
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taking shape as a discipline, and when Surrealism was being defined as a practice rather 
than as a historical moment in art history.  It is this context of beginnings and possibilities 
that is important to keep in mind when considering Mass-Observation and its place in the 
history of the avant-garde and early social science in Britain.  It follows that ethnography 
and Surrealism are not fixed modes of thought, and that my discussion of them here 
cannot be considered the simple comparison between two different stable traditions.  
 
 An awkward movement to categorize, Mass-Observation situated itself at the 
intersection of many disciplines such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, art and 
poetry.  In the founders' words, "the artist and the scientist, each compelled by historical 
necessity out of their artificial exclusiveness, [were] at last joining forces and turning 
back towards the mass from which they had detached themselves" (Harrisson et al. 1937: 
155).  In February of that year, in the journal New Verse, the group stated that in "taking 
up the role of the observer, each person becomes like Courbet at his easel, Cuvier with 
his cadaver, and Humbolt with his continent" (quoted in Crain 2006: 1).  The group 
wanted to free prose and poetry from professionals and to create it by and for the people.  
 
 Again, founded by Madge a poet, Harrisson an anthropologist, and Jennings who 
had helped organize the International Surrealist Exhibition with Andre Breton, Mass-
Observation formed a collective version of an ethnography aimed at making the familiar 
strange through its gathering and laying out of facts and opinions 'at home.'  Adopting a 
Surrealist attitude, Mass-Observation looked for meaning in accidents and coincidences.  
As scientists, they explored "familiar aspects of everyday life as if they were part of an 
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unfamiliar culture" (Marcus 2001: 16).  Through the collage and juxtaposition of jarring 
and disparate elements, the group hoped to subvert the 'natural' understanding of the 
current state of affairs (the burning down of the crystal palace, the abdication crisis, the 
impending war, and the advancement of modern technology) and to reveal public myths 
and assumptions.  In their introductory pamphlet Mass-Observation elaborated on its 
desire to bring to light old superstitions and to reveal the problematic process of their 
adaptation to modern technological conditions.  As I will be discussing in the following 
sections, this is a reemerging theme in the later works of Jennings and also a reoccurring 
concern in the collecting practices of philosopher Walter Benjamin. 
 
The more recent acquisitions – electricity, the aeroplane, the radio – are so 
new that the process of adaption [sic] to them is still going on.  It is within 
the scope of the science of Mass-Observation to watch the process taking 
place – perhaps to play some part in determining the adaption of old 
superstitions to new conditions.  These forces are so new and so terrific 
that they are commonly thought of as kinds of magic power that can only 
be wielded by a few men, the technicians.  Hence there is a widespread 
fatalism among the mass about present and future effects of science, and a 
tendency to leave them alone as beyond the scope of the intervention of 
the common man.  The technician on the other hand, is not concerned with 
the implications of his activity or its effect on the masses (Harrisson and 
Madge 1937: 16). 
 
Mass-Observation set out to perform a kind of social diagnosis, with omnivorous 
collecting and juxtaposition as their main lab practices.  As Highmore points out, the "use 
of the term 'science' in Mass-Observation [was] insistent, but [...] also precarious and 
open to a wide range of meanings" (Highmore 2002: 83).  For early Surrealism, scientific 
language and reference to lab work was a way of emphasizing its role as a practice rather 
than as a static art movement.  Not only did the first wave of Surrealists including Andre 
Breton come from medical backgrounds, but also the first journal of Surrealism in 
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France, La Revolution Surrealiste (1924-9), mimicked the journal La Nature.  The 
journal solicited submissions, which were to be sent to the Bureau de Recherches 
Surrealistes.  Inspired by the ethnographic collection of foreign artifacts, Surrealism 
sought to change normative outlooks and behaviors and framed their work as a kind of 
scientific 'knowledge making' (Clifford 1988).  But these new forms of knowledge 
consisted in the destruction of what was already in place without necessarily proposing 
an alternative.  Surrealism's scientific practice consisted in leaving its objects in a state of 
unresolved suspense.  
 
 Similarly, of all of Mass-Observation's identity problems, the one that is called 
out the most is its double claim as both an artistic and scientific venture (Hubble 2006; 
Marcus 2001).  Mass-Observation negotiated emerging disciplinary boundaries, struggled 
with them, and highlighted the tensions and the possibilities resulting from their 
interplay.  What Mass-Observation produced, according to cultural theorist Laura 
Marcus, was "an interface between documentary realism and surrealism" (2001: 9).  The 
differences between the two views, scientific and artistic, attributed to Harrisson and 
Jennings respectively, are most often characterized as problematic to begin with.  And 
Nick Hubble points out that what is interesting in fact, is not so much the eventual 
dissolution of the project "split along these predestined lines, but that it was ever able to 
transcend such fundamental difference" (2006: 6).  But the fundamental difference 
between artistic and scientific endeavors is somewhat ironic and complex, and its 
transcendence at the time is perhaps less surprising than Highmore and Hubble and 
convey in their accounts of Mass-Observation.  European anthropologists and Surrealists 
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in the 1920s and 30s were, in a sense, playing the same game, only reversed.  Where 
anthropologists looked to the exotic in order to make it familiar, Surrealists turned their 
gaze toward their own environment and framed it in such a way as to make it strange.  
After having witnessed the unthinkable catastrophes of the First World War, artists and 
social scientists in Europe sought to capture human nature in all its apparent absurdity.  
They were fueled by a desire to see and to question the culture in which they found 
themselves, and to juxtapose it with other, at times startling, possibilities.  Ethnography 
in France sent observers on its Mission Dakar-Djibouti (1931-33) with expectations that 
they would return with a heap of foreign facts and objects; and "the surrealists frequented 
the Marché aux Puces, the vast flea market of Paris, where one could rediscover the 
artifacts of culture, scrambled and rearranged," out of context like a Duchamp 'ready-
made' (Clifford 1988: 121).  Both could be said to have been seeking alternatives to the 
established and taken for granted cultural order. 
 
 Meanwhile, Mass-Observation developed its own way of rediscovering British 
culture; and its method of collecting data left a lot of room for surprises and chance in the 
discovery of hidden meaning.  Alongside the regular diary entries and responses to 
questionnaires, the data collected by the group included "day surveys" which were filled 
out by volunteers on the twelfth of each month.  These culminated in the publication of 
what was perhaps the most experimental and poetic book by Mass-Observation, May the 
Twelfth: Mass-Observation Day Surveys 1937 by Over Two Hundred Observers.  In this 
collection of observations, people recounted their whereabouts, activities, thoughts and 
remarks on the day of George VI’s coronation.  "The group collected forty-three day-
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surveys, seventy-seven people answered written questionnaires, and a squad of twelve 
anonymous observers covered the coronation like reporters – or, rather, like cameras" 
(Crain 2006: 3).  Jennings edited the book with a certain aesthetic attitude that was not 
geared toward a linear 'scientific analysis' per se.  Rather, it was designed as a kind of 
montage, where one could read first-person descriptions of the day, survey and 
questionnaire responses, and observers' accounts of what they had witnessed and 
eavesdropped.  The narratives could be perused in any order one wished.  Thus, as the 
editors explained, different kinds of focus were obtained, "close-up and long shot, detail 
and ensemble" (Jennings and Madge 1937: 90).  But reading the accounts in May the 
Twelfth could be somewhat tedious.  The book provided close looks – one could easily 
call it a voyeuristic gaze – at the everyday (even during this exceptional event), written 
up in multiple ways by ordinary citizens.  Transcripts of bystanders' cheery dialogue 
preceded detailed, almost technical, accounts of a photographers attempt to capture the 
scene.  For example: 
 
[...] Women behind: ‘Isn’t she lovely.’ ‘Isn’t 
she wonderful.’ 
Cheers for Princess Royal, Princesses and Queen Mary. 
Cheers for mounted officers. 
Gold coach: ‘Isn’t it lovely.’ ‘Isn’t it gorgeous.’ 
 
76. (CM.I.) (Apsley Gate.) 3.14. A huge burst of cheers.  
G.B. camera man focuses – turns over the lens-turret – gets  
his eye to the viewfinder, and his left hand on the panning 
handle. Shoots. He turns the turret over again, looks through,  
turns back. Shoots. Next unscrews the telephoto lens. A band  
in the procession comes playing down the drive. He turns  
over again, has a look, pans to a new position. There is a  
rush of people forward and cheering [...] (Jennings and Madge 1937: 142). 
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Also included in the book were newspaper articles, editorials, "press-cuttings" and 
reports of worker strikes and riots that took place in the lead up to this national event.  
As MacClancy suggests, the inclusion of these various accounts was Mass-Observation's 
way of "lay[ing] bare the tensions of organizing a nationwide celebration of unity in a 
country where equality is not the rule" (1995: 500).  The presentation of replies to 
questions about what people thought of the coronation created an a times caustic montage 
of official and public attitudes toward the event.  Observers were asked to briefly 
document their own feelings or opinions, as well as their neighbors': 
 
 
OWN VIEW NEIGHBOURS’ VIEW 
CL.50. No desire to see. Neighbours indifferent or 
considered too much fuss 
was made 
CL.60. Very keen: saw 
Procession with Womens’ 
Institute ticket. 
Neighbours keen. ‘Children 
all eager to put their flags 
up.’ 
CL.66. ‘As a spectacle, yes; 
as an enthusiastic, cheering 
participant, no.’ 
‘Some were quite keen, but 
many were apathetic.’ 
 
 
 Despite the work's style of raw juxtaposition and montage, and the significant 
absence of commentary on the editors' part, at the end of the book Mass-Observation 
reiterated its desire to be:  
more than journalism or film documentary, because it ha[d] the aim in 
view not only of presenting, but of classifying and analysing, the 
immediate human world. By publishing this book at this stage [they were] 
fulfilling another of the tasks of MASS-OBSERVATION, that of inviting 
observers and potential observers to contribute both to the analysis of 
material here presented and also to the future construction of MASS-
OBSERVATION on a truly democratic basis (Jennings and Madge 1937: 
414).  
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The group invited the public to take part in constructing an image of itself.  It pulled 
authority away from the single observer by multiplying the number of people involved in 
the production and analysis of the raw material.  Cultural theorist Ben Highmore points 
out that the importance of recording the everyday – and especially the diversity to be 
found in the everyday – and between individuals on the same given day (the twelfth of 
the month for example) needs to be examined in the historical context leading up to 
WWII.  Mass-Observation responded to “the image of a society where diversity was 
being brutally and systematically eradicated (Nazi Germany) [... through] the practice of 
promoting a ‘totality of fragments’, of a society ‘united’ by a heterogeneous everyday, a 
commodity of diversity” (2002: 92).  Mass-Observation’s May the Twelfth, was an 
exercise in the re-contextualization of multiple and multi-vocal facts and narratives.  In 
the play between Surrealism and ethnography, "the 'will to order' of anthropology [was] 
seriously undermined, while at the same time Surrealism’s tendency to revel in mythic 
individualism [was] effectively countered" (Highmore 2002: 82).  The 'artist-scientist' 
was called upon to extend his subject matter to that of the masses, and his generalizations 
and realizations were to be collective rather than singular and individual. 
 
 The book, by and for the mass, did not sell well, perhaps due to its ironically high 
cost.24  Disagreeing with the editorial approach, Harrisson had not taken part in the 
production of May the Twelfth.  Tension between the founders escalated, and with other 
creative experiments in mind Jennings left Mass-Observation later that year to work as a 
documentary filmmaker.  Although he left Mass-Observation, Jennings continued to 
                                                
24Mass-Observation’s later book Britain was much more popular with the general public. Over 100 000 
copies sold within 10 days publication. 
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work on some of its ideas.  He started to collect writings about the history of 
technological change.  He gathered thousands of articles, minutes from meetings of the 
Royal Society, prose by writers such as Darwin and Wordsworth among many, many 
more.  He named his anthology Pandaemonium.  Edited after his death by his daughter 
Mary-Lou Jennings, and by Charles Madge, Pandaemonium 1660-1886: The Coming of 
the Machine as Seen by Contemporary Observers represents selections from Jennings 
collection of texts from the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries.  As a proponent of Surrealism 
and collective expression, he preferred to speak of 'images' as public representations 
rather than speaking of 'symbols,' which he considered private:  "An image was not to be 
thought up by a gifted person but rather, to be sought out in the external world, in 
literature, or in the past" (MacClancy 1995: 497).  The passages Jennings amassed were 
ones that marked England's imagination, documenting the Industrial Revolution onward.  
In the process of editing the volume, Madge grouped the different texts in a thematic 
index, an idea proposed by Jennings in the notes that accompanied his selections.  With 
headings like THE MAN OF SCIENCE, DAEMONS AT WORK and MINERS, the 
index lends, according to Madge, added depth and dimension to the collection.  For 
instance, as Madge explains in his introduction to the book, the heading "MAN-
ANIMAL-MACHINE, includes images in which animals are viewed as machines, and 
machines are viewed as animals, and goes somewhat beyond this to cover images of Man 
and Robot, and Man as Animal" (Madge 1985, xx).  Pandaemonium was not meant to be 
an accurate description, nor an extended analysis of the periods of history it addresses.  
Rather, it was intended as a 'presentation' in which the 'rough cuts' between the raw data 
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were to remain apparent, where delicate traces and pictures representing the human 
condition were to be imagined.   
 
 In 1938 Jennings did a series of talks on the radio elaborating on his poetic 
approach and his desire to collect relics from the past. 
 
Poetry he said, enabled man to deal with himself: to protect and arm 
himself.  He spoke of Apollinaire who said that the poet must stand with 
his back to the future because he was unable to see it: it was in the past 
that he would discover who he was and how he had come to be (Jennings, 
M. 1985, x-xi). 
 
It was Guillaume Apollinaire who coined the term Surrealism in 1917.  The movement, 
as he saw it, was imbued with an air of antiquity.  For the Surrealists, even the newest 
fashion had to be somewhat 'outmoded.'  In a sense Surrealism emerged at the 
intersections of novelty and antiquity.  Philosopher Walter Benjamin would become 
extremely wary of Surrealism's combination of innovative, radical discourse and the 
commoditization of the old.  Instead of a transformative practice, what the Surrealists 
reinforced for Benjamin was a fetish for the object and for random meaningless 
collections.  In fact, Benjamin was critical of the European avant-garde, especially the 
Surrealists, for not living up to their intended revolutionary project.  He condemned them 
for their tendency to leave their decontextualized objects in a state of suspense, which 
had little transformative effect and simply reaffirmed its condition as a commodity.  
Without a revolutionary purpose, art became "the corollary to the frivolity that glorifies 
commodity" (Benjamin 1978: 158).  For Benjamin, there is no such thing as aesthetics 
without politics.  If art does not take part in re-shaping the social and technological 
customs it seeks to subvert, it is liable to be absorbed by them.  That is why he was 
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critical of the Dadaist and Surrealist movements of the 1920s and 30s.  Against art being 
sold for profit, artists promoted the idea of "art for art."  But by attempting to detach 
themselves from the social, they became a mirror of what they aimed to criticize.  Artists 
promoted their own objects as isolated and freed from norms, politics and commerce; a 
move, Benjamin argued, would leave their work to become just that, a trend-setting tool 
in the hands of capitalism.  For Benjamin, Surrealism's aesthetic technique of 
accumulation and irony through juxtaposition did not translate into a political practice.  
The Surrealist method for him was something of a "trick" which substituted "a political 
for a historical view of the past" (Benjamin 1978: 182).  His initial reading of the 
Surrealists was permeated by a certain anticipation of the re-ordering of a world that they 
had helped put into question.  But the movement fell short and Benjamin was left waiting 
for the revolution. 
 
Clutter and consumption 
Right from the start the great collector is struck by confusion, by the scatter, in which the 
things of the world are found. - Walter Benjamin  
 
Benjamin's critiques of Surrealism resound when thinking through the problem of Mass-
Observation, especially when considering the eventual fate of the project as a market 
research firm, which we will get to below.  Attracted by its revolutionary and intuitively 
Marxist beginnings, Benjamin found promise in Surrealism.  But the movement failed to 
follow its initial political preoccupations, and Benjamin condemned what he considered 
to be their bourgeois attitude.  Benjamin attacked Surrealism for being too all 
encompassing, and thus ridding itself of the possibility of creating meaning. 
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Everything with which it came into contact was integrated.  Life only 
seemed worth living where the threshold between waking and sleeping 
was worn away in everyone as by the steps of multitudinous images 
flooding back and forth, language only seemed itself where sound and 
image, image and sound interpenetrated with automatic precision and such 
felicity that no drink was left for the penny-in-the-slot called "meaning."  
Image and language take precedence (Benjamin 1978: 178-179). 
 
In its own attempt at being all-inclusive, Mass-Observation ended up with an 
unmanageable collection of contemporary photographs, pamphlets and writings.  Their 
intended project was in a sense so vast that "rather than commenting on the everyday, it 
would become coterminous with it" (Highmore 2002: 83).  It would become as 
impractical as Jorge Luis Borges' 1:1 map of the world in Exactitude in Science (1998).  
Bogged down by the endless empiricism of the everyday, a step back toward 
generalization was nearly impossible.  Mass-Observation published only a fraction of the 
material it intended to circulate.  Catalogued boxes lined the walls of the archive (and in 
Sussex, they still do), ready to be made into a kind of usable past. 
 
 Benjamin would surely have been disappointed in Mass-Observation. The 
project’s initial aims for social transformation may have captured him at first, but he 
would have likely criticized the project’s lack of distinction between lived experience 
(Erlebnis) and discourse of/about experience (Erfahrung).  A major problem he 
associated with modernity was that discourse about experience was not turned into 
knowledge.  Experience remained at a level of mere accumulation and distraction: "What 
we are left with is 'experience' that doesn't enter into meaningfulness, can't be reflected 
on, and so is unavailable for criticism" (Highmore 2002: 67).  But in his writings 
Benjamin proposes a solution to this modern form of alienation and information 
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overload: to use similar techniques of montage and distraction.  Unlike most readings of 
his famous essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," I argue that 
Benjamin was not mourning the status of art with respect to technology.  Rather, what he 
suggested was for the artist to make use of modern technology and its effects.  If he was 
to be useful, the artist had to stay abreast of the specializations that create social divides.  
And the artist for Benjamin must remain useful.  In "The Author as Producer," Benjamin 
emphasizes the need to wrench things from "modish commerce" and to give them 
"revolutionary useful value" (Benjamin 1978: 230).  He uses the example of the 
photograph and encourages the author to master its technical specialization so that his 
production may be politically useful. "[...] the barriers imposed by specialization must be 
breached jointly by the productive forces that they were set up to divide" (Benjamin 
1978: 230).  Thus for Benjamin, distraction, collection and montage became techniques 
to be used to bring to light the disruptions brought on by a distracting and divisive 
modernity. 
 
 But Benjamin's critiques of modernity and the Surrealists are just a few of the 
many ways of looking at Mass-Observation.  His collecting practice is another.  During 
the course of thirteen years Benjamin amassed an innumerable amount of writing and 
citations that documented the development of modernity through capitalism's 
quintessential exhibition space, the Paris arcades, or the early mall.  Put together in a 
style that mimics the walk of a Flâneur through a maze of ready-made goods, Benjamin's 
voluminous and ambiguous work, The Arcades Project, was fascinated at once with new 
technology and with junk.  His methods, much like the Surrealists he criticized, consisted 
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in assembly and juxtaposition.  In the introduction to The Arcades Project the translators 
describe Benjamin's preferred objects as well as his technique: 
 
[...] it was not the great men and celebrated events of traditional 
historiography but rather the “refuse” and “detritus” of history, the half-
concealed, variegated traces of the daily life of “the collective,” that was 
to be the object of study, and with the aid of methods more akin – above 
all, in their dependence on chance – to the methods of the nineteenth-
century collector of antiquities and curiosities, or indeed to the methods of 
the nineteenth-century ragpicker, than to those of the modern historian 
(Benjamin 1999: ix). 
 
The project could be seen as a structural argument.  Like Mass-Observation's May the 
Twelfth, or Jennings' Pandaemonium, The Arcades Project could be navigated in many 
different ways.  Not composed as a classic book to be read from a-z, the collection 
included "blinks" or key words meant to act as hyperlinks.  Benjamin was constructing a 
miniature city where one could get lost and wander, swaying to the familiar rhythms of 
modernity – distraction and accumulation.  For Benjamin, history was just that: an 
incessant accumulation.  He describe this in his famous passage on the angel of history: 
 
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the 
past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his 
feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught 
in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. The storm is 
what we call progress (Benjamin 1968: 258). 
 
Benjamin's way of laying out modernity's 'wreckage' was through his own process of 
gathering.  He invented his own technique that involved emulating the surreal 
characteristics he criticized.  That is to say he adopted the alienating techniques he was 
suspicious of as a way if bringing them to light.  But later Adorno would disagree with 
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Benjamin's way of bringing modernity out of dream and into history by simple 
accumulation and juxtaposition.  He argued against the simple presentation of facts and 
quotes.  For him, Benjamin's study was "located at the crossroads of magic and 
positivism. That spot [was] bewitched [and only] theory could break the spell" (1980: 
129).  He accused Benjamin of remaining at the historical level of the mere collection of 
experience (Erlebnis) and of not moving towards a politics and theory (Erfahrung).  
 
 And what about Mass-Observation – can the project be seen as a kind of structural 
comment on modernity?  Like Benjamin, Mass-Observation created a platform in which 
their political views met their aesthetic concerns.  The group at once struggled with and 
embraced its gathering and representation of a shear plethora of voices speaking at once.  
The Mass-Observation project, like Pandaemonium, and The Arcades Project was a work 
of citations, an explosion of the grand-narrative of history into its multiple fragmented 
parts.  This fragmentation became an end in itself.  And like the process of modernity 
they attempt to represent, these three documentary projects could potentially have gone 
on forever.  In fact, Pandaemonium and The Arcades Project were reconstructed out of 
the materials found in suitcases belonging to Jennings and Benjamin respectively.  The 
works were both edited based on notes and discussions left by their deceased master 
collectors.  "As far as the collector is concerned, his collection is never complete; for let 
him discover just a single piece missing, and everything he's collected remains a 
patchwork" (Benjamin 1999: [H4a, 1] 211).  An endless sea of noise and information 
formed the very material for these projects; and indeed the colossal works appear 
unfinished.  
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Observations and Critiques: the Ethnographer Sensor 
[...] behaviour is a fact, a relevant fact, and one that can be recorded. And foolish indeed 
and short-sighted would be the man of science who would pass by a whole class of 
phenomena, ready to be garnered, and leave them to waste, even though he did not see at 
the moment to what theoretical use they might be put! - Bronislaw Malinowski 
 
Humphrey Jennings' departure from Mass-Observation signals a shift for those who have 
studied the movement and its history.  Mass-Observation's subsequent work was much 
more statistically argued and contained much less raw or poetic material from overheard 
conversations and observations.  Without Jennings, Harrisson and Madge continued the 
project, aided by groups of hired and voluntary observers, and topics continued to range 
from politics and smoking, to astrology and pub going.  It is unclear as to how some 
observers were paid during this period, but Harrisson, a fairly public figure, was able to 
obtain some funding through radio appearances where he would discuss either his latest 
expeditions overseas or his groups' observations of British behavior and opinion. 
 
 Although Surrealism helped define Mass-Observation in Britain, the project 
explicitly aimed for a certain kind of scientific rigor; and the founders sought to draw, 
however problematically, conclusions about the mass.  Moreover, in spite of their goal to 
create an archive of the everyday made for the people by the people, Mass-Observation 
looked for legitimacy within intellectual and academic spheres.  They eventually created 
an Advisory Panel, which included biologist Dr. Julian Huxley, theologian Canon F. R. 
Barry, social anthropologist Professor Bronislaw Malinowski, and H. G. Wells, among 
others.  
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 In the forward to a Mass-Observation pamphlet handed out earlier that year, 
evolutionary biologist Julian Huxley endorsed the project of studying the English.  For 
him knowledge was the only way to "obtain any efficient measure of control."  And this 
was to be done by methods akin to "bird-watching and natural history observation."  By 
inviting the public to notice things they had previously taken for granted about their own 
society, Mass-Observers could, according to Huxley, "put many orthodox scientists to 
shame in their simplicity, clearness and objectivity" (Huxley 1937: 6).  His emphasis on 
the scientific and empirical nature of the project was, however, significantly toned down 
at the end of his short forward, where he noted the possibility of a wider social artistic 
outlet:  "Nothing could well be more valuable than to contribute towards ending the 
present divorce between the artist and society at large, and towards initiating a period of 
truly socialized art" (Huxley 1937: 7).  As I have noted above, this push and pull between 
the rigorous nature of bird-watching and the affective nature of a social art form is key to 
understanding the complex history of Mass-Observation and the diversity of those 
involved.  It is also characteristic of the context in which the project was founded, that is 
to say a milieu in which art was becoming more politically and psychologically 
subversive, and in which social inquiry was gaining recognition as a worthwhile 
scientific endeavor. 
 
 The group subsequently printed the book Mass-Observation: First Year's Work 
1937-8, where they once again outlined their goals of "social recording" and of making 
"invisible forces visible."  Armed with the desire to continue their experiment, they urged 
for the study of "the beliefs and behaviour of the British Islanders" (Madge and Harrisson 
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1938: 8).  Anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski wrote the afterward to this book in 
which he outlined an encouraging critique of Mass-Observation.  In his own widely 
celebrated work, Argonauts of the Western Pacific Malinowski elaborated on the 
importance of being present among the Trobriand Islanders whose way of life he depicted 
(1922).  Throughout he described how he feverishly kept notes on the minutiae of 
everyday life while in the field.  In so doing, he could fulfill one of the outlined goals of 
his ethnographic fieldwork:  To create a "collection of ethnographic statements, 
characteristic narratives, typical utterances, [...] to be given as a corpus inscriptionum, as 
documents of native mentality" (Malinowski 1922: 24).  As part of what was, since the 
late 19th century, a collective effort both in the US and in Europe to preserve what was 
considered the disappearing remnants of our human past, anthropologist were urged to go 
out and record indigenous cultures.  "Alas! the time is short for Ethnology, and will this 
truth of its real meaning and importance dawn before it is too late?" (Malinowski 1922, 
518).  A romanticizing of the discipline, and a concern with historicity, flirted with a 
form of nostalgia or regret for past custom (Stocking 1983).  In his large and detailed 
accounts of cultural groups in New Guinea, Northwester Melanesia, the Trobriand 
Islands, as well as in Australia, the US and Mexico, Malinowski fluctuated between 
evocative romantic descriptions and the elaboration of his functionalist theory.  He 
maintained that by attending to the wider context of Culture, the anthropological 
fielworker would be in the best position to genuinely contribute to "the study of man" of 
which psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics, history and other social sciences 
and humanities were also part.  Although Malinowski sought to refute the popular 
evolutionary hypotheses of the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Morgan 1985; Stocking 
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1983), he remained positivist in his desire to capture fleeting moments in time that could 
lend insight into the "rules and regularities of tribal life" (1922, 11).  His  
 
principles of method can be grouped under three main headings; first of all 
naturally, the [researcher] must possess real scientific aims, and know the 
values and criteria of modern ethnography.  Secondly, he ought to put 
himself in good conditions of work, that is, in the main, to live without 
other white men, right among the natives.  Finally he has to apply a 
number of special methods of collecting, manipulating and fixing his 
evidence (Malinowksi 1922, 6).  
 
Malinowski took hundreds of photographs and collected innumerous amounts of notes; 
documenting proof of what he argued was the secret of successful fieldwork - being 
there.  Since, Malinowski is often thought of as the archetypical ethnographic 
fieldworker, and despite the epistemological concerns evident in his writings, he has 
come to be associated with the creation of a certain mystique behind fieldwork and its 
methods (1922, 1954, 1960).  For Malinowski, the people he studied were a source of 
"crude data" that could later be turned into a true "Scientific Theory of Culture" (1960).  
Fieldnotes were an empirical step in the kind of magic that led one from the field to 
social theory. 
 
 In his afterward to Mass-Observation, Malinowski welcomed the organization 
and described himself as a proponent of 'anthropology at home,' especially for its political 
value in helping to avoid totalitarianism through widespread knowledge rather than 
ignorance.  But he was critical of Mass-Observation's methodology.  In order to become 
what he called "an instrument of social scientific research," Mass-Observation would 
have to be more theoretical, methodological, and rigorous.  They would also need to 
explain their choices of observations.  In his 1916 essay "Baloma; The Spirits of the 
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Dead," Malinowski attempted to outline his method for dealing with the "chaos of 
diversity and multiplicity" encountered in the field by reducing it to "simpler data" (1954: 
241).  But his argument was somewhat contradictory.  In one instance he seemed to 
suggest that data must be "recorded in a scientifically useful form," (237) and that 
collecting is in and of itself an act of choosing and therefore generalizing.  In another, he 
argued for the gathering of as many "cultural facts" as possible, leaving the parsing and 
theorizing to later.  In other words, he asserted on the one hand that without prior 
interpretation about what constituted relevant cultural information, "all scientific work in 
the field must degenerate into pure "collectioneering" of data;" and on the other that "one 
of the main rules with which [he] set out on [his] field work was 'to gather pure facts, to 
keep the facts and interpretations apart'" (Malinowski 1954: 237).  In the same essay, he 
argued against what he called the "cult of 'pure fact'" and proposed that one know what 
one is looking for and why.  In that sense, "every ethnological document" he insisted, "is 
itself a generalization" or step toward theory (Malinowski 1954: 238).  As he stated in 
another essay:  
 
[t]here is no such thing as description completely devoid of theory [...] 
which declares that some facts are relevant and others adventitious, that 
some factors determine the course of events and others are merely 
accidental by-play [...] To observe means to select, to classify, to isolate 
on the basis of theory (Malinowski 1960: 7-12). 
 
The process then appears to be two-fold for Malinowski: the elaboration of a theory is 
based on empirical observations that subsequently determine what observed cultural 
factors are relevant towards the discovery of general sociological laws.  So a process of 
induction (achieved through the documentation of observed cultural manners in the field) 
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orients one's later observations; and derived theories can then find confirmation or doubt 
through further empirical proof. 
 
 One need not look too far to discover the formulation of rules and regulations. 
According to Malinowski, the scientific method is intrinsic to the every day, or to human 
nature writ large.  Science is natural, even innate, and proof of this is culture itself.  
Human's use of words and concepts illustrated for Malinowski the presence of an 
underlying scientific method.  Science for him was implicit in all things.  Even those who 
rely on intuition can be thought in this sense as relying on a scientific method, since all 
action is based on passed experiences in the hopes of predicting future outcomes.  This 
definition of science, as a reliance on the past through observation and generalizations for 
the sake of the future, was for Malinowski at the heart of culture and "must be assumed 
as having been at work from the very beginning of mankind, ever since the species 
started on its career as homo faber, as homo sapiens, and as homo politicus." (Malinowski 
1960: 10).  The scientific approach that underlies human action is transmitted through 
example and through the elaboration of what we have come to understand as traditions 
and institutions.  For Malinowski's functionalist theory, culture is thus based on this 
implicit act of prediction, and all action comes to be understood as "a means to an end" 
(Malinowski 1960: 7).  Thus his definition of science derived from a pragmatic execution 
of a response to basic human needs.  Theory and its application were inseparable.  Seen 
in this light, Mass-Observation's vast collection of everyday words and actions could 
indeed have provided fertile ground for inductive theoretical fodder, à la Malinowski. 
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 But Malinowski warned Mass-Observation against the possible confusion 
between ethnographer and informant.  He highlighted inherent problems he saw between 
objective and subjective collection of data, arguing that there must remain a distance – an 
existential difference – between observers and observed.  He clarified that what was now 
technically called a "Mass-Observer" was really what anthropologists called an 
informant: "An informant is a member of the community observed who comments on 
happenings and takes part in them, who supplies the motives and feelings which account 
for his fellow-tribesmen's behaviour" (Malinowski 1938: 118).  Informants, for 
Malinowski, needed to be addressed as such, that is to say contextualized in terms of 
economic, social and cultural conditions.  The goal of an observation by the masses, of 
the masses, for the masses was thus seen as fundamentally flawed at the outset, since 
Mass-Observation deliberately confused the roles of the native informant and that of the 
trained and more objective ethnographer.  Finally, Malinowski suggested the group mix 
more with other social sciences and academia in general.25 
 
 In spite of Malinowski's critique, Mass-Observation continued to blur the lines 
between scientists and objects, between poets and muses.  Echoing French writer Michel 
Leiris' recent work L'Afrique Fantôme (1981) – in which he narrated his travels on the 
                                                
25 Raymond Firth, anthropologist at the London School of Economics, was not as indulgent in his critique 
as Huxley or Malinowski.  He argued that Mass-Observation was not original, that there had been previous 
observers of British working class life.  He also pointed to the lack of cohesiveness among the amassed 
‘facts.’  He considered them decentered and disconnected, and as such, the undigested information was of 
little social scientific value.  About the observers, he thought they claimed too much (MacClancy 1995).  
He attacked mass-Observation and their latest book Britain (1939) for unrepresentative statistics in a 
lecture that was later published in the journal Sociological Review.  His critique was no surprise given the 
fact that British social anthropology was claiming its ground as a professional discipline of trained 
observers, while Mass-Observation’s practices implied that anyone was fit for the job.  Everything from 
Mass-Observation was collectively written, rather than presented as the product of individualistic fieldwork 
such as that which was being established by the discipline in the 1930s. 
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Mission Dakar-Djibouti in a style that courted both autobiography and anthropology – the 
writings by Mass-Observation were a kind of self-ethnography that disdained the 
distinction between objective and subjective.26  Predicated on the idea that the mass was 
both the one to observe and to be observed, the group encouraged a kind of self-
examination and suspicion of the ethnographer's authority that anticipated anthropology's 
postmodern reflexive turn in the 1980s.  But Mass-Observation went a step further:  It 
sought to be demotic and revolutionary by creating documents for, by, and about, the 
people.  Cultural theorist Ben Highmore in his work on the everyday argues that the 
movement 
 
is most productive, as an approach to everyday life, when it treats 'natives' 
as the ethnographers.  In doing so [...] Mass-Observation can be seen as 
generating a radically democratic project.  It is here that Mass-Observation 
can be seen to fulfill the promise of Surrealist ethnography: the potential 
for everyone (academic ethnographers, capitalist industrialists, working 
men and women, and so on) to become 'natives' (Highmore 2002: 87). 
 
In fact, many have looked to the project as a practice that exemplified philosopher Michel 
DeCerteau's notions of resistance and agency through writing.  Authors Dorothy 
Sheridan, Brian Street and David Bloom have addressed self-writing as the carving out of 
a space for oneself where one can resist dominant social structures and meanings.  They 
have praised Mass-Observation for valuing the 'ordinary' narratives that get left out of 
official histories (Sheridan et al. 2000).  A kind of precursor to the study of the subaltern, 
the project has been hailed for paying attention to the history told by those most often 
marginalized from it, such as women, minorities and the working-class.  
                                                
26 Georges Bataille, an anthropologist writing in France around that same time, is also considered a primary 
figure in the blurring of genres such as poetry and scientific writing, autobiography and fiction. His journal 
Documents (1929-30), in which both anthropologists and artists published, used ironic montage to critique 
the artificial assemblages of acquired knowledge. For a discussion of this journal, see Clifford (1988). 
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 When war was declared by Britain, mass observers kept diaries and records 
detailing such things as reactions to propaganda and feelings about the blackouts.  Led by 
a frustration with the representation of the public in the press, Mass-Observation took on 
the task of mapping the social unconscious and of tracking public opinion.  This resulted 
in the publication of the book War Begins at Home (1940). The Ministry of Information 
took interested in their study and hired the group for its insight on morale.  But Madge 
disagreed with Mass-Observation's involvement with government, and in July 1940, he 
left the group, later becoming professor of sociology at the University of Birmingham.  
As for Harrisson, he continued to write reports for the Ministry of Information.  By 1945, 
in order to stay afloat financially, Mass-Observation's focus shifted from governmental to 
commercial work.  Harrisson soon left the organization and then became director of the 
national museum of Brunei.  By 1950, Mass-Observation Ltd. was an independent market 
research firm. 
 
 The Mass-Observation Archive, which includes an enormous collection of notes 
and reports written between 1937 and 1950, was given by Harrisson to the University of 
Sussex special collections, where it is now held.  It has since become a resource for 
historians looking to study wartime Britain and for cultural theorist focusing on the study 
of the everyday.  The idea of Mass-Observation was re-launched in 1981 so that reactions 
to the Royal Wedding and life under the Thatcher Government could be documented; and 
historians and archivists, who manage the collection at Sussex, continue to issue 
questionnaires to a panel of about 500 observers whose replies are also made available as 
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part of the current archive. Over twelve years ago, there were "over three thousand File 
Reports and over a thousand boxes of raw material, each box containing at least five 
hundred sheets" (Jeffery 1999: 51). The boxes can be looked through while in a glass 
room at the University of Sussex library, where a stopped clock on the wall in the shape 
of an eye reminds the curious researcher of the complex relations between viewer and 
viewed embodied in the archive. 
 
Second Orders of Observation 
 
 What Malinowski is proposing in his critique of Mass-Observation when he 
emphasizes the distinction between ethnographer and informant is what German 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann might have later considered a markedly modern second 
order of observation, or as Faubion puts it, the capability "of observing observers 
observing" (2011: 111).  The problem for both Malinowski and Luhmann is a 
methodological and epistemological one.27  In fact, Malinowski's search for the decoding 
of rule-based functionalist systems might find affinities with Luhmann's later theorizing 
of functionally differentiated communicative and organizational systems (Luhmann 
1998).  Luhmann's systems theory, its analytic divide between organized self-reproducing 
processes and their environment, and its reliance on the closure of these organized 
systems with respect to their environment are not unproblematic, but visiting them might 
offer a different way of looking at the problem of clutter and too much information that 
Mass-Observation and other grand collection endeavors face.  They may, moreover, 
                                                
27 To be more precise, for Luhmann the epistemological problem is indistinguishable from an ontological 
one.  How we come to know and observe the world is part and parcel of that world (or system to be exact). 
  
67 
67 
allow for the unearthing of cybernetic and information theoretic sensibilities that were 
brewing in many disciplines in Europe and in the US towards the end of WWII and on 
which Luhmann's model theoretic project is based.28  These information theoretic 
sensibilities have directly lead to the development of documentary technologies such as 
those currently produced by Memories for Life scientists, and would have undoubtedly 
fueled Mass-Observation's as well as Malinowski's inductivist and empiricist quest. 
 
 Perhaps too succinctly put, Luhmann's systems, whether living, 
psychic/experiential, or social, exist within environments that nurture and/or irritate the 
systems (1998).  They are systems, and subsystems (whether economic, legal or political) 
that are based on this very divide between themselves and their complex environment.29  
Within these systems is communication.  There, environmental complexity is reduced 
and information is parsed according to meaning that is grounded in binary semantic 
distinctions proper to each autonomous system.  Any communication that brings into a 
system other codes that do not directly contribute to the maintenance of that system 
produces what is essentially considered noise.  When the parsing of information and the 
communication of meaning fail to maintain the system it dissolves back into its 
environment.  Seen in this light, Mass-Observation's difficulty is one of a failure to 
reduce complexity.  Some principle of selection must operate in any engagement with 
immediate experience; otherwise, the sheer complexity of experience remains 
(cognitively and perhaps also affectively) overwhelming.  One has the system-theoretic 
                                                
28 Faubion outlines different kinds of programmatic inquiries of which the model theoretic is but one kind 
(well exemplified by Luhmann). See Faubion 2011. 
29 The separations between subsystems are themselves the result of the differentiation made by and within a 
larger social system.  As Luhmann explains: "subsystems of a social system [...] acquire their own form 
from this system's form of differentiation" (1998: 17). 
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right as a consequence to declare any such approach "incoherent," which Malinowski 
seems to come quite close to doing.  Despite his at times contradictory explanation of 
how to go about doing fieldwork and collecting data, Malinowski's methodological 
arguments for a trained anthropologist collector, as opposed to any lay observer and 
documenter, is based on his presumed professional ability to parse information and to 
reduce complexity.   
  
 For Luhmann, the social emerges from the interactions and communications that 
occur between psychic/experiential systems.  Individual actors exist but are distinct from 
these systems.  They constitute in a sense systems' environment.  Not unlike 
Malinowski's institutions, each independent system (or subsystem) serves a function that 
contributes to the overall maintenance of the larger social system (although subject to 
their own codes, the subsystems don't intentionally contribute to anything but 
themselves).  But unlike Malinowski's or Mass-Observations' focus on subjects, whether 
the Trobriand Islanders or the British, Luhmann focuses on the structure and semantics of 
particular systems.  In doing so, the object Luhmann emphasizes is communication itself 
rather than the communicating subject.  As James Faubion and Cary Wolfe point out, this 
allows for multiple subject positions as well as composite (and cyborg subjects) to co-
exist (2011; 2010).  
 
 Indebted to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's, who are in turn indebted 
to Heinz von Foerster's, biological notion of autopoeisis (self-reproduction or self-
making), Luhmann's systems theory postulates that the "modern or functionally 
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differentiated social system depends for its ongoing autopoeisis on the capacity of its 
subsystems to 'recognize themselves' in terms of binary codes that are specific to each of 
them" (Faubion 2011: 108).  Luhmann's concern with observation is part of a second 
wave of cybernetic thinking, which we will address further below.  Of interest here 
however is less an expose of Luhmann's argument for a functionally differentiated 
systemic modernity than the second order observations his modernity rests on.  For now: 
more than a simple distinction between observers and observed (first order), a second 
order observation implies the ability to observe oneself observing.  Based on an epistemic 
questioning - how we come to know the world - the second order takes the first order as 
its object.  For Malinowski, who seeks to formulate a more detached and objective 
science of man, the privileged position from which to know the world is that of the 
reflexive and methodologically trained ethnographer's (versus lay Mass-Observers 
observing themselves, which he would likely consider merely capable of first order 
observation had he made use of such concepts); whereas for Luhmann, it would seem that 
the ethnographer is able to see insofar as the systemic organization of which he is part 
allows him to.  Luhmann posits from the start that "there is no common (correct, 
objective) approach to a preexisting world" (1998: 10).  There are no external observers.  
Everything operates within a system.  In short, what Luhmann proposes is "a reflection 
on the forms of [...] a system's own self-observations and self-descriptions.  These must 
be submitted within the system in a process that must in turn be observed and described" 
(1998: ix).  So, although Malinowski still seeks to situate himself (the observer) outside 
the observed system (an impossibility for Luhmann), his emphasis on the observer's role 
in observing how he (the observer) is parsing social information might be considered a 
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form of second order observation.  In short, of interest is no longer the world out there, 
but the process of observation itself.   
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Systems Emerge From Noise:  
 
This chapter is also in part historical.  The practices addressed herein examine how 
architectures of memory and technological conditions of knowledge about ourselves are 
imagined and created.  While not embarking on a linear history of recording devices, this 
first half of this chapter examines the history of cybernetics and computing.  It considers 
the formalization of matter and meaning into pure information, and charts how, over the 
course of particular historical moments, the past has been turned into digital 0s and 1s.  
The second half of this chapter presents certain projects and practices of interdisciplinary 
scientists who are part Memories for Life.  These scientists develop information-mining 
technologies in order to improve human memory and knowledge about our selves.  The 
juxtaposition of these two sections - of the history of cybernetics and computing, and 
various Memories for Life projects - might enable a kind of montage thinking, a formal 
response to the practices examined, an enactment of the problems of gathering the 
particular and of collecting things in bits and pieces while gesturing to something larger 
at stake: the ways we attempt to look at our selves. 
 
A Brief History of Cybernetics and Computing 
Here we have the basis for a character profile of a technical civilization: if hypochondria 
is an obsession with the circulation of substances and the functioning of the primary 
organs, we might well describe modern man, the cybernetician, as a mental 
hypochondiac, as someone obsessed with the perfect circulation of messages. - Jean 
Baudrillard 
 
In the introductory chapter, we have seen how Memories for Life scientists make time 
and memories matter, that is, render them something to be captured, stored and shared.  
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In the second chapter, we have examined Mass-Observation's project to document the 
everyday life of the British and the project's resulting struggle in dealing with too much 
unfiltered information.  We have since visited Luhmann's notion of second order 
observation that allows for the parsing of complex information in the making of 
autonomous systems.  Luhmann essentially marks a passage in modernity from a concern 
with language (as representational) to a concern with code (as productive and inventive 
of distinctions).  The cybernetic or information theoretic sensibilities that characterize 
modernity for Luhmann are inherent in the conceptualization of certain projects that are 
part of Memories for Life, including those that seek, like Mass-Observation did, to 
provide a wide-angle view of the social and its memories as well as to provide elements 
that might contribute to the management of information in general.  Had Mass-
Observation sought ways to reduce the complexity of the information it indiscriminately 
collected, it may have struggled less (or a least differently) in its attempts to provide a 
portrait of the British.  In the section below, we will briefly expand on the history of 
cybernetics that Luhmann is but a part of.  A turn to the history of cybernetics and the 
related history of computing will help us examine how the emphasis on information and 
communication (as opposed to communicating subjects) is what allows for the 
disembodied notion of memory to thrive as something that can be recorded and 
subsequently tapped into.  In other words, by attending to this historical moment, we may 
better understand how we have come to observe, parse, communicate, and store 
information in the digital shape of 0s and 1s. 
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 WWII played a significant role in the development of new forms of acquisition 
and organization of information, the Mass Observation Project being but one example.  
Around the same time that the Mass Observation Project gained popularity in Britain, 
researchers there and in the U.S. were busy developing tools that would, decades later, 
promise to achieve many of the same goals: the creation of social knowledge through the 
mass documentation of everyday life.  Dubbed by historian of science George Dyson as 
the "big bang of the digital universe," this moment in the mid 20th century, saw the birth 
of what have arguably become two of the world's most commanding technologies: the 
atom bomb, and computing (2012).  Although the history of the Manhattan project is 
fairly well documented, the history of computing, invented at the same time, by the same 
people, remains somewhat more obscure.   
 
 Dyson considers this "big bang" the dawn of a new kind of species that he calls 
digital organisms. "Digital organisms, while not necessarily any more alive than a phone 
book, are strings of code that replicate and evolve over time.  Digital codes are strings of 
binary digits - bits" (Dyson 2012).  He describes the world, including movies, software, 
and viruses, in terms of these binary codes, which get replicated, much like genetic codes 
of organisms more commonly considered "living," through simple ways like the copying 
of cds, or Internet links.  Though he doesn't consider these sequences of code life per se, 
he likens them nonetheless to nucleotide sequences that might one day lead to life.  He 
compares operating systems to species of fauna and software applications to microbes, 
while Facebook and Amazon represent multicellular giants in our now digital universe.  
But as Dyson and James Gleick, author of The Information, remind us, we've been 
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inscribing and copying codes for centuries, keeping track of things, messages and 
transactions, long before the so called "digital big bang" of the 1950s (Gleick 2011).  
What's changed is the speed at which the transfer and the inscription of codes take place.  
"Like our own universe at the beginning, it's more exploding than expanding [...] 
expanding at the rate of 5 trillion bits per second in storage and 2 trillion transistors per 
second on the processing side" (Dyson 2012).  But as we will see below, over the last 
century, certain modes of thinking as well as technological developments coalesced in 
complex ways to form the field of cybernetics that the universe Dyson describes relies 
on. 
 
 Over time the word digital has come to mean much more than its literal and albeit 
defining characteristic of discrete (fingerlike) numericality.  It has come to represent a 
way of seeing the world, a way of thinking.  Anthropologist Dominic Boyer calls this 
epistemic approach that "has informed entire theoretical paradigms and analytical styles," 
"digital reason," not the least of which informs the work of the scientists I address in this 
dissertation (2013: 298).  To start with, and following Boyer, by digital, I mean the range 
of what we've come to refer to as virtual, instantaneous, and ubiquitous.  As such, digital 
is a qualifier for media, for communications and for objects.  In the final sections of his 
book on contemporary news journalism, The Life Informatic, Boyer addresses what he 
calls "a parallel legacy of digital mediation and digital thinking in anthropology" (2013: 
296).  As he points out, although digital media is a relatively new object in 
anthropological research, but "thinking digitally," in anthropology and in other sciences, 
has a much longer history.  Distinguishing the emergence of "digital reason" from digital 
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media proper, he maps out an ecology, rich with interdisciplinary exchanges in which 
technological advances permeate epistemological histories across the human sciences.  
 
 Starting with Freud's models of energy and current in the psyche, Boyer shows how 
an "electric sensibility" flowed through late 19th and early 20th century reasoning.  
Sparking urban landscapes and social imaginaries, "electricity offered [...] a method of 
understanding" the world (2013: 303).  Following these reflections on our early electric 
sensibilities Boyer turns to electronic computation, although, as he states, computation 
and mechanization were around long before the advent of electricity.  From Pascal's 17th 
century calculators, to Jacquard's famous 19th century punch-card loom, to Babbage and 
Lovelace's mid-19th century analytical engine, to Hollerith's turn of the 20th century 
tabulation machine, computation became a means for managing large amounts of data.  
By the early 20th century, with the emergence of major tabulating companies and the 
"industrialization and institutionalization of electro-mechanical computation," data 
processing became an industry (Boyer 2013: 305).  It was not until the 1930s however 
that these electric analogue computers were used to perform complex calculations in 
areas from the design of buildings, to gunnery systems, to more complex government and 
military operations.  
 
 In the mid 1930s, Alan Turing, British mathematician and cryptanalyst, 
conceptualized the first stored program computer that contained both instructions and 
data.  Turing's mathematical work showed that it was possible to code for 
unpredictability; computers could be given a set of rules and numbers, but those rules 
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couldn't predict how a system would behave, nor what numbers would be subsequently 
generated.  A few years later, Claude Shannon, another wartime cryptographic 
researcher, introduced the Boolean binary 0s and 1s as a way of converting and 
transmitting data (Dyson 2012; Gleick 2011; Hayles 1999).30  This process of conversion 
into 0s and 1s marked a new form of digital computation, based on filtering discrete 
signals from continuous noise.  True and relevant "information" extracted through a 
series of questions was transmitted, leaving behind spectrums of what was considered 
insignificant static perturbations.  As media historian Friedrich Kittler reminds us in his 
history of the gramophone, film and typewriter,  
cybernetics, the theory of self-guidance and feedback loops, is a theory of 
the Second World War. [...] During the war, a whole organization emerged 
for the purpose of delivering the results of fully automatized 
cryptoanalysis in coded form to the commanding officers at the front. 
(1999: 259-261).   
 
Wartime research continued to fuel innovations in information management, and the 
1940s saw the appearance of the first programmable digital computers.31   
 
                                                
30 In his old age, Claude Shannon developed Alzheimer's disease. Because of this disease, he died without 
ever being fully aware of the digital revolution spurred by his research. 
31 In line with and inspired by Foucault's archeology of knowledge and understanding of technology as 
tools which guide discourse and practice, Kittler seeks to map out discourse networks, which include a 
number of agents such as the technologies themselves and the institutions involved in the production, 
selection and storage of data which in turn becomes knowledge.  Kittler's also Latourian approach to 
technology places importance not solely on the object's invention, circulation or overall influence, but also 
on the making of socio-technical networks through the mobilization of historically contingent agents.  In 
Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler emphasizes the epochal change that came with Edison's prototype 
of the phonograph (1877), which marked the debut of the storing of sensory data.  Edison's phonograph, 
Kittler recounts, was a by-product of other inventions such as Willis' machine (1829), which related sound 
to speed and Scott's phonautograph (1857), which rendered sound visible.  He explains that before the 
phonograph, time could not be recorded except through what Lacan terms the symbolic means of writing.  
Here Kittler uses Lacan's notion of the symbolic to denote the discontinuity of signifiers involved in 
writing.  Streams of data (without noise) are transformed into letters with the monopoly of writing; and 
meaning emerges from a material finite set of Saussurian signifiers.  The symbolic is thus a structural grid.  
With the phonograph "the real takes the place of the symbolic" (1999: 24).  Romantic symbolic language is 
replaced by noise.  
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 Of interest and relevance to us in this compact history are not only the 
technologies being built, but also those being imagined.  One such technology is 
Vannevar Bush's Memex.  In his famous article, "As We May Think" (1945), Bush, head 
of the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, 
introduced the concept of the Memex, or "Memory Extender," a device now considered 
to be the prototypical hypermedia machine.  It would have allowed an individual to store 
all his books, records and communications so that they might be consulted with ease and 
speed.  Theoretically, the Memex would have consisted of a desk that would display 
microfilms of entered data such as books, articles and photographs.  The data would be 
associated by threads of key words and saved links, and later retrieved using a kind of 
code, much like the World Wide Web, Wikipedia, or desktop searches today.  Bush 
described it as "an enlarged intimate supplement to [a user's] memory" (1945).  Bush's 
Memex was never built.  Nevertheless, the ideas behind this memory device have 
spawned numerous current technologies, which allow for the capture, archival, and 
retrieval of large amounts of data.  Microsoft Research's prototypical database system 
MyLifeBits that allows for the storage and management of a person's entire collection of 
digital media, including text documents, images, sounds, and video discussed in the 
introduction (and which will be elaborated on in the following chapter) is directly 
inspired by Bush's Memex (Gemmell et al. 2006).  
 
 Following literary critic N. Katherine Hayles and her work on How We Became 
Posthuman, by briefly reviewing some of the history of computing, I hope to counter the 
teleological view that technological progress inevitably leads us to become, or to be seen 
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as, bodiless information.  Instead, I hope to show that the freestanding concept of 
information, or of memory as information, is the result of specific arguments and 
negotiations among a group of people from several different, and at times intersecting, 
fields.  In fact, many of these ideas can be traced back to the foundations of cybernetics 
as a discipline, which itself can be traced back to the annual Macy Conferences held 
between 1943 and 1954 where researchers were brought together to "formulate the 
central concepts that, in their high expectations, would coalesce into a theory of 
communication and control applying equally to animals, humans, and machines" (Hayles 
1999: 7).  Sponsored by the Josiah Macy Foundation, these meetings brought together 
researchers from diverse backgrounds, from mathematics, to computer science, biology, 
psychology and anthropology (including figures such as Gregory Bateson and Margaret 
Mead).32  The interdisciplinary Macy conferences were designed as discussions rather 
than the presentation of finished papers per se.  Like the Memories for Life network, the 
aim of these gatherings was to bring together many different fields.  And much like the 
way the concepts of "networks," neurons and the World Wide Web have been drawn 
from to explain one another during M4L meetings, the concept of information, that "may 
have begun as a model of a particular physical system came to have broader significance, 
acting simultaneously as mechanism and metaphor" (Hayles 1999: 51).  As such, 
concepts became constellations, embracing much more than their initial significance.  At 
the Macy Conferences, von Neumann's self-reproducing binary coded computers, 
                                                
32  The history of cybernetics is a complex and at times tangled narrative that, for our purposes, we will 
only gesture at here.  In the 1940s, many disciplines converged to create the field known as cybernetics, 
and over the next few decades this way of thinking would in turn influence many disciplines from 
mathematics and computing, to biology, physiology, philosophy and literature.  For a more detailed 
account of the foundational Macy Conferences, see Hayles' How We Became Posthuman. More on the 
history of cybernetics can also be found on the American Society for Cybernetics website, March 21, 2013, 
http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/foundations/history.htm. 
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neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch's work on information-processing neural networks, 
Shannon's information theory, and mathematician Norbert Weiner's grand visions for 
feedback, communication and control were brought together in the formulation of a new 
informatic paradigm.   
 
 The first meetings set the tone for what is now considered the first wave of 
cybernetics.  They focused on notions of circularity, feedback, and homeostasis.  
Biologically, systems were known to maintain states of homeostasis with respect to their 
changing environments for example.  Mechanically, feedback loops had been used in 
systems ranging from floatation devices, to clocks, oil lamps and the steam engine.   
Hayles describes three fronts along which arguments about information were developed: 
"The first was concerned with the construction of information as a theoretical entity; the 
second, with the construction of (human) neural structures so that they were seen as flows 
of information; the third, with the construction of artifacts that translated information 
flows into observable operations, thereby making the flows 'real.'" (1999: 50).  
Cybernetics, from the Greek term kybernetike, meaning to govern or to steer, emerged 
out of the meeting of these notions of feedback and self-control with those of information 
and communication.   
 
 Starting in the mid 1940s, mathematician and computer scientists John von 
Neumann implemented Turing's vision of coded unpredictability: "[an] address matrix, 
which stored strings of bits at randomly accessible coordinates as if they were locations 
on a chessboard" (Dyson 2012).  Soon after computers generated numbers based on sets 
  
80 
80 
of rules, which in turn generated more numbers, ad infinitum.  According to Dyson, 
"Turing and von Neumann both believed the future belonged to nondeterministic 
computation and statistical, probabilistic codes" (Dyson 2012).  Other than their use in 
the design of weapons, these machines capable of producing unpredictable numbers were 
also used to help predict erratic phenomena like weather.  In 1948 Shannon published "A 
Mathematical Theory of Communication" in which he examined the problem of encoding 
information using Weiner's work in probability theory, essentially founding the field of 
information theory.  As summed up by Hayles: "Shannon's theory defines information as 
a probability function with no dimensions, no materiality, and no necessary connection 
with meaning.  It is a pattern, not a presence" (1999: 18).  These developments drove the 
formalization of a message (content) into 0s and 1s.  As Boyer puts it, Shannon's 
epistemic innovation "instantiated a content/form divide in communication and declared 
only the latter a relevant design problem" (2013: 308).  Meaning per se was no longer 
deemed relevant in the quest for pure information.  In fact, "the safety [of 
communication] came in no small part from draining the words of meaning" (Gleick 
2010: 165).  Freed from the vagueness of meaning, from its material support, and from 
context in general, information could become free-floating.  Information in the shape of 
0s and 1s could be quantified, extracted and manipulated.  Information was considered a 
signal on a medium that granted it a material texture.  Claude Shannon defined 
information as a function of probability, regardless of meaning and materiality.  Weiner's 
notion of feedback in cybernetics also helped separate information from that which 
carried it.  Both Weiner and Shannon saw information as a series of choices made from a 
possibility of choices, or of message elements. 0s and 1s are then possible responses to 
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those choices, narrowed down by probability.  In a double move, the notion of 
information was pulled apart from the message it carried and from the medium on which 
it rested.  Digital coding greatly improved the efficiency of data processing.  More 
information could be created, transmitted and stored, with significantly less time, room 
and effort.  Advances in electronics in the 1950s lead to increased processing power that 
allowed for the later development of a wide range of computers, including the personal 
computers and networks we are familiar with today (Boyer 2013: 309).   
 
 This first wave of cybernetics, however, did not account, within its self-referential 
homeostatic systems, for the presence of an observer.  The observer was always located 
outside of the bounded mechanism it observed.  But when dealing with feedback loops, 
information had to travel through an "observer" before being reintroduced into the 
system, thus making him part of the system.  To include him, however, meant including 
the risk, as Hayles points out, of a recursive reflexivity, an endless self-absorbing loop of 
observers observing observers who are also observing (1999).  While not addressing this 
problem directly over the course of the Macy Conferences, this first wave of cybernetics 
highlighted the shifting boundaries between observer and system.   
 
 The second wave cybernetics emerged from 1960 onward out of the desire to 
further understand the structure of systems and to account for the observer.  Elaborating 
on what he called a "second-order cybernetics" in a series of essays, biophysicist Heinz 
von Foerster (who had attended the sixth Macy Conference and was appointed editor of 
the conference proceedings) sought to consider the observer, or cybernetician, as a 
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system.  Based on biological models, and following von Foerster's footsteps, Maturana 
and Varela formulated a view of the world composed of informationally closed self-
organizing and autopoeitic (self-making) systems.  These systems parse information from 
their environments in ways that perpetuate their existence and organization.   
 
 Luhmann's systems theory emerged out of this second wave cybernetics.  For 
Luhmann, the processes being observed, or operations, as he likes to call them, are those 
that mark the distinctions between self-reference and external reference.  Systems are 
subject to internal and external information.  Self-reference is itself "a systems-internal 
distinction that can be seen as a consequence of the differentiation and operative closure 
of the system" (Luhmann 1998:13).  The environment is necessary for self-reference and 
self-organization to occur.  In other words, self-reference is only possible in such that it 
can be distinguished from external reference.  Luhmann further distinguishes between 
reference and coding.  Both are binary: self-reference and external reference, and positive 
code values and negative code values.33  Positive/negative (or true/false) code values then 
operate on those two (self-reference/external reference) levels.  Through second order 
observation, all knowledge can be made subject to this code before being integrated into 
the system, further distinguishing the system from its environment. "Observations of the 
second order are the operative basis for the structural differentiation of certain social 
functions systems" (Luhmann 1998: 57).  Observations are operations that choose to 
distinguish systems from their environment.  Observations can themselves be observed, 
                                                
33 This distinction between reference and coding allows him to move past semiotic debates over the truth of 
meaning and the correspondence between signifier and signified that have long troubled "realist" versus 
"constructivist" arguments.  Instead, Luhmann replaces what he calls the "analytic" (stability of meaning) 
paradigm with what he considers "self-reference," and replaces the "synthetic" (constructivist) one with 
"external reference."   
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as they remain independent of the distinctions they choose.  As a result of this second 
order observation Luhmann can pose the question "of what an observer can and cannot 
see with his distinctions," thus exposing a kind of blind spot within the system.  
Throughout, again, there is no god's-eye-view, no all-encompassing objective vision:  
"What is construed as reality is in the final analysis guaranteed by the observability of 
observations" (1998:19).34  The distinctions that result from choices, or operations of 
observation, highlight the importance of contingency in systems theory.  Because 
observations result from choices, it follows that what is of concern is that which "is 
neither necessary nor impossible," given that those characteristics would leave no other 
choice (1998:45).  Contingency is the third undeterminable value added to those of 
being/non-being, or positive/negative, marked/un-marked.  Contingency is what creates 
meaning, in light of all other possible meanings to choose from.  Contingency is in fact a 
"defining attribute" of modern society for Luhmann.  Choosing one form of information 
from the complex environment over other possible forms of information, in other words, 
choosing certain distinctions over others will always have consequences.  Contingency 
(and therefore modernity for Luhmann) always entails risk.  Information is a binary 
distinction, a choice, and followed to its ultimate logic it becomes matter itself. 
 
 Hayles outlines a third wave cybernetics that "swelled into existence when self-
organization began to be understood not merely as the (re)production of internal 
organization but as the springboard to emergence" (1999: 11).  As part of this third wave, 
researchers, in new fields such as artificial life, design codes intended to evolve in 
unpredictable ways.  Notions of emergent behavior, artificial life, self-organizing systems 
                                                
34 In other words, there is no all-encompassing view from which everything can be seen as contingent. 
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and the evolution of complexity in a computational universe mark this moment.  With 
this wave, Hayles claims, We Became Posthuman.  Code, information, and life have 
become synonymous.  Creatures emerge; digital organisms form out of Dyson's "Big 
Bang."  For many, this digital universe isn't merely another layer added onto our already 
existing universe, it is the universe.  From cells to computers to quantum mechanics, 
binary information is reality's underlying structure.  Physicists such as Craig Hogan at the 
University of Chicago are designing machines (he calls it a Holometer) to test for the 
noisy informational fabric of the universe (Moyer 2012).  Hogan wants to know if the 
universe is composed of bits (0s and 1s).35 
 
 But we need not look to physics, or giant particle colliders to find "digital reason" 
at work.  As Hayles points out, all sorts of technical artifacts, from ATMs to movie 
making technologies to precise medical instruments "help make an information theoretic 
view a part of everyday life" (1999: 19).  These technologies participate in the creation of 
a future that is posthuman (in Hayles' sense) in that they lead us to imagine the body as 
but one possible material substrate for information.36  Life no longer belongs to bodies, or 
to the living for that matter.  Machines are made to think and evolve.  When the emphasis 
is on information rather than embodiment, seamlessly integrated bodies and machines 
become imaginable, even foreseeable for many.  The notion of pure information insures 
the maintenance of something we call consciousness, selfhood or memories, regardless of 
                                                
35 There are many other important figures in the history of cybernetics and computing, Warren McCulloch, 
Douglas Engelbart Theodor Nelson and J.C.R. Licklider among others.  See Thierry Bardini's book 
Bootstrapping, in which he discusses "Engelbart's crusade for the augmentation of human intellect" and 
Nelson's development of hypertext systems (2000); and M. Mitchell Waldrop's The Dream Machine for the 
history of personal computing as it relates to Licklider's notions of interaction (2001). 
36 In chapter four we will discuss in more detail, referring to the work of Wolfe (2010) and Luhmann 
(1998), the ways in which Hayles' notion of posthumanism rests on and reproduces the problematic 
distinction between information and matter (1999). 
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its material support.  This separation between mind and body can be seen as the 
continued elaboration of a self-possessed liberal humanist subject: a mind freely 
governing a separate body.  It differs from it however by raising possibilities for 
collective digital subjectivities, for several minds sharing one body.  A mind unhinged 
from its body can be seen as one step closer to the dream of tapping into a kind of 
collective consciousness, a kind of Matrix if you will.  The disembodiment of 
information is what allows dreams of uploaded brains and teleportation à la Star Trek to 
thrive.  These narratives rely on the premise that information can be extracted from one's 
head or that the constitution of a body is pure information; and that thoughts and bodies 
can be disassembled and subsequently reassembled somewhere else without a change in 
the constitution of one's consciousness, sense of self, or material consistency.   As Hayles 
puts it: 
"Stripped of context, [information] becomes a mathematical quantity 
weightless as sunshine, moving in a rarefied realm of pure probability, not 
tied down to bodies or material instantiations.  The price it pays for this 
universality is its divorce from representation.  [On the other hand] when 
information is made representational [...] it is conceptualized as an action 
rather than a thing.  Verblike, it becomes a process that someone enacts, 
and thus it necessarily implies context and embodiment.  The price it pays 
for embodiment is difficulty of quantification and loss of universality." 
(1999: 56). 
 
When pattern is emphasized over presence, universal and transferable information 
becomes more important than matter (or embodiment) itself, a view that is brought to the 
fore in the Memories for Life scientists' quest to augment our memory.  
 
 The view of a world made up of information combined with the technical 
possibilities for pattern recognition now fuel a growing mode of inquiry that has come to 
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be known as Big Data.  Many fields as diverse as astronomy, epidemiology, genomics, 
environmental research, finance, the social sciences and more are now praising the 
production of new forms of knowledge that come from mining large datasets.  The 
computation of Big Data is thought to produce a bigger picture of phenomena by letting 
numbers speak for themselves.  Initially, Big Data meant large datasets that required the 
use of super computers to mine and somehow analyze information.  Today, much data 
mining and number crunching can be done on regular desktop computers, thus raising the 
question of what counts as "Big."  Today, information that was once only available to 
researchers and scientists is often readily accessible and even made public.  Governments 
all over the world and at various levels (international, national, municipal), other 
institutions and companies help gather and publish the world's information (who does 
what, where, when, etc.).  Individuals, whether knowingly or not, leave traces that 
accumulate to form large amounts of minable data concerning one's (or a population's) 
health, wealth, genetic makeup, cultural habits and preferences, evidently, the list goes 
on.  People hail our current time as the age of information in which we live in a "new 
data ecosystem" (boyd and Crawford 2012; Manovich 2011; Mayer-Schönberger and 
Cukier 2013).  Social theorist Brian Massumi's critique of Negroponte's utopic Being 
Digital describes a world "rolled up in data, its now digitized mass threatening to 
suffocate the unprotected body, swamped by a downpour of pure availability" (1995).  
Someone, or something must filter the bombardment of information.  In March 2012, The 
White House committed over $200 million toward a "Big Data Initiative" to fuel efforts 
to develop strategies for dealing with and visualizing the mammoth amounts of 
information we record and produce. 
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 As we have seen with older, pre-digital projects that involve the recording and 
collecting of large amounts of data - the Mass-Observation Project or Malinowski's 
ethnographic project for example - issues of objectivity, accuracy, and more importantly 
questions of how to care for and curate amassed information are inseparable from the 
ways data is imagined in the first place.  In other words, data, whether big or small, isn't 
all about data; it's about ways of thinking about research, information and knowledge 
production itself.  Although quite different in terms of technology, scale and aesthetic, the 
projects we've examined so far, and the ones discussed in the section below, often rest on 
the assumptions that more data is better data.  Big Data epitomizes this belief to the 
fullest.  With their recently published provocations for thinking critically about Big Data, 
boyd and Crawford seek to question "the widespread belief that large data sets offer a 
higher form of intelligence and knowledge that can generate insights that were previously 
impossible, with the aura of truth, objectivity, and accuracy" (2012: 663).  They raise 
questions of ethics, and questions as to what counts as data, and what is to be done with 
data.  This problematic turn to numbers, they argue, may deepen the divide between 
qualitative humanistic research often considered subjective and quantitative scientific 
methods often deemed more objective, a divide well exemplified in the fate of the Mass-
Observation project.  It is as though Big Data were considered neutral data.  What Boyd 
and Crawford remind us is that collection and interpretation are far from neutral and that 
numbers do not fall from the sky.  They are the results of particular forms of 
measurements that are themselves the outcome of contingent methodological processes.  
Moreover, as important as why or how you collect data is, of course, what you do with 
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your data.  Geoffrey Bowker insists: "Raw data is both an oxymoron and a bad idea; to 
the contrary, data should be cooked with care" (2005: 184).  Part of the process of 
cooking with care involves paying attention to context.  But as we have just noted above, 
in the quest for clarity of signal, information is often separated from its material substrate 
and from its noisy context and meaning.  This stripping of context comes with the risk of 
considering all data equal and of separating data from the research process itself.  Bowker 
and Star go so far as to argue that the very notion of information is inseparable from that 
of context:  
[...] the context of information shifts in spite of its continuities; and this 
shift in context imparts heterogeneity to the information itself. [...] One of 
the interesting features of communication is that, broadly speaking, to be 
perceived, information must reside in more than one context. [...] A radical 
statement of this would be that information is only information when there 
are multiple interpretations. (2000: 290-291)   
 
The information theoretic sensibilities evident in the notion of Big Data are themselves 
the result of specific contexts, historical narratives, negotiations and decisions, and not 
just the outcome of a certain technological determinism.  The take home point in this 
brief history of cybernetics and the related history of personal computing is that there is a 
reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) relationship between the ways we think 
epistemologically and the artifacts we think with.  These informatic ways of thinking 
come with implications about how we conceive of what can and should be built.  And as 
we have noted with Malinowski's critique of Mass-Observation and his elaboration of 
fieldwork methods: what matters one place may matter less in another; and with 
Luhmann's second orders of observation: the observer (researcher) is always already part 
of the system observed. 
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Painting the Big Picture Bit by Bit 
 
Elegant.  My airy mood returned.  I was advancing in consciousness.  I watched myself 
take each separate step.  With each separate step, I became aware of processes, 
components, things relating to other things.  Water fell to the earth in drops.  I saw things 
new.  - Don DeLillo 
 
 
They meet in a gray room at the university of Sheffield, one with gray carpeting, just like 
the others. They talk about "gray matters": a computer interface that creates "a zone" they 
define as between remembering and forgetting.  It's a place to store digital files that 
haven't been consulted over a certain period of time.  The gray zone is an archive where 
nearly deleted documents are allowed to rest.  It offers a kind of a purgatory instead of 
the extremes of awareness or oblivion.  The computer scientists discuss how to best rank 
images according the how many times they've been viewed, how to allow for less 
distraction and how to highlight the "important information."  They determine the 
relevance of the data by counting users' actions (how many times a file has been opened); 
and they consider different ways users might be called upon to rank documents.  This 
calculation of users' actions and decisions, this combination of various algorithms, 
changes the way things look on the screen.  They worry about the difference between 
user-generated relevancies and automatically generated ones.  "What would your stuff 
look like if you used different metrics?" one asks.  "What's the threshold for the gray 
area?"   
 
 Later that afternoon, in another room, some of the same researchers start to map 
out the design implications of a recent study about personal sound recording practices.  
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They want to know how and when people record sounds, and the kinds of sounds they 
capture.  They want to know so they might design useful digital tools.  I took part in this 
study.  As the designated ethnographer on the project, I was called upon to meet with 
participating families, to give them sound recorders to take with them while on holiday, 
and to later go back to talk with them about what we called their "sonic souvenirs."37  The 
director of this research group has explained that he is hoping to unearth underlying 
relationships between sounds and memories.  His goal is less to test how people use 
recording devices than to discover clues to fundamental "human habits."  Once, after 
having just attended a design research conference, I asked him whether his research 
group had considered creating their own sonic recording and playing device (like an 
interactive sound pad, or sonic trinkets) and seeing what kind of insight that might lend to 
the design process.  I remind him that we humans not only have the ability to make tools, 
but to also be transformed by them.  Media is not simply a disinterested tool to be used 
in-between (or as a medium for) social relations, rather it helps create and determine 
these relations.  Media is never a simple carrier of meaning; it shapes messages and in 
doing so shapes the very relationships and practices in which it is embedded.  I repeat 
Kittler's favorite quote by Nietzsche: "Our writing tools are also working on our 
thoughts" (1999: 210).  Gesturing to the work of certain researchers at other universities 
and art institutes, the director tells me that he doesn't like "bizarre" design ideas.  Were 
we to make a strange sock drawer, he explains, the user would just say "oh my! What a 
strange sock drawer."  He would rather spend time understanding how people store and 
                                                
37 Two articles about this study have since been published in collaboration with these researchers.  For 
more details about the study see Dib, et al. 2010 and Petrelli, et al. 2010.  
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organize their socks in the first place.  He insists that there are fundamental human habits 
that must inform design.   
 
 During this meeting, I point to the different types of sounds participants recorded 
and to the difficulty of generalizing them.  The sounds ranged from mock interviews of 
other passengers in a train, family conversations, giggles, pseudo radio shows, 
commentary about the day’s activities, to the ambient sounds of insects heard while on a 
walk.  A few participants recorded verbal diaries or more abstract reflections about their 
trip, speaking into the recorder about their favorite parts of the holiday, and what they 
were looking forward to on their way back home.  Many recordings involved the 
combination of different types of sounds, i.e. diary-like observations followed by 
dialogue or ambient sounds.  Now, guided by our participants' sonic souvenirs and the 
ways they spoke about them, we elaborate on our findings through a series of apparent 
paradoxes to do with sound: the temporal and at times ambiguous nature of the recorded 
sounds made them both pleasurable and frustrating to listen to.  The sounds evoked other 
related memories but they also constrained the listeners to a certain pace of remembrance.  
Participants sought to document the events as they actually happened, but they also 
recorded staged performances and fictional narratives.  We compare sounds to 
photographs.  As opposed to photographs, sound physically hits and penetrates.  Unlike 
sight, sound is immersive and simultaneous.  It requires and even creates our presence, 
such that we are not in front of something, but within it.  In philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy's 
words, "Sound has no hidden face; it is all in front, in back, and outside inside, inside-
out" (2007: 13).  The conversation shifts to the tension between qualitative concept work, 
  
92 
92 
and the need for numbers to back up our claims, whatever they may be.  I remember 
Adorno's critique of Benjamin and struggle with my need to schematize.  I am afraid to 
betray the exceptions.  We are unclear as to how to achieve some sort of analysis rather 
than a mere presentation of a diverse array of facts.  The conversation shifts again, this 
time to how one of the researchers is trying to clean and organize his office and can't 
seem to throw anything out. 
 
 On another campus, in Dublin, computer scientists funded by Microsoft work to 
devise algorithms that might determine people's habits.  They do this by searching for 
redundancies in the photographs taken with the SenseCam and correlate these with GPS 
(Geographical Positioning Systems) readings.  Image recognition has advanced 
significantly over the past decade, but the problem remains as to how to annotate these 
images.  They look for patterns.   
 
 A researcher from the Online Computing Library Center visits and gives a talk.  
The OCLC is a non-profit cooperative that began in Ohio, US, in 1967.  They compile 
worldwide bibliographic information and provide it to the public.  Serving over 70 000 
libraries internationally, they work to "further public access to the world's information."  
OCLC and the libraries it works with produce WorldCat, the largest online public access 
catalogue (OPAC) in the world.  In addition to books and articles, WorldCat includes 
over 3.8 million sound recordings and visuals.  The speaker tells us that "what libraries 
suffer is their disaggregation on the web."  OCLC looks to bring them together in a 
centralized place.  When someone looks for a book for example, the catalogue points him 
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to the nearest library holding that book.  He explains that their mission is to bring 
libraries to the people.  To share the load of cataloguing all the publications amassed in 
this central online location, many of the libraries now share a way of indexing their data.  
In other words, metadata needs to be standardized.  The speaker is here to talk with 
information scientists about data mining.  He raises questions of relevancies and 
recommendations: Is it better to give the user a mildly relevant response to his search 
query but that points to a book located at a nearby library, or to produce a directly 
relevant bibliography for a book located far away?   
 
 At a Memories for Life workshop in London I meet someone from the UK Web 
Archive, also part of the British Library.  The Archive focuses on storing web pages since 
2004.  Within this archive, one can "observe the unfolding history of a spectrum of UK 
activities represented online. Sites that no longer exist elsewhere are found here."38  Some 
of these websites form collections organized by librarians or specialists in a field.  They 
are curated according to themes or events such as the July 7th 2005 London terrorist 
attacks, or the credit crunch.  They form assemblages of news and commentary, public 
information and weblogs.  They call a "historical version of a web resource" a Memento.  
They mine these old webpages from different international online archives.  Their site 
offers, like the OCLC, a centralized place to find things.  Later that evening I look up 
their Memento of Google.  It contains 4394 snapshots of the webpage taken between 
1999 and 2012.  The Web Archive offers to add a bookmark to my browser so that from 
now on, when I browse the web and hit a 404 Not Found error, I can click on the 
bookmark and get an older version of the page.  I decide to give it a try and type the URL 
                                                
38 March 21, 2013, http://www.webarchive.org.uk/ukwa/ 
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for my website.  I click on the "Find Mementos" link at the top of my browser and am 
startled by an old picture of myself pointing a camera to the viewer.  I follow the links on 
the 7 year old webpage and find an old abstract I wrote about documentary web practices 
such as blogging and how they represent a kind of two-tiered challenge to anthropology: 
to write about people who write about themselves.  I hadn't read Luhmann yet.  Things 
just felt recursive.  I worry about what else might be online.  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger 
is right, the future is unforgetting.  I remember Charles Babbage, the 19th century 
computing pioneer who invented the analytical engine.  In his Ninth Bridgewater 
Treatise, chapter IX, he considers the possibility of retrieving words long uttered from the 
air:39 
What a strange chaos is this wide atmosphere we breathe! … The air itself 
is one vast library, on whose pages are forever written all that man has 
ever said or woman whispered. There, in their mutable but unerring 
characters, mixed with the earliest, as well as the latest sighs of mortality, 
stand for ever recorded, vows unredeemed, promises unfulfilled, 
perpetuating in the united movements of each particle, the testimony of 
man’s changeful will (1838: 111-112). 
 
I feel a certain loss of control, and a sudden desire to be very quiet, lest my words echo 
for years to come.40   
 
                                                
39 An interesting fact in light of our discussion on memory and the desire to preserve one's past: half of 
Babbage's brain is on display in the Science Museum, London. 
40 In Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, Kittler includes Salomo Friedlaender's "Goethe speaks into the 
phonograph" (1916).  Friedlaender's short story is about finding Goethe's dissipating sound waves in his 
office, and combing them with a wax model of his larynx and a phonograph in order to hear his long gone 
voice.  To build the mold of his larynx, they dig up Goethe's skull from his grave.  This fairytale, which 
hints that one "could listen to antiquity and the Middle Ages and determine the correct pronunciation of old 
idioms" (1999: 67), transports the reader from the age of Goethe when "writing functioned as the general 
medium" (36) to an age in which recording technologies allow the very notion of time and mortality to 
dissipate.  "In the phonographic realm of the dead, spirits are always present - as sound amplitudes […]" 
(72).  With the Web Archive, there is no need to unearth a skull or mine the air in order to tap into traces 
long thought gone. 
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 Collecting and cataloguing large sets of information is the recurrent theme across 
the Memories for Life network.  A representative from the British Library's Oral History 
Society elaborates on a project they call National Life Stories whose mission is: "To 
record first-hand experiences of as wide a cross-section of society as possible, to preserve 
the recordings, to make them publicly available and encourage their use."41  They collect 
datasets and interviews relating to different themes such as the oral history of British 
theatre design, the oral history of the water industry, or the British Press.  Although they 
catalogue these sound files according to various professions, they insist, when referring to 
artists for example, that "it is important that they are life stories, rooting the speakers in 
the society which formed them rather than isolating them solely within the art world."  
They are creating what they call a memory bank of how people in Britain think, act and 
feel; and these digitized narratives might lend a bigger, historical picture of society as a 
whole.  They wonder about the impact of new social networking technologies on the 
traditional gatekeepers of collective memory like museums, national archives, and 
libraries. 
  
 In Southampton, a PhD student in computer science collects information about 
people who use social media sites like Flickr, Delicious, Twitter, and Facebook.  He 
aggregates this information and correlates it with other freely available data, such as the 
weather and the news, to create detailed stories about these people, about where they've 
been, what they've done.  He asks me if I think that once people learn about all the traces 
they leave they will continue to post all this information about themselves?  I assume 
they already know.  But I take note of his question.  My credit card knows I am in 
                                                
41 March 21, 2013, http://www.bl.uk/reshelp/findhelprestype/sound/ohist/ohnls/nationallifestories.html 
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England and that I have bought train tickets from Sheffield to London to Southampton to 
Oxford, and back again; and his knows that he is eating a sandwich right now.  He tells 
me the story of a guy in the US with an Arabic sounding name who was suspected of 
relations with terrorist groups.  This man used his computer, a camera, a GPS and any 
other recording devices he could get his hands on and proved his innocence by tracking 
himself 24/7.  He recalls another researcher who is part of the Memories for Life 
network.  He develops tools to tell if an image or document has been doctored.  He 
figures it will be useful in court.  Another student joins us.  He is part of the same 
research group at the University.  He works on what they call "provenance," tracking 
where a document has been, when it was used, and what other documents were used at 
the same time.  I ask them if they've encountered privacy concerns over the course of 
their research.  They laugh and remind me that we are in the country with the world's 
second largest DNA database and the most CCTVs.  They tell me it's important to be 
systematic and to separate concerns such as privacy, usability, data collection and 
security.  One of the students is working for a startup that specializes in online security.  
The company mines the web for information about you, and anytime someone online 
claims to be you, it notifies you.  It keeps watch on your identity. 
 
 Yorick Wilks, a specialist in artificial intelligence and language who shares his 
time between the Oxford Internet Institute and the University of Sheffield's computer 
science department, is also working on technology that will help keep watch on a person's 
identity.  As part of the Companions project, he predicts a future where robots (although 
he sometimes doesn't like to call them that) will act as long-term digital confidants.  He 
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works to develop language recognition tools to help create what he calls "conversational 
agents" that will provide companionship and comfort to its owners.  "Human dialogue, 
human conversation is the very heart of us," he tells me.   He seeks to relegate to 
companions the problems of remembering and sifting information through their ability to 
understand speech.  The interesting question however isn’t so much, as Cary Wolfe 
reminds us, whether or not these robots “can talk,” or even “think,” but rather how these 
companions ask us to reconsider the relationship between humans and their automated 
and information laden environments (2010).  But by reconfiguring anxieties about 
forgetting by relegating to companions the responsibility of inscription and retrieval, 
Wilks reaffirms our said humanness through language and memory, or language about 
language and memory, reproducing representational notions of human consciousness and 
thought.   
 
 Wilks wants to create something that understands its user.  He envisions a device 
or robot companion that might "build a life narrative of the owner, eliciting over a long 
period a structure of the owner's life, perhaps at a level of detail that even their relatives 
might not recognize, or know about" (Wilks 2010: xi).  He argues that the elderly and the 
very young will be the ones who will most desire or need such companionship.  These 
entities could be used as navigators of the World Wide Web, or as tracking and 
communication devices.  Like Negroponte's utopian "digital butlers," companions will be 
"delegates in the infosphere.  They will brave the chaotic waters of availability to search, 
sort, select, and process” (Massumi 1995).42  Wilks explains that the companion can 
                                                
42 Brian Massumi accuses Negroponte of being overly Cartesian in his elaboration of a digital future that 
creates “a directional self esconced [sic] in a problematic body which it overcomes with the aid of 
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actually take the shape of a furry pillow or backpack.43 The point is that they can help 
navigate the wealth of information found online, as well as one's own personal archives 
(photos, medical records, music, emails).  In fact, when it comes to helping sort one's 
"digital life," he describes the companion as a step toward "democratising the art of 
autobiography" (2010: 14).  When the user dies, Wilks imagines a companion that would 
imitate its deceased owner's voice and recount stories and memoires to love ones.  
 
 I meet again with one of the researchers working on the Sonic Souvenirs project.  
She tells me about her previous work that involved asking families about various 
personal mementos in their homes.  She examined the meaning invested in things, and 
now she wants to find ways to map those meanings onto digital artifacts.  She raises 
issues of what she calls "distillation," or selection.  When people have too many digital 
files, they don't really look at them, she explains.  She distinguishes design from 
information retrieval as a way of relieving the user of the feeling of being overwhelmed 
by a kind of digital hoarding.  "Design," she says, "is about meaning construction, not 
just search and find."  In the households she studied, mementos were kept in different 
places, from the kitchen, to the mantel, to the bedside drawer.  We agree that it's a shame 
you can't bump into digital objects.  Whether sounds, or photos, or children's drawings, 
digital objects all seem to occupy the same space: the screen.  The digital puts everything 
on the same plane.  It doesn't allow for different levels of intimacy or for the integration 
                                                                                                                                            
programming and technology in a way that spiritualizes matter, and all space, by conforming them to its 
will.” (Massumi 1995).  See also Negroponte (1995).   
43 The arguments across Memories for Life research seem to have shifted from old AI (Artificial 
Intelligence) concerns from the 1980s, of whether machines can think and act like humans, to new interests 
that focus on how machines behave, regardless of their physical or human-like attributes.  This said, the 
emphasis is still on recording human life in order to help improve human memory.  
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of various digital objects into everyday life besides the possibility of storing files into 
different folders, or making a picture publicly viewable on one's desktop or social media 
site.  In Kittler's words: ""The general digitization of channels and information erases the 
differences among individual media.  Sound and image, voice and text are reduced to 
surface effects, known to consumers as interface" (1999: 1).  The very concept of 
medium is erased.  It is as though something is missing. 
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3- Against Oblivion: 
 
This third chapter focuses on an extreme case of lifelogging that makes use of 
prototypical recording technologies designed by Memories for Life scientists: Gordon 
Bell, a senior researcher at Microsoft, who is on a quest to record his life for the sake of 
increased objectivity, productivity, and digital posterity.  Through this case study, I show 
how new recording technologies are both a symptom of, and a cure for, anxieties about 
time.  More specifically, I reveal how these memory banks are inherently tied to logics of 
capital, of stock and storage, and to logics of the technological where, when it comes to 
memory, more is more.  Both remembering and forgetting operate in the economic, 
possessive discourse of time: losing time/finding time, wasting time/saving time.  While 
not abandoning these terms, I show through the case study of Bell, that the past, as well 
as the present and the future, are always discursively, practically, and technologically 
informed.  The fear of oblivion that drives Bell's "archive fever" relies on the assumption 
that one is able to record the past and one's self as they were and subsequently leaves one 
at risk of drowning in a sea of information.  I end this chapter by reflecting on Foucault's 
genealogy of the western subject and by posing the question of how to tolerate so much 
information. 
 
Total Recall 
 
"I'm losing my mind [...], by the way, so are you." - Gordon Bell 
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Senior researcher at Microsoft Gordon Bell, the author of one of the epigraphs of this 
chapter—the one losing his mind, and reminding us that we are losing ours—centers his 
work on the possibility that, in time, we can overcome our impending absentminded fate 
(as quoted in the Introduction):  
 
[E]ach day that passes I forget more and remember less.  [...] Yes, each 
day I’m losing a little bit more of my mind.  [...] What if you could 
overcome this fate?  [...] Soon, you will be able to.  You will have the 
capacity for Total Recall.  You will be able to summon up everything you 
have ever seen, heard, or done.  And you will be in total control  (Bell and 
Gemmell 2009: 3). 
 
Bell has volunteered to become the main guinea pig for MyLifeBits and the SenseCam, 
the data management software and wearable camera designed by Microsoft.  As 
discussed in the Introduction, the SenseCam is usually worn around the neck and takes 
pictures automatically, either when various sensors are set off (accelerometer, light meter, 
and thermometer) or at various intervals (usually 30 seconds).   In 1998, Bell decided to 
go paperless and digitized all the yellowing documents in his possession.  An extreme 
lifelogger, he has since digitized just about everything he can: business and Christmas 
cards, drawings, bills, quilts, as well as recordings of all his conversations, every 
webpage he visits, gps coordinates of his whereabouts, and the list goes on.  He insists, 
however, on the difference between lifelogging and lifeblogging, since the latter involves 
making public one's lifelogs.  He is not a lifeblogger.   
 
 In September 2009, Gordon Bell and Jim Gemmell, the principal Microsoft 
researcher working on MyLifeBits, published a corporate manifesto in the shape of a 
book, which embraces and celebrates the future of digital memory.  They aptly named the 
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book Total Recall.  In it they paint the portrait of a world where what they call Total 
Recall, or the "e-memory revolution," will make us better citizens, better workers, better 
lovers, and better ancestors.   
 
E-memories will provide every person who embraces them with a 
different sense of their whole lives.  It won’t erase human nature’s 
capacity for self-deception, but it will surely make the truth of what we did 
and what happened around us more available, clearer, and less obscured 
by nostalgic make-believe (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 8).   
 
 
Armed with tools like the SenseCam and MyLifeBits, Bell and Gemmell claim the 
ability, and the necessity, to create an objective and comprehensive perspective of the 
world.  As such, they bring to the fore what Stengers would call an important bifurcation: 
one separating the world as it is and the world as we experience it - or remember it 
(2010).  The papers and books written by these researchers all begin with the premise that 
our memory is fallible and can and should be improved by the help of technology (Bell 
and Gemmell 2009; Hodges et al. 2006; O'Hara 2006, Wilks 2010). 
 
 Bell disciplines his past and present for the sake of the future.  In case he may one 
day need a given document or photograph, as either proof or memory cue, he feels it is 
safer to keep everything.  The art of archiving involves a kind of promise for tomorrow, 
for "that one day" Bell might need to recall that certain something he put aside and that 
has now become consequential.   
 
I'd hung on to those hundreds of pounds of yellowing paper not because I 
wanted to help found a thriving community of silverfish in my home, but 
because I knew that someday, for some reason, I would certainly need to 
refind at least one old item. [...] So I’d felt trapped into keeping all of them 
(Bell and Gemmell 2009: 29).  
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One cannot predict how valuable any given archive will be.  One might find out later, or 
one might never know. As Jacques Derrida's Archive Fever reminds us: "A spectral 
messianicity is at work in the concept of the archive and ties it, like religion, like history, 
like science itself, to a very singular experience of promise" (1996: 36).  Thus Bell 
spends time archiving his life to obtain a purchase on time - future time.  Archiving 
technologies create a kind of anachronism, as though the present becomes disjointed in its 
obsession with the past and constant capturing, clicking gaze toward the future.   
 
 When I think of Bell tracking, shadowing himself, I imagine him walking on a 
sunny Californian sidewalk, followed by a trail of snapping devices documenting his 
every step.  There is a second figure of him a few steps behind his trail of devices, taking 
notes, ingesting the information being spat out by his arsenal of recorders.  From the 
back, this second figure begins to draw a third figure, a faint sketch of his future self at 
the front of the pack.  The artist Sophie Calle once did a piece that involved shadowing 
someone.  Baudrillard writes about this piece and the strange reversal that occurs when 
one is obsessively tracking another (even if in the case of Bell, that other is himself). 
 
To shadow another is to give him, in fact, a double life, a parallel 
existence.  Any commonplace existence can be transfigured (without one’s 
knowledge), any exceptional existence can be made commonplace.  It is 
this effect of doubling that makes the object surreal in its banality and 
weaves around it the strange (eventually dangerous?) web of seduction 
(Calle and Baudrillard 1988: 79). 
 
To sum up: Sophie Calle did a piece called Suite Venitienne in which she tracks down a 
man she met in Paris who told her he was going to Venice. She follows/shadows him 
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around Venice without his knowledge and photographs the places he's been.  Baudrillard 
reflects on this act of shadowing in which someone is trying to uncover something about 
the other, but complicates this relationship by posing the question of who is actually 
following whom?  Calle herself appears to eventually believe that she (the shadow) may 
in fact be leading the subject.  Following the man may well be what gives him that aura 
of secrecy, and it becomes unclear as to what comes first, the secrets or their discoveries, 
his actions, or her photography.  And what if the man is actually aware of her following 
him?  What if in the course of her game she becomes the one who is examined and 
controlled by her subject?  Perhaps the secret she will uncover is that he is playing her.  
"[…] like a cornered beast. The system reverses itself immediately, and the follower 
becomes the followed […] shadowing implies this surprise.  The possibility of reversal is 
necessary to it.  One must follow in order to be followed" (Calle and Baudrillard 1988: 
81).  It is a question of obedience, seduction and disappearance while risking losing 
oneself into the other.  A strange game of puppetry and shadows emerges between the 
two actors.  With Bell, these two actors are him; and it is no longer clear who comes first, 
his present self, or his past self.  He shapes his life according to his detailed records of 
existence.  His future bends under the weight of his archived past.  
 
 In 1999, after Bell began digitizing his entire paper trail, he was struck by the 
sheer amount of labor his project involved.  He sought out a personal assistant.  Vicki 
Rozycki, Bell's assistant, has spent most of her time transforming two and three-
dimensional objects, from paintings, sculptures, puppets, and mugs, into retrievable, 
annotated bits of information. Together, Bell and Rozycki have exhausted years scanning 
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and saving documents from Bell's "pre-digital" era.  It is impossible to calculate the 
amount of lived time that they have committed to recovering recallable time - that is, the 
amount of present that they have paid down to withdraw Bell’s past.  Beyond things 
proper - objects, images, and documents - Bell and Gemmell have also been capturing all 
kinds of actions, from the number of mouse clicks on Bell’s computer, to the record of 
how many times documents have been opened, to his music playback history.  Bell 
describes the task at hand as the following:  
 
Building my own e-memory became a three-pronged effort.  First, I had to 
make digital copies of everything from my past. Second, I had to start 
recording everything I saw, heard, and did from that point forward. Then, 
third, I had to figure out how to organize the information in my digital 
corpus (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 29). 
 
 
This last organizational task is what led to the development of the MyLifeBits software.  
The utter volume of the ever-growing archive made it hard to parse pertinent information 
and retrieve it on demand.  Without proper annotation, or an extremely sophisticated 
filing system, Bell's e-memory was a black hole: things could go in but might never come 
out.  Like Plato's Pharmakon, which has the potential to heal and also be poisonous, 
Bell's attempt to master the past rendered his present, and possible futures, unmanageable 
(Stengers 2010: 29-31).  So he teamed up with Gemmell and brainstormed possible 
solutions to the problem of clutter.   
 
 While reviewing published literature on previous computerized organizational 
systems, Bell and Gemmell came across Vannevar Bush's famous 1945 essay in the 
Atlantic Monthly titled "As We May Think."  As discussed briefly in the previous 
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chapter, in this essay, Bush, head of the United States Office of Scientific Research and 
Development during World War II, outlines ideas for a prosthetic memory device called a 
"memex," for "memory extender."  He describes this imagined extension: "The memex is 
a device in which an individual stores all his books, records, and communications, and 
which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It 
is an enlarged intimate supplement to his memory" (106).  Physically, the memex would 
resemble a desk that would hold microfilms of notes, photographs, and other forms of 
memoranda.  The top of the desk would serve as a scanner and display. Annotations and 
hyperlinks between documents would allow a user to navigate the heaps of information.  
Furthermore, the memex would never run out of space, enabling the user to gather 
material freely without worrying about having to discard any of it. 
 
 Bush also imagined the user to be wearing a camera that would document 
additional pertinent information and feed it into the memex.   
 
The camera hound of the future wears on his forehead a lump a little larger 
than a walnut. It takes pictures [...]. As the scientist of the future moves 
across the laboratory or the field, every time he looks at something worthy 
of the record, he trips the shutter and in it goes, without even an audible 
click (1945: 102).   
 
 
Bush's memory extender was never built, but Bell at Microsoft has announced proudly 
that the time for the memex has arrived.  It is now feasible and affordable.  As for the 
walnut-sized camera - the SenseCam - as the story goes, it was invented one morning 
when Lyndsay Williams, a researcher for Microsoft research in Cambridge, misplaced 
her keys and dreamed up something that would remind her of where she had left them.  
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So she designed the wearable SenseCam that takes about three thousand pictures a day 
without the push of a button.  Bell has been wearing a SenseCam since 2003, and his 
mantra is "[c]apture everything, discard nothing" (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 46). 
 
Investing in Time 
 
Around the fish-eye lens of the SenseCam, the shapes and the meanings of pasts, 
presents, and futures vary according to particular affective, economic, and technological 
moments that are always, as Karen Barad would put it, intra-actively becoming.  In 1983, 
Bell suffered a cardiac arrest and spent ten days in a coma followed by double bypass 
surgery.  He refers to this moment as a decisive one, after which he decided to take his 
health more seriously.  For him, this involved "record keeping and self-monitoring" (Bell 
and Gemmell 2009: 101).  He claims it was part of what fueled his interest in a system 
like MyLifeBits.  Twenty-seven years after his cardiac arrest, now considering the 
possibilities of forgetfulness in old age - he is seventy-seven years old - Bell stresses that 
it’s "very real, and very scary" (52).  In an effort to forestall time, forgetfulness, and even 
his own disappearance, Bell takes care of chronicling his life.  "The fear of oblivion 
before death," he notes,  
 
is big enough to drive a $4.2 billion industry in medicinal herbs and 
supple- ments for memory enhancement. [...] For all I know, ginko biloba 
and the Brain Fitness Program will indeed improve your bio-memory. But 
the world of Total Recall promises something broader: a revolution (52–
53).  
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By revolution, what Bell is emphasizing is the radical difference between biological 
memory and "e-memory."  The latter, he claims, will prove much more useful and 
infinitely more accurate.  "[S]ubjective, patchy, emotion-tinged, ego-filtered" biological 
memory is continuously drifting and morphing, shaping the past into different narrative 
twists and turns, whereas e-memories are unalterable, indisputable, and "unforgivingly 
accurate" (56).  Instead of "blurry bio-memories," discussions will be based on facts (83).  
Moreover, these facts no longer need to be stored in your brain "as long as they are at 
your fingertip via your smartphone" (115).  No facts seem worthy to commit to mere 
human memory.  Total Recall can manage them all. 
 
 Bell's e-memory project does not just rest in the realms of the utopic.  As his work 
with Gemmell on the MyLifeBits software has shown - despite his use of visionary and 
absolutist language when he refers to a "complete record" of life - Bell is grappling with 
the contemporary concrete technological and organizational challenges that such a 
venture implies.  In chapter 9 of Total Recall, Bell grounds his futuristic mission by 
addressing both laypeople and other scientists, offering specific directives as to how they 
might proceed in helping to bring about the e-memory revolution.  This chapter, titled 
"Getting Started," suggests different ways one might enhance memory with the help of 
existing devices and software, from having a smart phone, a scanner, a digital camera, 
and gps unit, to digitizing one's life one medium at a time, from photographs to music to 
family recipes.  Here, Bell offers detailed examples of the kind of recording equipment he 
owns and how he likes to make use of it.  For instance, he advises getting a digital camera 
that allows for the recording of video so as to better "capture the ambience of a moment" 
  
109 
109 
(Bell and Gemmell 2009: 188).  He also suggests collecting personal and family-related 
medical information in one central document, keeping track of immunizations, allergies, 
illnesses, and test results so that one can achieve what he calls "quantitative health" (189).  
Moreover, Bell discusses the limitations that scanning one's paper documents might 
entail if not properly organized and annotated to facilitate later retrieval.  Therefore, he 
suggests taking the time to create a personally relevant hierarchy of folders with detailed 
file names for all digital documents.  But despite the tangible discussion he offers as to 
how one might go about lifelogging, many of his recommendations rest on the promise of 
future technological developments that he asserts will "rapidly improve in quality 
convenience in the next few years" (189).  The e-memory revolution does not just 
specialize in managing pasts; it holds many stakes in how researchers envision the future.  
These researchers develop models for the plausible (read as radically different from the 
"impossible") based on a past that is shaped so as to point to a probable future.  As such, 
the promise of future technological developments orients MyLifeBits and Memories for 
Life scientists' current research and prototype designs. 
 
 Despite his enormous digital collection, Bell claims that with less paper around, 
he feels much less cluttered.  Moreover, he predicts that his e-memory will never be 
overwhelmed.  In the future, with proper software, keeping everything will not be 
cumbersome or tedious at all.  Accordingly, Memories for Life scientists suggest 
archiving everything starting now, because digital memory and processing power will 
accrue and accelerate faster than memories accumulate.  These scientists speculate within 
a teleological framework offered by Moore's law that predicts an increase in memory and 
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processing power and a decrease in circuit, chip, and transistor sizes, allowing for faster 
and smaller computers.  Performance is famously said to double every two years.  As 
mathematician Alan Dix announced at a Memories for Life workshop, in seventy years, 
"we will be able to store a person's entire life record on a grain of sand."  Memories for 
Life scientists' past experiences become the ground for making inferences as to what is 
desirable and possible in the future.44  They rely on the same assumptions as those raised 
by anthropologist Christopher Kelty in his reflections on futurology, "that the absolute 
fact of technological acceleration - this knowing glance into the future - should order the 
kinds of interventions that occur in the present" (2008: 89).  Thus, these scientists feel 
confident imagining the future and working toward it.  In their future, they will never run 
out of digital space. Technological matter and virtual space appear as infinite, whereas 
time, the thing to be managed, stored, and extended, is treated as finite.45 
 
 To get the most out of time, now seen as finite, Bell must measure and control it.  
In order to manage his time, to keep track of how he should save and spend it, the devices 
he imagines and experiments with also specialize in supporting his prospective memory.  
"With a detailed e-memory of what I do, my computer is my personal time-management 
consultant" (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 81).  Monitoring how he does and should spend his 
                                                
44 Memories for Life scientists' projects fit into a historical trajectory of future-making described by 
anthropologists Susan Harding and Daniel Rosenberg in their edited collection Histories of the Future.  For 
Harding and Rosenberg, "[T]he future is not so much underdetermined as overdetermined.  Our lives are 
constructed around knowledges of the future that are as full (and flawed) as our knowledges of the past" 
(2005: 5). 
45 In contrast to what Nietzsche calls the eternal return, in which, because of the infinitude of time and the 
finitude of matter, everything (every possible combination of matter) will play itself out again and again, 
such memory-making technologies treat time as finite and matter (including digital space) as infinite.  As 
such, the makers of these tools attempt to govern each moment in its finite particularity.  On Nietzsche's 
understanding of temporality and his concept of eternal return, see Grosz (2004: 143). 
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time, receiving reminders at the right moments, as well as being able to set them on 
demand, is crucial to the design of Bell's e-memory.  This implies that the system be on 
hand at any given point, a concept now exemplified with the arrival of cloud computing, 
which allows users to keep large amounts of data online, accessible at all times from any 
terminal around the world.  "When your mind is absent, your e-memory will always be 
there" (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 60).  Standing in for an imperfect subjective memory 
and insufficient human capacity for time management is the promise of computational 
control over one's time.  In Picturing Personhood, anthropologist Joseph Dumit describes 
the elimination of subjectivity by processes of computed automation.  The positron 
emission tomography (pet) researchers Dumit studies seek to eliminate any opportunity 
for subjective or biased readings of scanned data in the name of neutral, consensus-
forming understandings of brain images.  "Every possibility of subjectivity must be 
eliminated to produce something reliable - that is, something real, something known.  The 
hero in this story is automation" (Dumit 2004: 122).  Similarly, the automatic monitoring 
of how Bell spends his time (reified in opposition to his subjective, and therefore possibly 
erroneous, memory) acts as a binding structure for his future self, for his future actions, 
and as a framework for future decision-making.46  Embracing a neoliberal ideal of self-
management and increased productivity, these technologies insure that he will never miss 
a constructive moment again.  By creating a structure in which he can bank time for 
future use, "Total Recall will help get things done" (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 91). 
 
                                                
46 At the 2011 American Anthropological Association meeting, a panel titled "Anthropologies of the 
Automatic," organized by Nick Seaver and Marcel LaFlamme, was brought together around problems of 
human-machine interfaces and concepts of autonomous agency.  Tracking new technological forms, from 
unmanned aircrafts to cloud computing and massive datasets, they examined how the automatic, qualified 
as "reliable, objective, or efficient," was brought to bear on human decision-making. 
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 Memories for Life's future-oriented projects exemplify how "[d]iscursive 
practices produce, rather than merely describe, the 'subjects' and 'objects' of knowledge 
practices" (Barad 2003: 819).  And as philosopher Michel Foucault has repeatedly 
demonstrated, discourse emerges from a set of historically situated possibilities that both 
constrain and allow for certain memory-making and knowledge-making practices (1971; 
1986).  Thus researchers' designs of time management devices depend not simply on 
what is said but also on what can be said at a given time.  Discourses about computers as 
personal assistants, or "servants" as Bell puts it, are outcomes of processes of 
industrialization and standardization, where machines have come to work for humans in 
the name of increased productivity (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 196).  But instead of being 
just production machines, new recording technologies are reproduction machines, where 
augmented memory means improved efficiency and longer-lasting lives and legacies.47 
 
 Recording technologies are designed to save us time by bringing the past into the 
present at just the right moment.  In order to do that, time must be agreed upon.  It must 
be standardized.48  To share information, every computer must be part of a network of 
time machines.  These machines act as servers communicating and agreeing on time 
across the globe over what is called Network Time Protocol (ntp), a set of time-sharing 
                                                
47 Quoting Benjamin Franklin, who reminds us that "time is money," Max Weber, writing at the turn of the 
twentieth century, observes in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism an affinity between 
Protestant notions of salvation and capitalist ethics of work, investment, and accumulation (2003).  
Drawing from Weber’s connections between moral virtues and the management of life and capital, 
sociologist Nikolas Rose, in his ruminations on genomics, neuroscience, and what he terms "the spirit of 
biocapital" titled The Politics of Life Itself, demonstrates that present-day bodies and time are optimized in 
a will to health and longevity that goes hand in hand with advanced liberal political rationality in the name 
of a productive and profitable future (2007). 
48 During the eighteenth century, the expansion of the British post office, and later the developments of 
railway systems, led to the adoption of standardized time on a supralocal level known as gmt (Greenwich 
Mean Time).  For a history of standardized time and the instauration of local time zones, see Galison 
(2003) and Zerubavel (1982). 
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conventions that allow for synchronization and communication.  Originally designed 
before the World Wide Web in 1985 by a University of Delaware professor, David L. 
Mills, ntp is one of the oldest Internet protocols.  It works by connecting computers to a 
clock and then sending two bits of information between the connected parts: first, what 
time it is at the source, and second, how long it took to transmit the message from the 
source.  Multiplied through a pyramidal scheme of connected computers, consensus 
emerges in the form of standardized time.  The master clock that computers worldwide 
are connected to currently is the Cesium Fountain Atomic Clock at the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology laboratory in Boulder, Colorado.  Based on the resonant 
frequency of the cesium atom, the time is considered accurate to within one second every 
sixty million years. Technological time, or more specifically atomic time, thus 
supplements and structures human biological time so that today's memory researchers can 
work toward the promise of a more productive, prosperous, and satisfying future. 
 
 The investments made by Bell and his fellow researchers are not just investments 
in time spent researching, recording, archiving, and synchronizing.  They are also 
ongoing financial ventures in speculative technological markets.  As Bell stated earlier, in 
the United States, there is a $4.2 billion industry involved in biological memory 
enhancement by way of vitamins and herbal supplements.  And as Richard Doyle and 
Tiffany Romain's work shows, industries such as cryonics are predicated on a present 
economic investment for the promise of future returns in the form of life later on.  
Consumers of cryonics will typically pay between $28,000 and $150,000 to have either 
their heads or entire bodies frozen for later reanimation (Doyle 2003; Romain 2010).  
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Common in these endeavors is an increased purchase on time driven by a faith in 
continuing technological advances. 
 
 Bell, himself an angel investor (individuals who provide capital for start-up 
companies and research), encourages start-ups specializing in lifelogging and other forms 
of information management.  He even concludes his book by stating that he is "ready to 
put [his] money where [his] mouth is and invest in start-ups that will take advantage of 
the e-memory revolution" (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 226).  Besides being devoted to the 
future of his personal e-memory and his book-length manifesto for Total Recall, Bell is 
invested in a much larger memory market that has moved money and researchers across 
America and Europe.  As philosopher Bernard Steigler maintains, memories have 
become "the privileged object of industrial investment" (2009: 97).  In 2004, the United 
Kingdom Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council initially granted 
Memories for Life £62,000 in funding, and named the project a Grand Challenge in 
Computing Research.  The main goal of this ongoing challenge is described as "bringing 
together a diverse range of academics in a bid to understand how memory works and to 
develop the technologies to enhance it" (Memories for Life 2011).  Additional private 
and public funding has fueled both the network at large and its individual research 
projects.  In 2005, Memoir, a project coming out of the Information Studies Department 
at Sheffield University, received £470,000 as a Marie Curie Host Fellowship for the 
Transfer of Knowledge.  Furthermore, Microsoft has invested over $550,000 in 
SenseCam research over the past six years, giving away cameras, software, and support 
to various clinics and university labs in the United Kingdom and the United States.  In 
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2012 the SenseCam went from prototype to product.  Production rights have been 
purchased by Vicon, a company specializing in motion capture.  At £500 each, they 
mostly cater to academic and research markets.  Vicon and Microsoft now host an annual 
SenseCam conference that brings together research on its possible applications.  At 
Microsoft Research in Cambridge, it has been an ongoing project to involve 
neuroscientists from the Memory Clinic and Memory Aids Clinic at Addenbrooke's 
Hospital.  I will return to a more detailed investigation of some of their studies in the 
following chapter.  All these projects are investments.  They are current mobilizations 
toward a future that contains and organizes the past. 
 
 In 2003, Bell and Gemmell were approached by the United States Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (darpa) about the development of a research 
program they were starting called LifeLog.  Sharing the hopes of a technologically 
enhanced future for memory, darpa wanted a system to capture and store a person's 
experience and interactions.  They wanted the system to get to know the user (a soldier, 
for instance) and assist him in completing tasks.  As a growing prototype, the MyLifeBits 
project could serve as an example.  But as Bell and other researchers have recounted, the 
LifeLog project was publicly abandoned amid accusations of the Big Brother type.  
Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, darpa had launched an initiative called Total 
Information Awareness (tia) with the goal of creating a centralized database of 
information (transactions, communications, and movements) about every person, 
corporation, and institution in the nation, in the hopes of identifying terrorist patterns.  
Public outcry caused the tia project to be dismantled.  When reflecting on these 
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abandoned projects, Bell expresses sincere disappointment in what he considers an ill-
informed public; and he is proud to point out that darpa has since developed Advanced 
Soldier Sensor Information Systems Technology (assist).  To explain the purpose of this 
system, Bell gives the example of a soldier in Iraq who could perform daily rounds while 
recording them to a video blog.  In Bell’s story, this recording could then allow an 
intelligence officer to spot a suspicious-looking vehicle (Bell and Gemmell 2009: 79).  
For Bell, these projects bring to the fore the advantages of lifelogging for both 
individuals and nations.  But instead of Big Brother, he prefers the term Little Brother 
because the e-memory revolution is not just about a larger institution recording 
individuals, it’s about millions of individuals recording themselves. 
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter, other groups of researchers who have 
been actively invested in the future of lifelogs are historians, librarians, and sociologists. 
The last decade has seen a veritable explosion of original sources in the forms of 
micronarratives.  When addressing this eruption of recorded first-person accounts, Bell 
goes so far as to claim: "We look back at the ages before the advent of writing as 
'prehistory.'  The next generation will look back on our era as pre–Total Recall" (Bell and 
Gemmell 2009: 226).  Prompted by the proliferation of these chronicles of contemporary 
life, researchers from the British Library, core members of the Memories for Life 
network, are also looking for ways to archive these fragments of the past. 
 
 Whether for improved health, corporate interests, educational purposes, national 
security, or cultural heritage, these memory projects invest in a desire to enhance our 
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collective knowledge about ourselves.  In so doing, these tools increase the gap described 
by Barad as dividing the external world from the internal one.  This divide passes through 
the figure of the knowing subject and structures a representationalist triad of knower, 
knowledge, and known.  We might borrow Michael Fischer's words in asserting that 
these recording and knowledge-making technologies allow "memory to be stored, 
externalized, and recalled for comparison, and analysis[; And that this remains, in fact,] 
the period of the rational, autonomous ego hypostatized by Descartes" (2003: 325).  We 
could also go a step further and argue with Hayles, that  
Instead of the Cartesian subject who begins by cutting himself off from his 
environment and visualizing his thinking presence as the one thing he 
cannot doubt, the human who inhabits the information-rich environments 
of contemporary technological societies knows that the dynamic and 
fluctuating boundaries of her embodied cognitions develop in relation to 
other cognizing agents embedded throughout the environment, among 
which the most powerful are intelligent machines.   
 In these views the impact of information technologies on the 
mindbody is always understood as a two-way relation, a feedback loop 
between biologically evolved capabilities and a richly engineered 
technological environment.  Such feedback loops may be reaching new 
levels of intensity as our environments become smarter and more 
information-rich, but the basic dynamic is as old as humans" (Hayles 
2002: 233).   
 
 
 In order to turn vast collected bits of information into retrievable data or 
knowledge, Memories for Life scientists attempt to draw signals from noise, meanings 
from the mundane.  Bell and other researchers at Dublin City University, such as Gurrin 
Cathal and Alan Smeaton’s team, are working to develop a system that recognizes near 
duplicates of documents and photographs in order to mark "events" and distinguish them 
from preceding or subsequent ones.  Their software searches for novelty, which they 
equate with meaningfulness.  Bell predicts that such software's ability to sort through data 
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and reduce redundancy will only improve as researchers begin acquiring the personal 
data of users, such as their pulse, breathing, tone of voice, and even brain waves to 
determine the importance of a particular moment.  Pattern recognition is key to 
examining the archives.  If history can help to avoid the mistakes of the past, then 
memory banks can help to avoid problems that scientists do not even understand yet, 
problems that exist only as patterns.  In a desire for the oracular, scientists seek to turn 
patterns into predictions.  In short, "[t]he more you record, the better," insists Bell (Bell 
and Gemmell: 62).  
 
Collecting One's Self 
Theuth is the Egyptian god Toth, the ‘scribe of the gods’, to whom was attributed the 
invention of writing [...]  When it came to writing, Theuth declared: ‘Here is an 
accomplishment, my lord the king, which will improve both the wisdom and the memory 
of the Egyptians [...]  The King replied [...] ‘you, who are the father of writing, have out 
of fondness for your offspring attributed to it quite the opposite of its real function.  
Those who acquire it will cease to exercise their memory and become forgetful [...]  What 
you have discovered is a receipt for recollection, not for memory.’ - Plato 
 
 
Bell enjoys reviewing his SenseCam images in rapid succession. "Talk about your life 
flashing before your eyes!  It’s an amazing feeling to see your life on fast-forward like 
that" (49).  Experiencing firsthand what is said to happen to someone just before they die, 
seeing his life flash before his eyes, reminds Bell that he is still very much alive.   
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Figure 1 
Images taken by Lina Dib using Microsoft’s SenseCam. 
 
For him, seeing his past in the form of images reassures him that he will not forget his 
life, and also that others will not forget him.  In a fight against obsolescence, he imagines 
that his e-memory will help keep him alive even after he is dead.   
 
If we can have a complete record of the things about people that especially 
provoke meaning for us, what will we do with this complete record when 
they are gone?  We will maintain the e-memory of that person as a 
treasured heirloom.  And, someday, we will ask it questions.  The e-
memory will answer.  You will have virtual immortality. (Bell and 
Gemmell 2009: 139).  
 
An e-memory would allow Bell to surpass his biological limitations and interact with 
other humans beyond the death of his body.  Whereas large portions of memories (nearly 
everything excluding paper-based records) previously had to die with their rememberers, 
memories now gain an extended life in which they become the spokesperson for the 
deceased, even, as we have also seen in the previous chapter with Wilks' Companion 
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project, answering questions that the deceased may have been unable, or unwilling, to 
answer in life.  Indeed, the finite temporality of the human body and the desire to pass on 
a part of oneself to future generations underlies many Memories for Life projects.  Like 
Wilks' "artificial companion," Bell's Total Recall would help its user create an 
autobiography by collating photographs and narratives collected over time.  Imbued with 
e-memories, the archive, or companion, could then be passed on to the user’s 
descendants, who would interact with it to learn more about the user and his life.  Designs 
such as these express a longing for memories to add up, to make sense, and to provide a 
more complete picture of a person.  
 
 In an attempt to make something tangible out of time, these researchers seek to 
inscribe the recordable, storable passage of time as the constituents of a user's 
individuality, neatly packaging both temporality and personality in something that can be 
decontextualized and passed on for generations.  Turning time into matter, grasping a 
moment in a photograph, is an attempt to conceive of life as something bounded, as being 
rather than becoming.  For Bell, life has now taken a material form, which he can store, 
access, and manipulate, adjusting its speed and resolution.  However, the ironic 
consequence of this turn toward materiality (and to the archive) is that it allows the very 
concept of a disembodied subject to thrive; reductive materiality is what allows for the 
construction of an interiority and exteriority via an assembled narrative continuity.  For 
Bell, it is through the disciplining of matter, through the practice of building an archive, 
that an e-subject with an e-memory is constructed. 
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 To address digital personal records as transposable selves highlights Bell and 
other Memories for Life researchers' underlying engagement in an important 
philosophical debate about what constitutes an authentic, objectified memory, and what 
some call a "digital me."  Indeed, much has been written linking the notion of identity to 
that of memory and agency.  Historically, one can return to the period in which the self as 
the locus of subjectivity is debated among such philosophers as Descartes, Locke and 
Hume.  Looking back at the constitution of the very concept of self, Charles Taylor 
argues that the Cartesian objectification of the body and its activities, as separate from the 
mind that observes it, creates a form of "modern disengagement" (1989:175).  Taylor's 
disengagement, coupled with the contemporary desire to capture experience, objectifies 
memory as separate from the self or mind in which it operates.  It is the self representing 
and interpreting itself.  J. Lenore Wright defends this Cartesian separation of knower and 
known in so much as it allows for self-knowledge and thus a kind of self-representation 
(2006:71).  For Wright, the dialectical relation between the two is brought to the fore in 
processes of self-narration where the lines between the self who knows and the self who 
is objectified are paradoxically blurred.49 
 
 In his article "Space, Time, and the Politics of Memory," anthropologist Jonathan 
Boyarin argues that the creation and the experience of memories today occur differently 
than in the past.  "[N]ew technologies of transportation and communication [...] have 
profoundly altered our sense of time and space [...] and the possibilities of reifying, and 
hence 'preserving' images of the past" (Boyarin 1994: 3) and in so doing, have altered the 
                                                
49 A great deal of work has been done on the concept of “self” in anthropology and social theory, from 
Carrithers et al. (1985), De Certeau (1990), Giddens (1991), Mauss (1985) Shweder and Levine (1984), to 
Pandolfi (1993) and Turkle (1984), to name but a few. 
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possibility of preserving images of ourselves.  Boyarin reflects on how identity and 
memory are constantly confounded "insofar as consciousness, the ground of 'identity,' is 
constituted by the sum of all the impressions and imaginings retained in the brain" (1994: 
23).  But he complicates this reflection by pointing to the fact that memory is 
intersubjective, political and social.  Philosopher Michel Foucault situates the western 
notion of subjectivity at this precise intersection between memory and intersubjectivity.  
It is through the use of external "memory tools," and through the sharing of selected 
memories he claims, that an ethical self is constructed.  For the purpose of considering 
such added ethical dimensions of the self and its technologies, we will leap cavalierly 
over the millennia, from the Stoics to the present, and focus on Foucault's genealogy. 
 
 According to Foucault, the West's cherished notion of subjectivity developed in 
Antiquity through the very practice of collecting personal data.  In his studies on the care 
of the self, he explores the role of ancient writing practices in the knowledge and the 
creation of the self.  He inquires as to how, through a system of phenomena and historical 
processes that we now refer to as culture, the questions of truth and self-cultivation were 
generated (1982: 243).  He argues that about 2000 years ago, with the Stoics and 
Epicureans, the western concept of self developed through the keeping of personal 
notebooks and through correspondence.  In Foucauldean theory, the care of the self 
(referred to by the Ancient Greeks as epimeleia heauto) revolved around the reflections, 
the practices, and the experiences through which an individual catalyzed transformations 
that granted access to true self-knowledge.  Foucault states that "around the care of the 
self, there developed an entire activity of speaking and writing in which the work of 
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oneself on oneself and communication with others were linked together" (1986: 51).  In 
other words, Foucault describes what he terms technologies of the self, which were 
methods and techniques through which identity was composed, performed and 
monitored. 
 
 Foucault analyzes the historic notion of "knowing thyself" that was professed as 
an "art of living."50  In antiquity, the acquisition of knowledge of oneself was put into 
practice through the widespread use of hupomnêmata, or personal notebooks.  In these 
books their authors would jot down citations, fragments of reflections, sketches, 
examples and accounts of actions either witnessed or learned, creating an archive – 
described as a physical memory – available for future reference.  They were "the 
meditations, the readings, the notes that one takes on books or on the conversations one 
has heard, notes that one reads again later, the recollection of truths that one knows 
already but that need to be more fully adapted to one's own life" (Foucault 1986: 51).  
These notebooks were also used to keep a kind of track record of one’s mental, physical 
and spiritual health.  Thus hupomnêmata were by their very nature continually 
unfinished, and in many ways intrinsically disorganized.  Furthermore, they had to be 
available at a moment's notice.  The possibility of using them spontaneously was one of 
their key characteristics.  Discussing the impact of hupomnêmata, Foucault claims "this 
new technology was as disrupting as the introduction of the computer into private life 
today" (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983: 245).  As mentioned earlier, unlike intimate diaries 
                                                
50 Foucault contrasts the classic period with the later Christian period, which was founded on the 
renunciation of the self through confessional rituals. The classic form of care of the self was transformed 
with the rise of Christianity and became a religious necessity for achieving salvation rather than an "art of 
living." 
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that reveal unspoken secrets, these ancient notebooks were also used to capture the 
already said.  So citational practices were common within hupomnêmata.  The author 
constituted his own identity through a mass of writing that he would not only appropriate 
but also embody.  More specifically, this practice pointed to a self that wasn't yet what it 
strove to become.  Thus, rather than being considered merely archives, selected bits of 
the past were to be used in the making of one's future self. 
 
 This said, could the SenseCam, readily collecting the already seen, be considered 
contemporary hupomnêmata?  Again, the intent in keeping these notebooks did not 
revolve around the simple practice of recording everything about the past per se, but 
rather around a practice of carefully collecting directed toward an ethical realization of a 
future self.  On its own the omnipresent SenseCam does not seem to incorporate the act 
of selecting and editing, key in the constitution and elaboration of oneself for oneself.51  
However, the exercise of recording one's activities combined with the use of an archival 
technology, which would allow one to recognize, annotate, retrieve, and share only 
certain bits of recorded information, may indeed help one understand when and how to 
intervene in order to better their physical and mental health.  Mnemonic technologies 
geared toward the enhancement of one's wellbeing could then be considered technologies 
                                                
51 If a popular contemporary digital practice was to be compared to that of keeping hupomnêmata, it might 
be blogging. As the blogger navigates the plethora of information on the web, he selects but certain ones to 
comment on, elaborate on, and return to. The choices he makes while collecting and exposing both his and 
others' thoughts may be constitutive of a kind of exercise on himself. Another such technology might be 
Microsoft's MyLifeBits. Ironically however, archival tools such as this one create the problem of 
remembering how and where things are stored in order to retrieve them efficiently. Designers of various 
information management technologies are actively addressing this challenge and trying to come up with 
ways of automatically annotating pictures, documents and videos in order to alleviate some of the 
difficulties related to the management of large amounts of data. 
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of the self in Foucault's sense.  In other words, through the process of selection, editing 
and reviewing, (re)collection might be seen as a means towards a kind of self-fulfillment. 
 
 But the role of the interlocutor in Foucault's understanding of technologies of the 
self is also an important one.  An interlocutor serves as a means to verify one's 
impressions and experiences of the world.  The interlocutor acts as an outsider who can 
attest to one's pertinence and truthfulness.  In fact, according to Foucault, western notions 
of subjectivity were developed further through correspondence rather than simply in the 
collection of words already said.  In Seneca's letters with Lucilius and in Marcus 
Aurelius' letters with Fronto, Foucault locates narratives that he describes as an "account 
of one's relation to oneself" (1994: 217).  The letters he examines consisted in reviewing 
and making accounts of one's entire day, in its quotidian banality, as a means of attending 
to oneself.  Self-cultivation was then considered "not an exercise in solitude, but a true 
social practice" (1986: 51).  Derrida’s work examines the significance of the archive in 
terms that also mark the extension of the private into the public and vice versa.  He 
describes the archive in terms of space:  "There is no archive without a place of 
consignation, without a technique of repetition, and without a certain exteriority.  No 
archive without outside" (1996: 11, emphasis in original).52  Originating from the Greek 
word arkheîon - which means the house in which resided those who commanded and held 
political power - the archive was a lieu that marked the institutional path linking the 
private and the public.   
 
                                                
52 Memory shares these topoi in Arstotle's sense; memory must have a place and an image at the juncture of 
prosthesis.   
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 Faubion also attests to this when he asserts that "Greek ethics is indeed personal, 
but unlike ethics grounded in a metaphysics of autonomy, of a radical and absolute 
freedom, it places ethical practice in the encompassing web of the house and polis [...].  
Ethics and its domestic and political environment are thus entirely of a piece" (2011: 75).  
For Foucault, to write, to record oneself, was to exhibit oneself, to make oneself seen.  
Self-narration became a specific method of reflexive representation while simultaneously 
revealing oneself to others.  In Antiquity, this form of correspondence regularly occurred 
between a master and a student.  The student was told to record all his daily thoughts and 
activities and report them to the master who would act as an interlocutor.  In the process 
of reviewing and narrating one’s memories to another, one would be caring for oneself.  
Could Wilks' furry robot companions be considered contemporary master interlocutors? 
 
 The techniques practiced by Foucault's Stoics are neither governed by a concern 
for salvaging the self, nor by a concern for memory per se.  Rather memory is a means by 
which one creates a guidebook for one's actions.  One draws lessons from the past in 
order to better oneself.  To what degree are today's technologies built on anxieties about 
memory rather than on the realization of an ethical self?  Pervasive new recording 
technologies reflect a change in attitude and perhaps a change in the way we construct 
ourselves.  The idea that if one records everything one will better know oneself is quite 
different from the practice of selection involved in the keeping of hupomnêmata.  Both 
can be seen as a commitment to self-knowledge, but with ancient technologies of the self, 
it is not necessary to record everything, rather only bits and pieces relevant to oneself.  
With Foucault's Stoics, the emphasis is on a current process of becoming; with Bell, 
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memory acts as a safeguard against losing who he has been, or a mathematical mode of 
prediction for the future.  For French historian Pierre Nora  
 
[m]odern memory is, above all, archival.  It relies entirely on the 
materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility of 
the image.  What began as writing ends as high fidelity and tape recording.  
The less memory is experienced from the inside the more it exists only 
through its exterior scaffolding and outward signs - hence the obsession 
with the archive that marks our age, attempting at once the complete 
conservation of the present as well as the total preservation of the past. 
(1995: 636) 
 
 
Seen in this light, Foucault's history of the concept of self in the West problematizes 
memory as a means to self-fashioning, whereas today's grounding of memory in 
authenticity promotes the discovery of an exterior omnipresent, recorded self.   
  
 Bell offers a transcendental account of the world to which he is granted mediated 
yet transparent access through his many automatic recording devices.  Individuals, 
objective facts as well as experience are considered entities that are always already there 
waiting to be known and captured rather than something discursively created.  In order to 
examine Bell's account, I turn to historian Joan Scott's "The Evidence of Experience," 
where she traces how the notion of experience has become inseparable from that of 
exterior evidence.  Referring to Raymond Williams' genealogy of the term experience, 
she traces how its meaning has ranged from that of knowledge gleaned from past events, 
to a particular kind of consciousness, to a most truthful and immediate witnessing, to 
refer finally to something objective, something outside of the individual. In all cases, the 
notion of an individual - as either internalizing, or faced with "experience" - is considered 
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primordial. The (experiencing) individual thus becomes the unquestioned category.  And 
yet, as Scott argues, 
 
[i]t is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are 
constituted through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes 
not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or 
felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek 
to explain, that about which knowledge is produced (1991, 779-780). 
 
 
Barad’s notion of "agential realism" also calls into question such a separation between 
our consciousness or experience, our discourse, and the empirical world.  For Barad, it is 
not the empirical world that is at stake but rather its referent as pregiven material to 
which we have mediated access (Barad 2003).  Instead, she considers the empirical world 
to be composed of phenomena, themselves emerging from the intra-activity, or what 
Stengers calls the "reciprocal capture" of matter and discursive practices (2010: 219).  
The past is neither simply there to be inscribed, nor is it the sheer product of human 
agency.  But Bell's Total Recall project is not concerned with the material-discursive 
becoming of the past.  Rather, the processes by which Bell’s e-memory creates 
indisputable evidence goes unremarked.  What matters is the fact that evidence is being 
gathered.  Memory, as Nora puts it, has been seized by history.  "Memory has been 
wholly absorbed by its meticulous reconstitution.  Its new vocation is to record; 
delegating to the archive the responsibility of remembering, it sheds its signs upon 
depositing them there, as a snake sheds its skin" (Nora 1995: 636).  The result: a plethora 
of archives.  
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 So are we really preserving the memory of our time?  The SenseCam shows us a 
great deal that we may have otherwise forgotten, and with it Bell reifies the notion that 
because we can record everything, we must.  What Bell doesn't do however, is question 
how SenseCam images, come to constitute what we call memories.  Paradoxically, as 
Plato points out in the epigraph to this section, documenting may also make us forget 
(Plato 1973).  We place our confidence in these collection bins and in doing so imagine 
that we are making room for other things.  In preserving the traces of our era, in actively 
creating the archeology of the future, are we compromising our own memory, that of the 
present?  Recording everything may actually have the opposite effect than that desired.  
So far, sifting through test users' collected sound and video, let alone innumerable 
photographs, has proved challenging, such that, in the words of anthropologists Susan 
Harding and Daniel Rosenberg, our futures appear as "junkyards of memories we have 
not yet had" (2005: 5).  
 
 In a short story by Jorge Luis Borges, a character named Funes falls off a horse 
and loses consciousness.  Upon awakening, he finds "the present [...] almost intolerable it 
[is] so rich and bright; the same [is] true of the most ancient and most trivial memories" 
(1962: 112).  Funes discovers that he is crippled but that his perception and memory have 
become “infallible.”  He describes his immense power of recollection: "I have more 
memories in myself alone than all men have had since the world was a world [...] My 
memory, sir, is like a garbage disposal" (1962: 112, emphasis in original).  Overwhelmed 
by details and the particular, Funes becomes incapable of formulating thoughts and 
generalities.  He spends his days in the dark, enumerating the different memories that 
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come to mind, each one as important as the last.  Rather than enhancing the human 
through a so-called 'memory extender,' might we become like Borges' Funes, who 
because of his incredible memory is plagued with the impossibility of discerning?  Would 
knowledge be replaced by 'pure data'?  An information overload renders all things equal 
and the self, overwhelmed and incapable of action, becomes catatonic.  Like Borges’ 
narrator who interacts with "Funes, the memorious," we might become "benumbed by the 
fear of multiplying superfluous gestures" (1962: 115).  These researchers' collections 
have become so vast that "rather than commenting on the everyday, [they have] become 
coterminous with it" (Highmore 2002: 83).  They have become as impractical as Funes' 
memory, or as Borges describes in another short story, a one-to-one map of the world.  
Bogged down by the endless empiricism of the everyday, a step back toward 
generalization appears nearly impossible.  Bell in fact recognizes the importance of a 
classification system.  "My data is entangled," he admits.  A Total Recall system for him 
must involve the ability to organize, classify, and annotate one's material.  "[Y]ou don't 
really have a grasp of your material until you have built a mental model, a structure, such 
as a taxonomy or mind-map, under which you classify the information being absorbed" 
(Bell and Gemmell 2009: 134).  Without classification, all you have is noise.53 
 
 
  
                                                
53 In short, Foucault argues that without processes of selection following moments of collection, one cannot 
"make one's self" into an ethical subject (Foucault 1986). See also Faubion’s An Anthropology of Ethics 
(2011). 
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4- Prosthesis and Anamnesis: 
 
With this chapter, instead of asking whether or not these technologies mirror reality or 
the past, through the case study of Mrs. B, a woman who suffers from amnesia and wears 
the SenseCam in the hope of leading a normal life in which she can share the past with 
loved ones, I prefer to ask how they act, what they do, and whom they speak for.  
Throughout, this chapter proposes a shift from a representationalist argument about the 
bifurcation of nature (in this case, the objective reality of the ticking past and our 
subjective recollection of it) to a consideration of the ecologies of memories that we build 
and how they perform specific cuts through time (Barad 2003; Stengers 2010).   For the 
amnesiac Mrs. B the problem of too much information is experienced quite differently 
than for Bell.  The noisiness created by the plethora of recorded memories is what allows 
her to un-forget, to experience a kind of anamnesis.  She exists in time through her 
experience of what Proust has called involuntary memory.  While Bell's desire to 
remember suggests that the past is out there, as a given, ready to be recorded, sorted, and 
subsequently tapped into whenever the need arises, Mrs. B's experience of involuntary 
memory suggests that the past is always only within the present.  By focusing on a 
posthumanist cyborg subject who longs to share the past with loved ones, I show how 
these new digital tools do not merely belong to the world of objects and representations 
(Faubion 2011; Haraway 1999; Hayles 1999; Wolfe 2010).  They participate in a care of 
the self (a kind of poetic self-making) that occurs though one's relationship with one's self 
and with machines, but also with one's past, and as Faubion emphasizes, "with others, 
who themselves demand care, consideration, acknowledgment [...]" (2011, 75).  As such, 
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these technologies are open to, and participate in, redefining concepts, subjectivities and 
temporalities.  I end by calling for an agential-realist account of intra-active memory, 
where intra-action, as defined by philosopher of science Karen Barad, presupposes no 
preexisting entities (or even temporalities) prior to relationships (2003).54  In the case of 
memory, intra-action means emphasizing not only the fluid relationships between 
individuals and machines, actors and actants, but also between the past, present, and 
future. 
 
The Noise of Memory 
Brooding at the end of the world on my island of Sal in the company of my prancing dogs 
I remember that month of January in Tokyo, or rather I remember the images I filmed of 
the month of January in Tokyo.  They have substituted themselves for my memory.  They 
are my memory. I wonder how people remember things who don't film, don't photograph, 
don't tape. How has mankind managed to remember?  I know: it wrote the Bible. The 
new Bible will be an eternal magnetic tape of a time that will have to reread itself 
constantly just to know it existed. - Chris Marker 
 
Bell's ambitious project of digital taxonomies and virtual immortality discussed in the 
previous chapter talks around, rather than about, certain very real problems of living and 
remembering in the present.  For people with memory impairments such as amnesia, the 
problems of recording the past, of information overload, and of noise are experienced 
quite differently.  Unlike with other participants in the e-memory revolution, the noise 
and unpredictability created by their collection of images are actually what allow them to 
occasionally remember their past.  Because of amnesiacs' general inability to remember 
the past, they cannot plan for the future.  They are, in a sense, caught in the present.  
                                                
54 Like Stengers' cosmopolitical approach, Barad's agential realist account "acknowledge[s] nature, the 
body, and materiality in the fullness of their becoming without resorting to the optics of transparency or 
opacity, [or] the geometries of absolute exteriority or interiority" (2003: 812). 
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Instead of keeping objective, standardized, and productive time, these exceptional users 
of recording technologies rely on their devices to give them a sense of temporality, of the 
subjective passage of time. 
 
 In an ongoing study performed by researchers at Microsoft and Addenbrooke's 
Hospital in Cambridge, Mrs. B, a woman with amnesia, wears a SenseCam to help her 
recall events in her life.  While this study shares Bell's representationalist framework, 
which assumes that Sense- Cam images are irrefutable proof of the past, Mrs. B is not 
concerned with organization and posterity.  She is not involved in a utopian scheme of 
living "better than well" (Elliott 2003).  Rather, she is trying to perform everyday actions 
such as caring for herself and remembering her loved ones.  When considering the 
promise of an e-memory like one described by Bell, Emma Berry, the neuropsychologist 
working with Mrs. B, explained that she does not care about what we call the system, or 
even its intended function per se.55  She said she cares about rehabilitation and about her 
patients who are suffering from Alzheimer's disease and amnesia.  Berry emphasizes that, 
far from being a blissful forgetting, Alzheimer's creeps up slowly in a painful process that 
leaves its sufferers with no memory of who they are or how to do basic tasks.  Moreover, 
amnesiacs do not record things in order to store them "out of mind"; their minds have 
essentially left them. 
 
 Berry came to Microsoft Research to test whether some of their newly developed 
tools such as the SenseCam would help the patients she was working with who suffered 
                                                
55 References to and quotations from Berry are from semistructured interviews, workshops, and informal 
meetings conducted in person by the author over the course of fieldwork research between 2006 and 2008.  
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from different forms of dementia.  She hoped these tools would help patients regain a 
sense of normalcy and self through what she terms autobiographical memory, in short, 
the kind of memory related to past events in one's life.  "SenseCam might help people 
remember what they did three weeks ago at that wedding. [...] [O]r they might remember 
the birth of their child. Or, they might remember the last holiday they took."  Berry 
explained that Mrs. B is a patient in her sixties who had limbic encephalitis, a viral 
infection of the brain.  She now has a damaged hippocampus, an important structure 
involved in remembering, located in the medial temporal lobe of the brain. Subsequently, 
she has a very poor memory.  "We got evidence that after five days, she entirely forgets 
something that happened that was very significant."  Berry continued, "But actually, in 
reality, it's the next day," she whispered, although no one else was in her office.   
 
 Berry recounted a visit to Mrs. B and her husband's home.  Mrs. B had cooked a 
lovely meal for her.  With three courses and bottles of wine, she had clearly gone through 
a lot of trouble.  Berry had stayed with the couple until about midnight before going back 
to her hotel close by.  By 8:30 the next morning, Berry reported that Mrs. B had "no 
recollection of the previous evening whatsoever."  Mrs. B said she knew who Berry was 
on a semantic basis, so she knew that her name was Emma, and that she worked with her 
memory.  But that was all. In 2005, Berry and her team asked Mrs. B to wear a 
SenseCam.  She has been wearing one ever since.  Over the course of several studies, 
they have found that SenseCam does in fact help her to remember.  When she wears it, 
months later she has what appear to be detailed recollections of past events (Hodges et al. 
2006).  Berry elaborated on the experimental process: the researchers ask Mrs. B to wear 
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the SenseCam if she is doing something she deems interesting or meaningful, such as 
going to the theater with her husband.  Then, starting the next day, and every other day 
for two weeks following this event, Mrs. B and her husband review the images and 
discuss them.  What the researchers are trying to encourage is a reencoding of memories.  
Every time someone remembers, Berry explained, they create new pathways that allow 
them to retrieve their memories.  So the more one goes back and recalls events, the more 
traces one creates to follow later on. "So if you go back and remember your last holiday, 
it's like you're encoding those memories again [...].  If I get you to keep remembering 
your holiday, you're more likely to remember it in ten years than if you don't go back to 
that."  Like a snake eating its tail, I imagined Mrs. B eventually watching images of 
herself watching images in a recursive feedback loop. 
 
 Berry performed a similar SenseCam experiment with a patient who has multiple 
sclerosis.  Again she noted that "events, images that [the patient] was not able to recall 
initially, seem to have become permanent memories now."  She remarked on the blurring 
distinction between the events and their evidence in images. "I'm not sure whether we are 
creating new memories from the pictures or whether she is remembering the events 
following a trigger from the pictures [...].  But either way, it seems to be working."  In 
Joan Scott's reflection on the nature of evidence, she considers how the primacy of the 
visual allows one to "claim [...] legitimacy on the authority of experience" and to 
communicate this legitimacy to others as knowledge (1991: 776).  But Scott complicates 
this attributed legitimacy to evidence by pointing to evidence's double bind: on the one 
hand, it can be said that narratives determine the structure and pertinence of evidence, 
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much like the present determines how one reads the past.  On the other hand, evidence is 
considered as evidence on the basis of its freestanding qualities.  It is evidence because it 
is real, no matter what.  Seen from this perspective, this patient's experience of viewing 
the SenseCam images (and being told that they are images from her life) causes her to 
recognize moments of her past.  She comes to notice elements of her past that reside in 
the image as she is carried beyond the image into the nebulous realms of recollection.  
The images at once create and trigger a memory.   
 
 As Scott points out, when evidence is based on experience, one cannot argue with 
the account of one's own past.  The problem she raises however is that when experience 
is used for pointing to evidence, it leaves aside the ways in which the seeing subject 
comes to see evidence, and the ways in which this evidence operates.  
[T]he project of making experience visible precludes critical examination 
of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of 
representation [...], its premises about what these categories mean and how 
they operate, and of its notions of subject, origin, and cause (Scott 1991: 
778).   
 
In this case, what needs to be addressed is how the researchers, users, and images 
construct each other as well as notions of the past, present and future.  
 
The evidence of experience works as a foundation providing both a 
starting point and a conclusive kind of explanation, beyond which few 
questions can or need to be asked. And yet it is precisely the questions 
precluded - questions about discourse, difference, and subjectivity, as well 
as about what counts as experience and who gets to make that 
determination - that would enable us to historicize experience, and to 
reflect critically on the history we write about it, rather than to premise our 
history on it (Scott 1991: 790). 
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The SenseCam might point to evidence of a past that is forgotten, but what it does not 
point to is how the resulting images operate, how they have become something through 
which a subject remembers in the first place.  
 
 Berry quickly emphasized the importance of regarding the images as triggers, as 
memory cues.  She declared the need for them to be treated as what they are: images, and 
not a neat serial form of an inaccessible past.  Like filmmaker Chris Marker in his 
narrative of Sans Soleil - a fictional documentary that evokes philosophical questions 
around memory, documentary, and the act of recording - Berry prefers when things 
"proclaim themselves to be what they are: images, not the portable and compact form of 
an already inaccessible reality" (Marker 1982).  Berry's view differs from the way many 
researchers in the Memories for Life network speak about digital memory, that is, as a 
receptacle that one tosses the past into, to later pull out again.  At a Memories for Life 
workshop I had attended the previous year, Berry argued that the term capturing memory 
gives a misleading picture of what SenseCam does.56  SenseCam is not a black box of 
life.  In fact, she and her team prefer to focus on the effects that recollections, as 
subjective and perhaps inaccurate as they might be, have on a patient.   
 
 Berry gave me another example: she and Mrs. B were reviewing over two 
hundred images, when an image, "just an ugly image, just a knee bending over the boot 
of [her] car, and [...] her glove," prompted her to remember the wind.  It was fiercely 
                                                
56 In Archive Fever Derrida distinguishes the archive from memory.  He argues that the archive "will never 
be either memory or anamnesis as spontaneous, alive and internal experience" (1996: 11). Derrida points to 
the paradoxical quality of the archive as the stabilized place of memory that destroys memory itself.  The 
materialization of the past in the form of the archive must not be confused with the unstructured, 
extemporaneous experience of memory.  
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windy the day the photograph was taken.  And beyond the gloves and the car - beyond 
the image - were the buildings.  Mrs. B remembered wondering why two identical 
buildings were different shades of gray. "And that triggered - 'That's it! We went to the 
theater, and we went to a restaurant, we did this and we did that, and we had this pizza, 
and I remember I drank wine and I spilt it.'  It all came back to her."  Berry explained 
that, out of all the SenseCam images taken every thirty seconds or so, one was bound to 
be powerful.  She was describing the power of involuntary memory - how in one instant 
something could trigger a flood of memories. 
 
 Memory is not merely perspectival and intra-subjective, it is quixotic, 
idiosyncratic, and capricious.  Herein lies the logic of the SenseCam: Mrs. B's memory is 
not only beyond her occasional ability to conjure; it is beyond her ability to predict.  
Berry asserts that the "objective passive capturing" performed by the SenseCam creates 
opportunities for involuntary memories.  For example, were we to take a staged picture of 
the London Eye, or of Big Ben ("active" as opposed to "passive capture"), the chances of 
those images triggering a memory for Mrs. B are quite slim, compared to the multiple 
"here, there, and everywhere" pictures taken by the SenseCam.  Although the sheer 
number of photographs passively captured by the camera (approximately three thousand 
per day) is daunting and creates an enormous amount of noise to sift through, it is the 
very randomness of the images that allows for one of them to provoke the experience of 
memory.  In short, noise makes un-forgetting, or anamnesis, possible; an analytics or 
automated interpretation would be illegible to Mrs. B.  This use of noise takes advantage 
of the very individual and situated ways memory works.  Whereas I might remember 
  
139 
139 
someone's brightly colored socks on the train, another rememberer might not have 
noticed them.  Instead, she remembers the smear of landscape across the window, the 
map arching over the door.  And images of the landscape, or the map, are what allow her 
to recall her trip to London.  Memory is of course synesthetic rather than strictly visual, 
and even visual cues can evoke memories of sounds, smells, or textures.  The muggy 
morning smell, the cold metal armrests, the flat, distant voice of the conductor across the 
speaker could be evoked by a picture of fog, the seats, or the speaker. 
 
 Memory, like breathing, is both voluntary and involuntary, or in biomedical 
terms, controlled by the sympathetic and parasympathetic regions of the brain.  Indeed, 
memory is perhaps one of the most ineluctable of involuntary processes; while it is not 
uncommon to stop oneself from laughing, yawning, or sleeping, the past comes rushing 
in whether we want it to or not.  Though many have read involuntary memory to be 
quintessentially transcendental (a moment breaking free from its past to enter the present 
like the spirit infusing the flesh), involuntary memory is, in fact, eminently immanent.  
As Gilles Deleuze shows in his reading of Proust's À la recherche du temps perdu, 
involuntary memory is about neither identity nor resemblance but rather the confrontation 
between two moments and the incongruities that this friction produces.  Discrepancies, 
dissimilitudes, and dissemblances rather than similarities, representations, and affinities 
provide the ingredients that evoke the familiar flavor of an involuntary memory.  
"[I]nvoluntary memory [is] the analogue of a metaphor: it takes 'two different objects,' 
the madeleine with its flavor, Combray with its qualities of color and temperature; it 
envelops the one in the other, and makes their relation into something internal" (Deleuze 
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2000: 60).  An immanent notion of involuntary memory, what Deleuze citing Proust calls 
a "morsel of time in the pure state" (61), is localized in friction, situated in alterity, 
emplaced in difference. 
 
 Frictions between the past and the present are continuously being negotiated.  
Barad's notion of agential cuts offers another way of addressing these apparitions of 
difference. Whereas Deleuze's involuntary memory invokes differences brought together 
within an instant, Barad's agential cuts invoke togetherness (the fabric of time) pulled 
apart, creating a relationship, in this case between the past and the present or between the 
object of the photograph and the moment it purports to represent.  Agential cuts are 
moments of friction that both result in, and are the result of, intra-actions (rather than 
predetermined interactions).  "It is through specific agential intra-actions that the 
boundaries and properties of the 'components' of phenomena become determinate and 
that particular embodied concepts become meaningful" (Barad 2003: 815).  In her 
reading of physicist Niels Bohr’s understanding of the concepts of "position" and 
"momentum," Barad explains that these concepts are always particular to the phenomena 
at hand.  In doing so, she shows that agential cuts are also in a sense immanent: they 
occur within ontologically indeterminate phenomena, enacting "agential separability - the 
local condition of exteriority-within-phenomena" (815).  As for the SenseCam images, in 
a state of friction with the past, they create agential cuts through time that enable the 
phenomenon of remembering.  In other words, for Mrs. B, the past exists in intra-action 
with the present, through the spark of involuntary memory triggered by her SenseCam 
image. 
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The Evidence of Memory 
 
Generally speaking, if the events amnesiac patients claim to remember bear resemblance 
to the evidence in the SenseCam photographs and to their partners' narratives, then Berry 
and her team consider the patients' recollections genuine.  Based on this, they conclude 
that the SenseCam helps users remember the past.  But many other researchers, 
engineers, psychologists, and computer scientists at Microsoft and Memories for Life 
workshops and meetings have doubts as to whether Mrs. B is actually remembering when 
she reviews the images.  Berry, along with these researchers, have raised the possibility 
that Mrs. B, and other amnesiacs using a SenseCam, might be misremembering, that the 
images might be changing their memories.  But Berry admits: "Personally I get mixed up 
between memories and dreams. I can't remember what's real and what's not. And we all 
change our memories to fit [...] with our identity [...]. We all reconstruct our past, don't 
we?" Memories, like dreams, do not merely visit us while we are slumbering through our 
days and nights, respectively; rather, their intra-actions create memoryscapes and 
dreamscapes.  For Mrs. B, the past does not exist until she enters in relation with it 
through the SenseCam images, creating her presentscape within which the past occurs.  
Borrowing from Donna Haraway, Barad proposes the notion of "diffraction" rather than 
reflection. "[D]iffraction patterns illuminat[e] the indefinite nature of boundaries" (Barad 
2003: 803).  Instead of demarcating the real from its reflected image, the notion of 
diffraction might highlight the indefinite boundaries between the past and the present, 
between the SenseCam images and one's memories. 
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 But Berry is interested more in pragmatic than epistemological questions, 
emphasizing that for amnesiacs, the sense of normalcy created by the experience of 
remembering is what matters.  She compares amnesia to more visible pathologies, 
arguing that amnesiacs should be treated with no more skepticism than migraine sufferers 
who report getting relief from painkillers.  In a sense, Berry is insisting on a move toward 
what Barad has described as "performative alternatives to representationalism [that shift] 
the focus from questions of correspondence between descriptions and reality [...] to 
matters of practices/doings/actions" (2003: 802).  For Berry, the therapeutic effects of 
SenseCam images - or, more specifically, the therapeutic effects of believing that one is 
remembering - are more important: "Mrs. B tells us that SenseCam not only helps her 
memory but it makes her feel better.  [...] She’s less anxious because she's got a device to 
help her remember - because it's pretty bloody terrifying, actually, to be living in a world 
where you haven't got a memory."  Again, for Berry, it is a matter of rehabilitation.  She 
explained that her job is to help her patients achieve their goals. Mrs. B's goals are to be 
able to remember past events and to recognize her friends.  Mrs. B's husband's goals are 
to share experiences with his wife.  What Berry is concerned with is the personal 
wellbeing of her patients, as opposed to "empirical proof" of whether or not they are 
remembering accurately.  Whether Mrs. B's recollections reflect past events or not, Berry 
underscores the importance of how Mrs. B and her husband are affected in their daily 
lives by their memory-supporting device. 
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 Nonetheless, researchers at Microsoft, including Berry and her team, have been 
very enthusiastic about cognitive science research using SenseCam that would support 
their findings.  Berry grunted as she sifted through numerous e-mails on her desktop, 
looking for a specific paper that reported on a recent imaging study.  She eventually gave 
up trying to find the paper and proceeded to sum up the investigation: Berry 
acknowledged that SenseCam offers an "evidence-based way of reviewing" the past and 
that the spaced rehearsals seem to offer a way of continuously re-encoding it.  But 
researchers sought to distinguish the kind of memory that was being triggered through the 
use of the device.  Was the experience of remembering for the amnesiac an experiential 
one (what computer scientists and psychologists term episodic memory), or was it a 
factual one (what they call semantic memory) (Hodges, et al. 2006)?  In other words did 
the patient remember after viewing images of her day, or did she simply know what 
activities she had done?  The autobiographical memory with which one constructs a sense 
of subjectivity through the recollection of past events seems to differ from the functional 
memory involved in finding one’s car keys for example.  And this points to yet another 
problem, does one need to represent the actual experience in order to support its 
recollection?  By what means does data evoke the experiential?  And what kind of 
evidence is there for remembering?   
  
 To answer some of these questions, and to figure out whether Mrs. B was simply 
learning the images or genuinely remembering, the scientists turned to functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fmri).  They designed a study in which Mrs. B was asked to 
wear a SenseCam over the course of three different trips.  Each trip was a two-day stay 
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away from home to a place she had not been before, staying in a hotel overnight.  
Following the first trip, Mrs. B was asked not to look at any of the SenseCam images, and 
her husband was asked not to talk much about the event.  After the second trip, she was 
asked to review those pictures every two days over the course of two weeks.  During the 
third trip, she was asked to keep a written diary that she subsequently reviewed every day 
for two weeks.  The experimenters then scrambled all the images, adding some from a 
trip that she had not been on.  In the scanner, Mrs. B was asked to review the images and 
press a button when she recollected the event, another button when an image looked 
familiar, and another when she had no recollection whatsoever. 
 
 The results showed that the novel images, the ones that belonged to someone else, 
were completely unfamiliar to her, as were the images from her first trip.  Moreover, she 
showed much better recollection with the SenseCam images she had studied than with 
her written diary.  When the researchers looked at the scans, they found that the 
SenseCam images activated parts of the brain thought to be involved in autobiographical 
memory.  Having now collected "more objective evidence" that Mrs. B does not 
remember events unless she uses the SenseCam and studies the resulting images, Berry 
and her team felt able to make the claim: "SenseCam does support memory."  To further 
qualify this evidence, Berry explained that the parts that were activated in the brain were 
those associated with episodic memory (associated to past events), and not semantic 
memory (associated to knowing the name of the president, for example), proving that 
Mrs. B was not just "learning" the images.   
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 But, asking Mrs. B whether she recognizes her own past in images of her past 
reifies what Barad sees as the "ontological distinction between representations and that 
which they purport to represent" (2003: 804), the ontological distinctions that Wolfe's 
posthumanism proposes we move beyond.  These memory scientists' approach leads to 
concerns about the accuracy of representations, and in doing so reifies the boundaries 
from which these questions emerge.57   The fact that one proves the efficacy of image-
based SenseCam with imaging devices such as fmri is of course not only tautologically 
representational, it is part of what Regula Valérie Burri calls the "visio-technoscientific" 
regime that seeks to make bodies predictable, stable, fixed, and productive vessels of 
biomedical knowledge (2007).  SenseCam images are made to instantiate biomedical 
power through the accumulation of fmri images of remembering human brains.   
 
 
Posthumanist Assemblages 
 
[...] so here artificial memory operates by means of a creation of spaces that will be filled 
by a process of selection and retention, disjunction and replacement. [...]  for it is such a 
process of disjunction and replacement that defines the artificial or prosthetic. - David 
Wills 
 
In the previous chapter, through Bell's quest for a self-governed productive life brought 
about by devices such as the SenseCam, we have noted how certain technological 
memory practices help reproduce a liberal free-thinking humanist subject (Rose 2007).  
But these networks of machines and humans might bring us closer to what Hayles 
considers properly posthuman through a displacement 
by technoscientific articulations of [...] autonomy, free will, rationality, 
individual agency, and the identification of consciousness as the seat of 
identity. The posthuman, whether understood as a biological organism or a 
cyborg seamlessly joined with intelligent machines, is seen as a 
                                                
57 In other words, so far, we are still very representational. 
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construction that participates in distributed cognition dispersed throughout 
the body and the environment (Hayles 2005: 245). 
 
This distributed cognition Hayles describes occurs with the help of the SenseCam for 
Mrs. B, and through the use of biomedical technologies such as fmri for the scientists 
who seek to see memory at work.  But I'd venture to say that rather than displacing the 
human, Hayles' notion of posthumanism still rests on the human's ontological distinction 
from, and extension through, technology and its environment.  Instead, how might we 
approach this prosthetic distribution as a mode of intra-actively becoming, a mode that 
leaves room for immanent distinctions between the human and its environment (Barad 
2003, Luhmann 1998)?58  As Donna Haraway describes with her anticipated cyborgs, 
"any objects or persons can be reasonably thought of in terms of disassembly and 
reassembly; no 'natural' architectures constrain system design" (2000: 365).  The 
documenting cyborg represents the breaking of boundaries between self and other, or self 
and environment.  Nature becomes a synthetic domain and the prosthetic is presented 
neither as a supplement, nor as an extension of the organic human body, but rather, the 
prosthetic as human body.  
 
 By examining the case of Mrs. B, I acknowledge that prosthetic technologies are 
inexorably linked to an ontology of the normal versus the pathological.  But more 
importantly, in what may seem at first glance paradoxical, through the case of this 
amnesiac, I want to expand the perspective that we are condemned to ontological 
reversals that simply reveal the constructedness of our pathologized bodies, naturalizing 
                                                
58 As Chris Kelty once told me: "it seems that part of the implicit ethical imperative behind this work is that 
we have to care as much about the human-machine as we do about either humans or machines.  It's cyborg 
science." 
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(in utopian and enthusiastic fashion) the prosthetic in the process. 59  By thinking of 
memory as an immanent response to noise, or complexity (Luhmann 1998), I want to 
offer a formulation of the prosthetic, or of technologies of enhancement, that are not 
initially, nor markedly, grounded in the 'pathological,' but rather in the ways we conceive 
of things (our bodies and machines, the past and the present) as coming together.  This 
demands a certain rethinking of the posthuman and the prosthetic that goes beyond the 
extension of the human body (and beyond Hayles' notion of distributed cognition). 
Wolfe's work on posthumanism offers such a rethinking.  He suggests that in order to 
attend to our said humanness, we must first acknowledge that the human "is 
fundamentally a prosthetic creature that has coevolved with various forms of technicity 
and materiality, forms that are radically 'not human' and yet have nevertheless made the 
human what it is" (2010: xxv).   And as he rightly points out, this rethinking has profound 
ethical implications in how we construe our relationships with, and toward, non-humans.   
 
 To start, let us distinguish posthumanism from transhumanism, as these two 
currents are often confounded but have radically different implications.  On the one hand, 
transhumanism is a movement engaged in the augmentation of human capabilities, often 
seeking to transcend material and bodily limitations.  Or as Kelty puts it, a movement 
"that despises the present for its intolerably slow descent into the future of immortality 
and superhuman enhancement" (Kelty 2008: 93).  This enhancement is premised on the 
promise of technological advancements.  On the other hand, posthumanism remains more 
or less ambivalent toward technological gains per se as a means to utopian progress.  
                                                
59 Tarek Elhaik has offered timely and pointed provocations for rethinking the pathological in light of new 
media and experimental cinema (2008, 2011). 
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Often mistaken for posthumanism (or another meaning of posthumanism than the one I 
am getting at here), transhumanism can be seen as deriving from the industrial revolution, 
spurred by shifting relationships between humans and machines that have led both 
humans and machines to be construed as parts of larger mechanical modes of production.  
Andy Miah, researcher in the fields of ethics and emergent technologies, sees Darwin's 
"biological humanism" as also having "allowed the human to be reduced to a level of 
mechanics, a view that pervades contemporary understanding about being human" (Miah 
2007: 13).  Going further back still, Wolfe considers this mode of thought as stemming 
"directly from ideals of human perfectability, rationality, and agency inherited from 
Renaissance humanism and the Enlightenment" (Wolfe 2010: xiii).  Transhumanism 
might in this case be considered an extension of humanism.60   
 
 As they seek, through technology, to enable an all-knowing, all-remembering 
subject that transcends the realms of materiality and embodiment, several of the 
Memories for Life researchers we have discussed, such as Bell and Wilks, situate 
themselves squarely within these transhuman realms.  While Hayles' criticizes (as we 
have seen in chapter two) this abandonment of matter and the body, Wolfe's elaboration 
of posthumanism doesn't rest at nostalgia for an embodied subject.  Rather than framing 
posthumanism through questions of embodiment proper, through the work of Derrida and 
Luhmann, Wolfe emphasizes the role of difference (Derrida 1976) and information 
(Luhmann 1995, 1998) in the elaboration of a posthumanist subject.  As we have seen in 
                                                
60 For Chris Kelty, however, transhumanism "is a radically antihumanist position in which human agency 
or will - if it even exists - is not ontologically distinct from the agency of machines and animals and life 
itself" (2008: 93).  It is transhumanism's depiction of the inevitability of technological progress (despite 
humans themselves) that brings Kelty to characterize this movement as antihumanist.  
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previous chapters, information for Luhmann is the functional emergence of distinctions 
that occur in the parsing of complexity.61  In a critique of Hayles' reliance on historicity 
in the articulation of a postsomething, Wolfe refuses to situate posthumanism as 
something that simply comes after the human (2010: 121).  Instead, posthumanism 
represents a way of rethinking, both immanent and noisy, about the very distinctions 
humanism relies on.  This immanent view can be achieved when one understands that the 
distinctions between the self (observer) and the outside world (reality), or between 
humans and machines, are in fact the products of self-reference (Luhmann 1998).   
 
 Mrs. B's experience of involuntary memory can offer such a perspective.  The 
event of memory for her is the moment when the SenseCam images separate the past 
from the present. For Luhmann, events "occur only once and only in the briefest period 
necessary for their appearance (the 'spacious present')" (1995: 67 quoted in Wolfe 
2010:10).  It is the moment when things take shape.  "[I]nformation is nothing more than 
an event that brings about a connection between differences" (Luhmann 1995: 75).  This 
said, the period, or event, "has a conferred, not an ontological character" (48).  Following 
Luhmann's pull away from the question of the ontological, what I am arguing for is not a 
view that says that the past, or historical objective facts don't exist.  Rather, that they can 
only be gleaned from within the (spacious) present.  It is at the moment of the event that 
we may locate these distinctions.  In David Wills words, artificial memory opens up a 
space in which "a process of selection and retention, disjunction and replacement" takes 
                                                
61 We might argue then, à la Derrida, that we became posthuman with the invention of language; or à la 
Latour, that we have never been human. 
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place (Wills 1995: 230).  Wills locates the prosthesis precisely at that this disjuncture, 
this threshold, this event:   
 
[P]rosthesis treats of whatever arises out of that relation, and of the 
relation itself, of the sense and functioning of articulations between 
matters of two putatively distinct orders: father/son, flesh/steel, 
theory/fiction, translation/quotation, literal/figurative. familiar/academic, 
rhetoric/medicine, rhetoric/cybernetics, French/English, nature/artifice, 
public/private (Wills 1995: 10).   
 
To this list I would add humans/machines, presents/pasts, memories/images.  
 
 The relationship between posthumanism and notions of pathology or 
enhancement is, then, not about the history of technology, nor about moralizing opinions 
about how to use technology as therapy per se (although these debates are invariably 
shaped by the ways we have come to distinguish the human from animals and from non-
living entities).62  Instead, this relationship, and these technologies, bring to the fore the 
contingent ways we construct the very notions of transformation, plasticity, otherness and 
humanness.  In sum, these technical objects, and our relationships with them, point to the 
instability of what we consider natural.  It is in this sense that Wolfe argues that "persons 
aren't persons" (2010: 119).  Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, once a member of the 
United States President's Council on Bioethics, argues that changes in what we consider 
human nature will invariably "change democracy and the nature of politics itself" (2002: 
7).  He subsequently argues for a more stable concept of the human (a concept that 
posthumanism in fact threatens).  Instead of questioning the distinctions that the very 
notions of enhancement are based on, Fukuyama's "use of the word posthumanism is 
                                                
62 Fukuyama (2002), Graham (2002), Miah (2007) and Stock (2002) have addressed more directly, in more 
detail, and along different respective lines, policy questions relating to bioethics and human enhancement. 
  
151 
151 
expected to do the work of establishing what is immoral about human enhancement" 
(Miah 2007: 5).  But posthumanism is interesting for what it has to offer 
methodologically, not morally.  I'd like to argue that a destabilization of what we 
consider "human nature" is precisely what needs to occur.  In other words, the interesting 
questions aren't so much whether recording technologies allow for more objective and 
enhanced views of ourselves, of our memories or of the past, nor whether they will help 
us achieve immortality, nor whether these are good or bad occurrences.  Of interest is 
how these technologies help us see prosthesis, or in Luhmann's terms, conferred, 
functional and immanent distinctions, to begin with.  And as Faubion points out, it is  
 
anthropologically imperative and in good accord with Foucault's precedent 
not to conceive of the subject position within a mechanical model whose 
variables are finite and definite and whose systematic transformations are 
strictly determinable [... Foucault] rather gives a privileged place to 
change, and especially to change generated through processes of 
problematization, of putting into question the taken for granted, including 
what the subject might unreflectively take for granted about itself (2011: 
45, 46).   
 
Again, as we have noted in the previous chapter, Foucault's elaboration of Greek 
technologies of the self can be seen as a form of "self-intervention, of autopoiesis, of the 
self's production of itself."  As such, he brings forth a "'practice-oriented' nature of 
ancient ethics" (Faubion 2011: 48).  Despite the fact that "the coding of ethical value does 
not license the reduction of the ethical subject to its or her or his practice [... or] to the 
circumstances of [a value's] use," we might do well to look less at whether these 
technologies mirror the past, and focus more on the problematization of what they 
actually do, on their operational value (in relation to complexity), as Berry seems to be 
getting at (we will focus more on the implications of such a shift in the following 
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concluding chapter) (Faubion 2011: 103).  By focusing on what these tools do, Berry and 
her team come closer to creating memories for life, rather than memories of life.63 
 
The Experience of Memory 
 
 I want to end this chapter by asking what it would mean to move beyond 
discussions about having a memory (memory as ontology) to discussions about 
experiencing memory (memory as practice, or memory as an event)?  In 2006, a 
psychology professor at Rice told me that without the use of medical imaging, his 
research was not deemed scientific or publishable.  Regrettably, he explained, he did not 
view imaging as a proof-producing apparatus.  He considered it a metaphor.  "Other 
researchers see memory as a box and you shove things into it.  I don't even conceptualize 
where it is.  It's a state of mind," he announced.  For him, memory was about experience 
rather than a place in the brain.  He then reminded me that if he took my heart out, my 
memory would stop as well.   
 
                                                
63 Nietzsche, in a pull away from the modernist predicaments that allow an inner self to be externalized and 
objectified, situates the person as a tabla raza to be constructed using building blocks of memory.  Thus, he 
warns against the uses and abuses of history and memory in the shaping of man.  In a near glorification of 
amnesia, Nietzsche puts forth the idea of history for life which would replace the assumption that one can 
know the past scientifically and objectively and from it draw laws for life.  Rather, (and perhaps too 
eagerly), he prefers the “unhistorical” in order to accommodate the plasticity of man in the service of life.  
History must be at the service of life “and only if history can endure to be transformed into a work of art 
will it perhaps be able to preserve instincts if even evoke them [...]” (1997: 96).  With a will to power, to 
become a creator, Nietzsche assigns man the power to ascribe meaning to the past in the present.  That is to 
say that the self is created by ascribing a timeless quality to past events, as though they were to recur 
eternally.  Nietzsche’s famous notion of eternal return discussed in several of his texts concerns the 
rejection of a chronological view on life for one in which past, present and future collapse into a single 
eternal moment.  For Nietzsche, this perhaps paralyzing idea becomes acceptable in the rejection of 
certainty and absolute knowledge.  For Nietzsche, the idea of a self, unified, by memory and history, is 
abandoned in favor of a de-centered self who actively forgets and rebuilds himself. 
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 Rather than approach Memories for Life technologies - from MyLifeBits 
software, to SenseCams, to fmris - as determined inscription devices, we might consider 
them as what Barad terms apparatuses: "neither natural probes of the natural world nor 
structures that deterministically impose some particular outcome" (2003: 816).  As part of 
an "apparatus of observation," memory remains flexible in its becoming (815).  A 
memory enacted, or memory as event, is then no longer seen as a discreet whole but 
rather as constantly shifting in its boundaries.  It rests upon a notion of emergence or 
event (and here I include the emergence of temporality) that is ongoing and immanent.  
Once more, as with Proust's madeleine, memory is synesthetic, involving an intertwining 
of visual, aural, haptic, and even olfactory senses in measurement and treatment.  It is 
part of a cyborg body, wherein the boundary between flesh, technology, and time is 
permeable. 
 
 As we have just seen, researchers who make up the Memories for Life network 
are working on different projects ranging from Total Recall, to historical archiving of 
first-person accounts, to helping amnesiacs share meaningful moments with their loved 
ones.  All of these projects share a common premise: that memory is fallible and that it 
can and should be improved by the help of technology.  Although some of these projects 
clearly stand in excess of what technology can currently do, they offer a technological 
cure for forgetting on both individual and social scales.  In attending to our finitude, new 
memory technologies offer the dream of immortality.  In attending to our goals of 
hyperproductivity, they offer "personal time-consultants."  Finally, in attending to our 
inability to recognize places and faces, they offer gps tracking devices and SenseCams.  
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But in doing so, these recording technologies create a new symptom for scientists to cure, 
that is, the accumulation of too much information.  This resulting problem of noise, 
however, is experienced differently depending on the various ways that memory is 
enacted.  Separating the knower from the known, Bell's e-memory seeks to organize time 
as searchable and retrievable matter.  For Mrs. B, however, the overwhelming amounts of 
collected information in the form of images insure that, amid the noise, something 
unexpected and unpredictable is bound to spark recollection.  Noise, then, the logical 
conclusion of unregulated growth in information, is both the symptom and the cure for 
anxieties about losing the past.   
 
 Through Mrs. B's experience of involuntary memory, we can begin to articulate 
an account of remembering that does not take for granted transcendental access to matters 
of the past.  This does not mean there is no possibility for objective remembrance but 
simply that exteriority can only exist within phenomena.  While Bell's Total Recall 
project suggests that the past is out there, as a given, ready to be recorded, sorted, and 
subsequently tapped into whenever the need arises, Mrs. B's experience suggests that the 
past is always only within the present.  In philosopher David Hoy's words: "If voluntary 
memory breaks the past and the present into separate domains, involuntary memory 
shows their more primordial immanence" (2009: 192).  The experience of memory is not 
so much a bringing of the past into the present as "the making of spacetime itself" (Barad 
2003: 817).  Ultimately, then, Memories for Life scientists can still account for the 
objectivity of the data produced by their prototypical apparatuses such as the SenseCam, 
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while creating unpredictable agential cuts through which memory comes to exist 
materiodiscursively in the present. 
  
 So, instead of asking whether or not these technologies mirror reality or the past, I 
prefer to ask how they act, what they do, and whom they speak for.  Memory 
technologies do not merely belong to the world of objects and representations.  They are 
open to, and participate in, the distinction of concepts and affects while proposing new 
forms of temporality.  I would like, then, to propose a shift from a representationalist 
argument about the bifurcation of nature (in this case, the objective reality of the ticking 
past and our subjective recollection of it) to a consideration of the ecologies of evidences 
we build and how they perform specific cuts through time (Barad 2033; Stengers 2010). 
We will examine in the next concluding chapter how instead of building tools with the 
purpose of reifying our existing concepts of subjectivity and temporality, we might let go 
of the problem of memory altogether.  We will see how the distinctions objects create 
bring forth questions of emergence, contingency and creativity.  We might also consider 
our own performative practices of writing as creating agential cuts, in this case, between 
two extreme temporalities, or modes of remembering and forgetting: Total Recall and 
complete amnesia. 
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5- Conclusions - Prototypes and Parasites: 
 
In guise of a conclusion, this last chapter draws on the tropes of the prototype and the 
parasite in order to think with Memories for Life's emergent recording technologies. 
Parasites, as philosopher Michel Serres reminds us, disturb systems (Serres 2007, Wolfe 
2007).  They create noise.  As parasites, prototypical recording technologies disturb our 
concepts of memory and forgetting.  Rather than merely representing the past, these 
technologies also help shape our present and future.  As such, they are performative 
rather than just representational or constative.  They help create subjects along with new 
concepts and temporalities.  Beyond their purely useful, or instrumental qualities, 
prototypical and parasitical technologies become tools to think with.  They help create 
what Marcus has termed para-sites: spaces "where anthropologists and their interlocutors 
come together to discuss matters of common concern"  (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010).  
They are spaces in which to perform horizontal collaborations in a transforming world 
(Marcus 2000).  In a sense, parasites (disturbers of systems) help produce para-sites 
(places in which to reflect on the possible disturbances that occur within these systems).  
Seen in this light, this dissertation, in its attempt to evoke, depict and reconfigure old 
concepts might be considered a kind of parasitical prototype, a working tool to think 
with, to test ideas, and to generate new para-sites. 
 
On the Uses and Ab-uses of Technologies for Memory 
It's just we wanted, we needed something for the deployment which would kind of work 
in a general way. [...] So there were problems with it, it's not a kind of definitive answer, 
but it certainly found its uses. - Microsoft researcher  
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As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, since the 1980s, the field of design has 
placed a great deal of importance on the development of its user-centered approaches.  
Anthropologists, armed with their prized and precious fieldwork methods, have since 
become cherished additions to many design research teams.  Fast moving engineers 
engage with the slow pace of anthropology so as to justify and make sense of their 
designs.  With the help of Anthropology, they hope to gain insight into how to make 
more functional, useable, user-friendly objects, interfaces and spaces.  It is in this context 
of coveted knowledge about the user that I, as a representative of the ethnographic trade, 
find myself with teams of computer scientists, engineers, designers, and psychologists.  
And as we have seen, throughout this dissertation I focus on research and design groups 
based in the UK.  These interdisciplinary scientists come together as part of a nationally 
funded research project called Memories for Life.  As part of this initiative, these 
researchers look to build better tools for human remembering (cameras, sound recorders, 
furry robots, and operating systems).  I approach them because I want to know more 
about the makers of such memory tools.  I want to unpack what happens when we come 
to realize that objects do not fall from the sky.  They approach me because I can help 
them decipher the ubiquitous user. 
 
 While user-centered design has its many merits, over the course of fieldwork I 
began to wonder what would happen if we were to stray from this conventional notion of 
use.  Would anthropology lose relevance?  Has anthropology, embraced by user-centered 
design, become too timid to suggest anything other than use as a primary design concern?  
Or, that may be the wrong way of wording the question.  What if the word use could be 
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made to mean more than a certain mode of employment or habit?  Its etymology also 
suggests new ways of using use: use as practice, use as performance rather than 
instrumentality.  What follows is an attempt to find another way of talking about design 
and anthropology's useful attraction to each other.  This chapter and dissertation end in a 
rough sketch that has come out of this thinking about use value.  What I start to outline in 
conclusion to this conclusion is a certain refusal to conclude or to settle on our objects 
and concepts.  This refusal comes in the shape of a prototype for a manifesto, an attempt 
to stray to the edges of usefulness, to step away from our usual task of being nuanced in 
order to adopt a more extreme position, because sometimes anthropology's job is to ask 
questions, to stir habits, to provoke. 
 
** 
 
 As this dissertation has shown, we record and build objects to better know 
ourselves, and to make better use of our time and space, which we then fill with 
recordings, communications, and more objects.  We design computing machines to make 
us more efficient.  We connect them to a grid of standardized time in order to transmit 
our codes and move our bodies across vast distances.  
 
 This desire to better know ourselves is nothing new, as we have seen in the first 
chapter with the large-scale UK documentary endeavor the Mass-Observation Project that 
took place between 1937-1950.  But as we have also noted by examining philosopher 
Walter Benjamin's Arcades Project, collecting comes with the problems of sorting and of 
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making sense of the things amassed.   Held in constant tension between its identity as a 
work of art and a work of science, between its surrealist roots and statistical demise, the 
Mass-Observation Project, as well as the Arcades Project, sat at the intersection of poetry 
and pattern.  The critiques of both these project we've examined, either on the part of 
philosopher Theodor Adorno toward Benjamin's "archive fever," or especially on the part 
of anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski toward Mass-Observation, raise important 
questions as to how to situate one's self as observer and collector of everyday life.  Here 
Luhmann with his cybernetic modes of observation begins to provide angles (informatic 
filters if you will) though which to begin to sort the overwhelming complexity we are 
faced with when capturing the infinitely particular.   
 
 By looking at the history of cybernetics and computing in chapter two, we have 
charted the formalization of matter and meaning into pure information, and how, over the 
course of particular historical moments, the past has become something to be turned into 
digital 0s and 1s.  Through various Memories for Life projects, we have noted how 
everything around us is getting 'faster and smarter.'  We couple with machines in the 
hopes of finding patterns, diagnoses, cures.  We record everything our machines sense, 
lest any important clues fall outside of the archive, into an abyss of forgetfulness, or 
complete obliteration.  We build nets to catch it all, all the information that can be kept, 
just in case: we trap sounds, distances traversed, books written and read, money spent, 
calories ingested, sentimental Kodak moments with loved ones, for later... always for 
later.  
 
  
160 
160 
 Gordon Bell from Microsoft captures everything he owns, everything sees, hears 
and says.  We have discussed in more detail in chapter three Bell's ambition to spur the e-
memory revolution using tools such as Microsoft Research's SenseCam, the wearable 
badge-sized camera equipped with light, temperature, and position sensors.  Based on the 
sensors, this prototype determines when to take a picture and record information.  This 
prototype has generated a tremendous buzz; capturing the public's imagination as the 
penultimate tool to seamlessly and ubiquitously (one doesn’t even have to push a button 
to take a picture) upgrade our often dubious memories. Never forget a place or face 
again!  
 
Memories for Life: A Future Commercial 
When your wetware wears out,  
or your Oliver Sacksed in an accident, 
it won’t be the end of the game. 
You’ll reload this blackboxed prosthetic memory, 
restore everything as far as your last saved brain. 
- AF Harold (bbc4 – Oct 04, 2007) 
 
 The SenseCam is also being used (among other things) to help people with memory 
loss such as Alzheimer's or amnesia.  Chapter four focused on this other SenseCam user, 
Mrs B., an amnesiac who forgets events after about two days.  While Bell from Microsoft 
is not an amnesiac, nor has Alzheimer's, both he and Mrs. B. share the desire for a better, 
more perfect memory.  By logging every moment of their different lives with the 
SenseCam, they both hope to be more efficient people.  Bell wants a flawless memory so 
that he can be a healthier more productive human being.  He also hopes that his archive 
will become a sort of treasure chest for his children and grandchildren to sift through.  As 
for Mrs. B, she simply wants to be able to share memories of past events that she can no 
longer recall with her loved ones.  Through Foucault's work on technologies of the self, 
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Luhmann's emphasis on information as necessary functional distinctions that help us deal 
with complexity, Faubion's attention to the ethics of subject formation, as well as Wolfe's 
elaboration of posthumanism as a mode of thought, the case studies of Bell and Mrs. B 
have allowed us to reflect on problems of identity, temporality, clutter and noise.  More 
importantly however, these thinkers and these technological prototypes have helped us 
consider how concepts such as these are never still. 
 
 Of interest here, is not to engage with the promise of perfect memory or of the 
possibility of storing our "selves," but to examine the ways prototypes embody ideas and 
hopes; and how they in turn debunk, complicate or reinforce those very ideas.  In doing 
so, they often act as catalysts for fresh ones.  There is an iterative quality to the prototype 
that implies intrinsic plasticity and rapid exchange between the world of concepts and the 
world of things, a rhythmic and temporal flux that separates it from mass-produced 
artifacts.  Prototypes are tools to think with.  They are particular and telling objects in that 
they represent at once the idealization of what is to be built as well as the rudimentary, 
necessarily incomplete experimental processes in which such building occurs.  How 
might prototypes help us apprehend ways of knowing through making?  Might crafting 
itself become a means for reflection, a way to elaborate further social, epistemological, 
and ethical issues?  To address these questions, we turn to apparent design failures.  We 
examine studies that involve lending the SenseCam to everyday users (ie: people who 
aren't necessarily inclined to pursue an e-memory revolution, nor that require the use of 
tools to remember their immediate past); and we look at the example of another 
Microsoft prototype that also specializes in storing the past.   
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Figure 2 
Images taken by Lina Dib using Microsoft’s SenseCam. 
 
 As we have seen with the case of Mrs. B (chapter four), in several studies, 
Microsoft has shown that reviewing SenseCam pictures does help support patients with 
memory loss (Hodge et al. 2006).   Yet, these memory-producing prototypes display 
certain conceptual contradictions.  The term prototype connotes speculation and the 
future; prototype as prelude, as anthropologist Marilyn Strathern suggests (2010: 16).  
But these up-and-coming objects specialize in generating a retrievable past.  They are in a 
sense constructing the archeology of the future.  The irony however comes with the 
problem of organizing and contextualizing the innumerable images captured by the 
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device.  Faced with so much information, one wonders whether it would be less tedious 
to simply forget. 
 
 Since my participation in test uses of the SenseCam, I have never looked at my 
pictures in order to remember something I did or ate in the past (note: I'm not clinically 
amnesiac).  However, I have enjoyed the aesthetic serial qualities of sequencing the 
images, and have occasionally indulged in revisiting random days from my past.  The 
astounding volume of photographs makes it virtually impossible to predict which 
historical moment I will stumble upon.  It feels like a little surprise every time I click on a 
file.   
 
 While the researchers behind the SenseCam conduct ethnographic studies, 
psychological questionnaires, and magnetic resonance imaging to claim that capturing 
thousands of images a day does indeed improve one's memory, I want to propose using 
ethnographic tactics to unearth other potential uses of such devices, uses that might stray 
from their initial design as prosthetic memory tools:  
 
To start, let us play with this concept of use, or is it about intention? 
Let us bring anthropology to design as a mode of attunement, a kind of listening and 
toying, rather than an instrumentalist justification (Nancy 2007; Stewart 2007).  To be 
clear, I am not arguing for a pure return to form.  What I want to emphasize is the 
generative, productive ambiguity of the object.   It is useful to quote Baudrillard: 
 
Functional perfection exercises a cold seduction, the functional 
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satisfaction of a demonstration and an algebra. It has nothing to do with 
pleasure, with beauty (or horror), whose nature is conversely to rescue us 
from the demands of rationality and plunge us once more into an absolute 
childhood (not into an ideal transparency, but into the illegible 
ambivalence of desire) (1981, 188-189). 
 
We are going adrift - for a moment allow us to dérive... Let us go back to the object 
before it became an object.  Let us go further back than its justification in perfect memory.  
Let us pause at a prototypical moment where, just then and there, it could have been 
otherwise.  Let us sit in the place of noise, where design is never still, where it can always 
be otherwise.  Street signs that borrow from Jonathan Olivares’ “Useless” exhibition 
chapters punctuate this noisy place (2011).  They read: "Useless by Design" and "Useless 
is Up to the User."  We find these street signs useful. It is at the intersection of "Useless 
by Design" and "Useless is Up to the User" - between design's intentions and design's 
appropriations - that the makers of the SenseCam teamed up with a professor of 
sociology from Manchester and the BBC Wales.  These researchers decided to give the 
camera to ordinary (and not especially forgetful) users.   
 
 For a moment, a rich one in the research process, designers stepped beyond 
SenseCam's intended objective of providing a more functional human with a more perfect 
memory.  Instead of naming the object a 'recollection tool' and testing for its efficiency, 
these designers took a more performative and playful approach.  They left possibilities 
open for the SenseCam to enact other things than total recall and found that their device 
could be one that spurred creativity and made the familiar strange and poetic.  Through 
the SenseCam images, people told stories about how they noticed their own lives and the 
world around them in ways they hadn't before.  The designers took note of "how 
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conceptual frameworks and technological shifts can alter a perceived trajectory of some 
new device or set of devices [...] in new and exciting ways" (Harper et al. 2008).  In fact, 
instead of creating digital traces that were analogous to users' memories,  
 
SenseCam data presented a picture of daily lives which was at once 
different to the one recollected by participants and yet brought a sense of 
wonder, depth and felt-life that was strangely enriching; furthermore, 
SenseCam data enabled participants to create artistic and evocative stories 
about prosaic activities that would not normally merit being recounted" 
(Harper et al. 2008).  
 
Some even did so in non-linear ways, re-mixing images of the past based on aesthetics 
and story-lines rather than on the past "as it had occurred."  Like a Surrealist practice of 
"tapping into the unrealized possibilities harboured by [...] ordinary life [...]" the familiar 
became strange and the mundane whimsical when framed behind the fish-eye lens of the 
camera (Sheringham 2006: 66).  Others even tried tying the unit to a dog, and discovered 
the possibilities of seeing the world in new ways.  The act of recording became 
"performative rather than merely constative" (82).  Instead of attending to a preexisting 
cognitive framework where memory is stuff (or pictures) contained in the head (or 
laptop) and where more is always more, forgetting about memory as a driving concept, or 
design goal, helped SenseCam designers move from purely instrumentalist to more poetic 
and inventive approaches.  When objects stray from their intended use, they become tools 
to think with rather than containers for pre-existing concepts.  As Sherry Turkle puts it in 
her edited volume Evocative Objects, things can become "provocations to thought"(2007: 
5). 
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 Drawing on the analogy of a box filled with mementos, stored under the bed, or in 
the attic, Microsoft Research has also developed and tested a prototype they termed the 
Family Archive.  The archive as a unit looked like a small wooden desk and consisted of 
an interactive touch interface, which was part screen, part scanner, and part digital 
storage for the scanned images.  Using the family archive, test users could upload 
pictures and scan images of objects around their home for later retrieval.  The system was 
intended to act as a practical tool to organize and archive family memories in a digital 
age.  However, test users did not use the archive for organizing their photos into neat 
little digital boxes.  They found the modes of ordering that the device offered were messy 
and hard to work with.  But as French philosopher Michel Serres reminds us, "systems 
work because they do not work.  Nonfunctioning remains essential for functioning" 
(2007: 79).  Instead they played with it as an interactive tabletop for scrapbooking and 
storytelling, cutting, pasting and compositing images.   
 
 A function of these prototypes is to allow a kind of dérive (drifting) as encouraged 
by the Situationists.  In the mid twentieth century, the Situationists International, an 
influential group of artists, thinkers and activists, promoted the deliberate construction of 
what they called a moment of life in which one might allow oneself to go off track, to 
"[...] drop their usual motives for movement and action, their relations, their work and 
leisure activities, and let themselves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the 
encounters they find there" (Debord 1996: 22).  As such - and following Cary Wolfe's 
reading of the word "abuse", where "ab" signifies "away" - prototypes are technologies 
that can be readily "ab-used" not in the pejorative sense of mistreated, but treated rather 
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as vectors that move "away-from," tangential to, their preconceived outcomes (Wolfe 
2007, xx).  
 
 What the makers of both the SenseCam and the Family Archive discovered 
through test uses was that they were supporting more than mere collection and 
recollection.  They discovered that while they might be addressing practices in certain 
contexts (recording practices in contexts of forgetting), those same practices could also 
be generative of new contexts (recording practices in contexts of play and creativity).  
Their detailed field studies revealed that they had created instruments that touched on the 
generational obligations of organizing the past, the desire to store things out of sight, the 
possibilities for making art, for telling stories, and for surprising oneself and others.  
Although built with a specific purpose in mind - supporting memory and providing a 
solution to the problem of forgetting - these prototypes' were nonetheless imbued with 
possibilities.  Untethered from their original function, prototypes are more like 
receptacles for potentialities than resolute objects in the world.  When treated as 
receptacles, they foster innovation, imagination and creativity. To quote Serres: 
"Inventive thinking is unstable, it is undetermined, it is undifferentiated, it is as little 
singular in its function as is our hand" (1995: 34).  Like Serres' hand, prototypes have the 
opportunity to become what they grasp.  Thus the promise of the prototype is not so 
much that it does what it was built to do, but rather that it breaks free of its intended 
function while fostering a conjectural quality and embracing multiple futures. 
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 One could liken prototypes to pesky parasites, in that they derange systems, they 
bring on noise.  The parasite, the arrival of the third, disrupts organized dichotomies (in 
this case remembering and forgetting).  And, beyond immaterial ideas, but shy of being 
finished products, these objects in becoming create productive para-sites for unleashing 
devices from intended results.  Para-sites, as George Marcus describes them, are spaces 
of hyperaware horizontal collaborations in a transforming world (2000).  The difference 
between parasites and para-sites is a productive and performative one.  In a sense, 
parasites - disturbers of the system - help produce para-sites - places in which to reflect 
on the possible disturbances that occur within the system.  Seen in this light, this 
dissertation in its attempt to evoke, depict and reconfigure old concepts might be 
considered a kind of parasitical prototype, a working tool to think with, to test ideas, and 
to generate new para-sites.  
 
 In 2010 the SenseCam can be said to have gone from prototype to product. 
Production rights have been purchased by Vicon, a company specializing in motion 
capture.64  At 500£ each, they cater to academic and research markets.  Vicon and 
Microsoft now host an annual SenseCam conference that brings together research on its 
applications.  In doing so, they might be embracing what Jimenez and Estalell refer to as 
a "prototyping culture [...] where the experimental [...] shifts from knowledge-site to 
social process."65  They might be creating a more 'seamful' approach to their designs, 
                                                
64 https://www.viconrevue.com/home.html 
65 In 2010 Christopher Kelty invited me to participate in a publication entitled Prototyping Prototyping in 
which many of these ideas were initially fleshed out.  Unusually, this publication was designed to precede a 
conference in Madrid entitled Prototyping Cultures: Social Experimentation, Do-It-Yourself Science and 
Beta-Knowledge, organized by Alberto Corsín Jiménez & Adolfo Estalell and the Spanish National 
Research Council. 
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encouraging others to engage the device, propose modifications, and proactively spur on 
its evolution (Chalmers and MacColl 2003).66  To adopt Serres' term prototypes are kinds 
of "quasi-objects," and iteration is key.  With SenseCams being continually appropriated 
for reasons ranging from the construction of reliable, viewable histories for amnesiacs, to 
the creation of poetic visual narratives, the users may be taking a leading role in 
elaborating their eventual incarnations. 
  
Prototype for a Manifesto 
 
 As "provocations to thought," and based on the discussion above, I will end this 
dissertation with ten design principles that I find useful in order to continuously and 
productively stray from use itself, that is to say that these are principles meant to stop us 
from stuffing things with preconceived concepts and outcomes, to instead let things fill us 
with new forms of life and thinking: 
 
• Design to provoke rather than to illustrate thought.  
Do not design something "useable for an interpretative framework already 
established" (Highmore 2011: 167).  In other words, instead of a design grounded in 
given practices of consumption, design to accommodate new practices.  
• Embrace objects not as things of your own making but as things that also make 
you. 
                                                
66 Nerea Calvillo states it clearly: "P is often referred to as a singular and first item. But as everything 
comes out of a context and is an interpretation of previous elements, a P could be understood in plural, as a 
collection of tests, as a research process, and whose goal is not the production of an object but the 
production of knowledge" (2010: 38). 
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Design as a mode of detournement, a reorientation away from function. 
Drift, drift and drift some more.  Follow the Situationists and promote the deliberate 
construction of a moment of life in which you might go off track, "[...] drop [your] 
usual motives for movement and action, [your] relations, [your] work and leisure 
activities, and let [your]selves be drawn by the attractions of the terrain and the 
encounters [you] find there" (Debord 1996: 22)  
• Be artful.  
Adopt a skateboarder's gaze and turn ramps, surfaces, railings and bumps in the road 
into challenging and enchanting obstacles on which to perform. 
Instead of justifying new objects with old habits, create news ways of looking.  When 
Duchamp imported his objects into the art world, he blurred the boundaries between 
useful things and art, between everyday things and concepts, between things in one 
context and things in another. It is at this blurry junction that designers must make. 
• Be suspicious of neutrality and expertise. 
Be ware of sticky habits and concepts.  
Never stick to design principles. 
"[O]bjects are active life presences" (Turkle 2007: 9 emphasis in original).  As such, 
they should shift as contexts shift.  Even rocks shift.  So too must design! 
• T(h)inker with objects in processual ways.  
Mine the everyday for moving rocks and build bridges with them. 
Like Levi-Strauss' bricoleur, arrange and re-arrange different contexts for use.  As he 
reminds us, objects are both goods and good to think with (Turkle 2007). 
• Be critical, playful, open-ended, multilayered and ambiguous. 
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Embrace John Cage's 'purposeless play' and Surrealisms renewal of seeing. 
Don't make excuses. Just make. 
Let the user break the object and remake it otherwise.  Always look for how it can be 
otherwise. 
• Design for appropriation and seamfulness  
Seams bring to the fore edges and gaps, but also overlays and connections between 
users and designs, and between purposes and unintended outcomes (Chalmers and 
MacColl 2003).  Objects and their uses come into being through what Barad terms 
intra-actions. "Boundaries do not sit still," she writes. "It is through specific intra-
actions that a differential sense of being is enacted in the ongoing ebb and flow of 
agency" (2003: 817). 
• Embrace prototypes as unfinished quasi-objects whose boundaries are never still. 
Untethered from their original function, prototypes are more like receptacles for 
potentialities than resolute objects in the world.  When treated as receptacles, they 
foster innovation, imagination and creativity. "Inventive thinking is unstable, it is 
undetermined, it is undifferentiated, it is as little singular in its function as is our 
hand" (Serres 1995: 34).  Like Serres’ hand, prototypes have the opportunity to 
become what they grasp.  Thus the promise of the prototype is not so much that it 
does what it was built to do, but rather that it breaks free of its intended function 
while fostering a conjectural quality and embracing multiple futures. 
• Objects should be readily "ab-used"  
- not in the pejorative sense of mistreated, but following Cary Wolfe's reading of the 
word "abuse," where "ab" signifies "away," treated rather as vectors that move 
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"away-from," tangential to, their preconceived outcomes (2010: xx) .  
• Embrace DIY and hacker culture. 
Applaud the user who put a SenseCam on his dog or on a kite, just to see what would 
happen.  He saw the world in a new light. 
From now on, the user will also be known as the maker. 
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